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ABSTRACT

Bearing Il/liberal Secondary Witness: Un/disciplined Pedagogies of Response to
Testimonial Narratives
by
Queenie Sukhadia

Advisor: Kandice Chuh
This dissertation is preoccupied with secondary witnessing—the process of readerly
subjects receiving and responding to testimonial accounts of state-sponsored torture and
genocide that they themselves have not experienced firsthand. It examines how certain secondary
witnessing postures and practices have been made commonsense for readers—public readerly
subjectivities as well as professionalized ones such as literary critics—by liberal discourses,
technologies, and institutions, while others have been rendered imperceptible by being
represented as too delayed, too quixotic, or too unfeasible. My dissertation understands
‘liberalism’ as a tripartite entity: first, the onto-epistemologies inaugurated and normalized by
the Enlightenment, that also authorized the violent processes of colonialism, imperialism, and
racial capitalism; second, the chronotrope of ‘late liberalism’—a mode of governance that
emerged in the wake of, and responded to, the legitimacy crisis posed by anticolonial and other
social justice movements by accommodating and defusing the radical potential of difference;
third, it also encompasses neoliberalism, as a form of biopower that differentially distributes
vulnerability and protection to populations based on their alignment, or lack thereof, with market
thinking. My project thus attends to the discursive and material harms that these commonsense
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liberal secondary witnessing attitudes and praxes disburse, taking as its exigency the fact that
since the means to liberation themselves have been enlisted for the ends of power-amplification,
the paths to more emancipatory futures need to be dreamed anew.
My dissertation excavates the secondary witnessing possibilities represented as nonviable
by hegemonic liberal infrastructures—‘illiberal’ secondary witnessing alternatives—by reading a
global archive of twentieth and twenty-first century testimonial narratives attesting to statesponsored torture and genocide. The textual archive this project curates and works through,
toward the aforementioned ends, spans Guantánamo detainee Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s memoir,
Guantánamo Diary, Syrian writer Mustafa Khalifa’s semi-autobiographical novel, The Shell,
Salvadoran writer Horacio Castellanos Moya’s testimonial novel, Senselessness, Guatemalan
Mayan peasant woman’s eponymous testimonio, I, Rigoberta Menchú, Egyptian feminist writer
Nawal el Sa’adawi’s prison memoir, Memoirs from the Women’s Prison, and Boubacar Boris
Diop’s novel about the Rwandan genocide, Murambi. My project holds that these testimonial
narratives make illiberal secondary witnessing alternatives legible through metaphoric
pedagogies. While the term ‘pedagogies’ clarifies my project’s critical relationship to these
testimonial texts—of following their lead and illuminating the non-normative secondary
witnessing praxes that they instruct readerly subjects in, the adjective ‘metaphoric’ seeks to
highlight the figurative form in which these illiberal secondary witnessing possibilities take
shape across these testimonial accounts: the analogies, similes, and metaphors, sometimes
implicit and at other times explicit, through which they are articulated. I organize this
dissertation through an unpacking of three metaphoric constructions, embedded in these
testimonial narratives, to explore the illiberal secondary witnessing onto-epistemologies and
practices that they gesture toward.
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PROLOGUE

I remember my cheeks being flushed, my palms clammy, on that chilly winter evening as
I sat before the blank Word document open before me. My body was urging me to attend to what
kept creeping in at the edges of my stream of thought, and yet every time the discomfort
surfaced, I did the exact opposite—I tried to push it deep, deep down again, silencing its pleas
for attention. But then, I’d glance at the book on my desk—Mustafa Khalifa’s The Shell—and
the blue Post-It flags peeking out at me from between its pages. And I would again shift around
in my seat, ill at ease.
As I read through the novel for a human rights seminar, I found myself marking the
metaphors of animalization and objectification—where detainees, subjected to brutal torture,
rendered their pain and humiliation tangible by comparing themselves to animals and objects (‘I
was treated as if I were an animal or an insensate object’)—that seemed to surface over and over
again across The Shell’s pages. This was not the topic I had originally chosen to focus my
seminar paper on, but soon enough, I was flagging the pages with blue Post-Its nonetheless—just
in case, just in case I decided to write about these metaphors after all, metaphors that seemed to
recur constantly, even across the other testimonial narratives I had been reading that semester.
But what would I say about these moments? That testifiers leverage these metaphors to urge
readers to work to return their deprived humanity to them? That seemed to be as obvious an
explanation as it was paltry. There seemed to be more going on, but somehow, in the moment,
that seemed to be the only plausible explanation I could come up with. Of course the detainees
were comparing themselves to animals and objects to elicit a readerly pathos for how brutally
their humanity had been snatched from them. That was all. Right?
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But, even so, I couldn’t quell the niggling thought: is that all that these metaphors of
animalization and objectification are doing? Are they only just a bid for the detainee-testifiers’
re-humanization? Does that mean that if a detainee is perceived to be sufficiently animal- or
object-like—as lacking humanity, based on the arbitrary criteria used to distinguish humans from
animals and matter to begin with—that they can be tortured, no problem? Moreover, why is
perceiving a human as non-human animal or matter so deplorable, in the first place?
These were questions that I wanted to think through further. What happens if the
conversion of human into animal/object doesn’t motivate a rescue response? What shifts if we,
as readers, sit with the possibility that the human is always also animal/object? Can readers
respond to these testimonial accounts in restorative ways without consigning other life/non-life
forms to sanctioned physical and discursive harm? But asking these questions felt blasphemous. I
found myself being appalled at the idea of proposing that the conversion of ‘human’ detainees
into ‘animal’ or ‘object’ mustn’t prompt immediate outrage. I felt stupid for pursuing this line of
thought, for reading into a metaphor whose intent seemed so transparent, so commonsense. I also
felt morally neglectful; in even considering that we collectively hit pause on our instinctive
attempts at re-humanization to think through its discursive implications and the permissions it
implicitly grants, I worried that I was instrumentalizing—even enabling the perpetuation of—
human suffering in favor of a seemingly idle intellectual exercise. I felt irresponsible.
As I stared at my computer screen that evening, I again steeled my resolve to write my
seminar paper on an entirely different topic—something, quite frankly anything, that didn’t
provoke such a strong, visceral discomfort in me. But those blue Post-Its wouldn’t let me turn
away from them. As I thumbed through The Shell again, desperately trying to find textual
anchors for a different line of inquiry I might pursue instead, I remembered my professor (and
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now dissertation advisor) Kandice’s words. She would frequently urge us, her students, to attend
to and scratch our intellectual itches; she’d say, “when it feels like you aren’t allowed to do
something, take a step back and ask after the structures and conditions that produce this sense of
impossibility.”
It was these words that gave me the courage to return to the blue Post-Its to ask: What
are the structures and conditions that have produced this particular reaction—to restore the
detainees’ deprived humanity—as commonsense? Why does it feel like sacrilege to question this
mode of response? What is the otherwise that this testimonial text is inviting me to attend to?
What happens if I stop resisting this pull, if I ignore my trained commonsense and linger awhile
with this otherwise?
It was the act of asking these questions—of the various metaphoric formations that I
encountered in testimonial narratives—time and time again, that eventually culminated in this
dissertation. Despite my frequent asking of these questions over the course of working on this
project, posing them has never gotten easier. Working through every chapter of this dissertation
has been a discomfiting endeavor: trying to distance myself from trained, pre-packaged,
commonsense responses to testimonial accounts, in favor of illuminating discarded alternatives
to them, has often produced those very clammy hands, those same self-flagellating feelings of
stupidity and irresponsibility. And yet it has been that very discomfort that has made this project
seem so exigent.
Working through this project has also empowered me to realize that though certain
modes of response—certain freedom-practices—have indeed been made hegemonic and
intuitive, as I explore in this dissertation, they’re always failing. In that, they’re never exhaustive
and total, they’re never able to completely quash alternatives into non-existence. And it is this

3

very challenge of excavating these alternatives, then—of naming them, of pulling them out from
under the weight of their domineering counterparts—that has remained the propelling force
behind this dissertation.
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INTRODUCTION
Il/liberal Secondary Witnessing
“Liberal empire has always … offered the ‘precious poisonous gift of freedom’.”
.
—Patricia Stuelke, The Ruse of Repair
“Certain well-intentioned contemporary political projects and theoretical postures
inadvertently redraw the very configurations and effects of power that they seek
to vanquish.”
—Wendy Brown, States of Injury
“We cannot reconstruct the world and create genuinely new worlds using the
same categories by which we are destroying it!”
—Arturo Escobar, Pluriversal Politics
Mohamedou Ould Slahi is a Mauritanian national who was extradited from his country of
citizenship and subsequently detained and tortured in the U.S.-administered Guantánamo Bay
detention camp for nearly 15 years, from late 2001 to 2016, for suspected involvement in the
9/11 terror attacks—an ordeal he testifies to through his memoir, Guantánamo Diary, which was
declassified and published by his pro bono lawyers in early 2015 while he remained in U.S.
custody. Through the vehicle of this memoir, Slahi submits to a Western readership1— hailed
through the direct second-person address of “[y]ou, Dear Reader” (Slahi 225, 232, 244)—his
account of the vicious treatment he was subjected to by the U.S., inviting his readers to
adjudicate his condition. In vulnerably laying out his experience of brutalization, at the behest of
the U.S., before his readers, Slahi invokes them as a jury that he expects will pass a verdict on
his situation after having read his testimony—a notion that takes on tangible shape toward the
end of his memoir, when Slahi explicitly solicits their decision by asking: “What do the
1

The fact that this text is addressed to a Western, and likely American, readership is evinced in multiple ways: the
choice Slahi makes to write this life narrative in English, a language he learned while detained at Guantánamo; the
detailed explanations he provides of Mauritanian cultural customs; and finally, the American cultural references he
embeds in his narrative—for example, “[Redacted] and I facing each other with the same topics, like the movie
Groundhog Day” (Slahi 88; italics in original)—as well as his use of American expressions, such as “For Pete’s
sake” (Slahi 102).
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American people think? I am eager to know. I would like to believe the majority of Americans
want to see Justice done” (Slahi 372).
The editor of Guantánamo Diary, Larry Siems, amplifies this juridical positioning of the
reader through his paratextual remarks. First, Siems offers supplementary material that hyperperforms the provision of facts—which reinforce Slahi’s account—to the juror-reader: a wellresearched timeline of Slahi’s detention acts as prefatory material, while footnotes closely tail
Slahi’s narration throughout, providing external corroboration2 of the events Slahi recounts and
the state agents he incriminates in the memoir. Second, Siems also acts as Slahi’s character
witness3, using his introductory remarks to furnish the juror-reader with his own impressions of
Slahi, formed through close engagement with Slahi’s text as well as through interactions with
those that have met Slahi firsthand, such as his lawyers. Through Siems’ commentary, Slahi
emerges as a man who retains his good-humored persona amidst his harrowing ordeal4, rather
than becoming vengeful, and is able to write about his experiences evocatively, without
succumbing to either exaggeration or fabrication5—with Siems drawing an implicit contrast

2

Siems, in “Notes on the Text, Redactions, and Annotations”, writes that his footnotes speculate about the
information being obscured by the redactions imposed upon the text by the U.S. government. However, in effect,
several of these annotations in fact work to corroborate—on the basis of “declassified government documents
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act requests and litigation, news reports and the published work of a
number of writers and investigative journalists, and extensive Justice Department and U.S. Senate Investigations”
(Slahi xiii)—information provided by Slahi in the narrative. For example, one of Siems’ footnotes reads: “In this
passage, MOS describes a five-hour flight, a change of airplanes, and then a much longer flight. A 2008
investigation by the British human rights organization Reprieve found that transfers of prisoners to Guantánamo
typically involved a stop at the U.S. air base in Incirlik, Turkey, and the Rendition Project has found that a C-17
military transport plane, flight number RCH233Y, flew from Incirlik to Guantánamo on August 5, 2002, carrying
thirty-five prisoners” (Slahi 32).
3
This editorial move evokes the slave narrative, which was often prefaced with authenticating statements from
white abolitionists as a way of securing readers’ trust in and soliciting their support for the abolitionist cause.
4
Siems quotes from a letter that Slahi wrote to his attorney Sylvia Royce, to make this point: “You asked me to
write you everything I told my interrogators. Are you out of your mind? How can I render uninterrupted
interrogation that has been lasting the last 7 years? That’s like asking Charlie Sheen how many women he dated.”
(Slahi xvi). Later, Siems explicitly notes: “[Slahi] has a fantastic sense of humor” (Slahi xlviii).
5
Siems substantiates Slahi’s words—“I have only written what I experienced, what I saw, and what I learned firsthand. I have tried not to exaggerate, nor to understate” (Slahi 369)—by writing, “He has, from everything I have
seen, done just that. The story he tells is well corroborated by the declassified record; he proves again and again to
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between these traits and those that characterize a ruthless, manipulative criminal (one that the
U.S. portrays Slahi as being).
This (para)textual framing positions readers of Slahi’s testimonial memoir as analogous
to the judicial apparatuses that evaluate Slahi; it hypothesizes that readers will interact with the
text through the same exacting metrics that a jury employs, while also nudging them to recognize
that in engaging with the text, they wield the same power that a jury does, to determine Slahi’s
fate and grant him release/restoration or catalyze further deprivation. Yet, even as Slahi’s
memoir equates its readers with a jury, it also suggests that readers aren’t exhaustively
determined by this judicial mode of engagement. Slahi’s text gestures to the fissures that can
open up between the reader and a typical judicial posture when he writes, "I don’t expect people
who don’t know me to believe me, but I expect them, at least, to give me the benefit of the
doubt” (369); instead of the disinterested stance that a juror-reader might adopt when engaging
with a testimony, Slahi hopes that readers will vest their trust in his word. Siems too, while
recognizing that readers may interact with the memoir as an evidentiary artifact, urges them to
approach it as an aesthetic, literary one instead, as evinced through his touting of Slahi’s text to
be “an epic for our times” (Slahi xlix), along with his use of literary terms such as “protagonists”
(Slahi xlvii) to describe the characters that populate Slahi’s account of his detention experience
at Guantánamo. Guantánamo Diary’s figuring of its readers as stringent judges while
simultaneously acknowledging that this juridical stance can be exceeded offers this dissertation
its key analytical foothold—it suggests that while specific ways of interacting with testimonial
narratives have surely been made commonsense for readers, these modes of engagement aren’t
comprehensive—alternatives do in fact exist and can be tapped into.

be a reliable narrator. He certainly does not exaggerate: the record contains torments and humiliations not included
in the book, and he renders several of those he does include with considerable discretion” (Slahi xlvi).
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Further, as I note earlier, the collapse Guantánamo Diary stages between its readers and
jurors also works to remind readers of their ability to respond to Slahi’s narrative and shape its
afterlife—how the text circulates and is received in the broader world as well as the actions it
catalyzes for Slahi and the other Guantánamo detainees. Slahi, in his memoir itself, proposes
several possible responses—several typical trajectories of activism—that readers may pursue
after wading through his testimonial account: readers may call for Slahi and the other detainees’
rights to be restored through their release and demand the permanent shuttering of spaces such as
the Guantánamo Bay detention camp; they may censure the American government for holding
hundreds of Muslim men captive in the camp and torturing them without just cause; they may
even pressure the state into setting up a torture and war crimes commission to account for its
atrocities. Even as Slahi suggests that these actions may be somewhat restorative for him and the
other detainees, he simultaneously mounts a nascent critique of them by drawing parallels
between his own experience in Guantánamo and other spectacular histories of injury- and deathproduction such as slavery and the Holocaust. At one point in the text, Slahi quotes an American
interrogator saying—“Wahrheit macht frei, the truth sets you free” (15)—going on to reflect,
“When I heard him say that, I knew the truth wouldn’t set me free, because ‘Arbeit’ didn’t set the
Jews free. Hitler’s propaganda machinery used to lure Jewish detainees with the slogan, ‘Arbeit
macht frei,’ Work sets you free. But work set nobody free” (15), thus forging a kinship between
the U.S.’s Guantánamo operations and the concentration camps set up by the Nazis in Germany.
At another point, he establishes a continuity between the transatlantic slave trade and his forceful
extradition to and captivity in the U.S. by telling his interrogator: “You’re holding me because
your country is strong enough to be unjust. And it’s not the first time you have kidnapped
Africans and enslaved them” (Slahi 212). By yoking these violations together, Slahi brings into
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being a looping temporality that showcases how these widely acknowledged acts of brutality—
the Holocaust and slavery—haven’t been consigned to the past, as discrete/exceptional events, or
been definitively overcome; in fact, they’re regularly reanimated in new forms, on new bodies6.
While the outrage and clamor for rights that these atrocities prompted haven’t been completely
futile, they have nevertheless been unable to stanch the systemic infliction of physical, mental,
and emotional wounds on vulnerable bodies in an enduring manner—they haven’t been able to
dismantle the logics that allow such violations to recur. Similarly, the readerly responses Slahi
suggests may indeed be conducive to his and the other detainees’ immediate liberation, but they
provide no reliable bulwark against the resurrection of such sovereign violence in renovated
garb.
Given this context, a remark Slahi makes before the Administrative Review Board7—an
American state body tasked with adjudicating Slahi’s condition and determining his future, thus
being almost analogous to the juridical reader that Slahi anticipates and writes to in Guantánamo
Diary—takes on added significance. Testifying to the conditions of his detention, Slahi says at
the hearing: “Please … I want you guys to understand my story okay, because it really doesn’t
matter if they release me or not, I just want my story understood” (Slahi xix). In deprioritizing
his immediate release in favor of alternate ends crudely stitched together in the amorphous
imperative to ‘understand his story,’ Slahi’s comment gently illuminates an otherwise to the
responses and modes of engagement that his testimonial narrative explicitly names. Slahi’s
6

A. Naomi Paik advances a similar claim in Rightlessness, although her argument pertains specifically to the United
States and its repeated institution of detention camps to contain the various populations it has identified as
‘threatening,’ based on shifting geopolitical conditions. She writes, “while [each] camp’s prisoners may find release
from its confines, the conditions that have created and sustained their rightlessness … remain stubbornly in place,
always at the ready for new rightless subjects” (Paik 218).
7
The Administrative Review Board is a military body that executes a judicial function with respect to the
Guantánamo detainees. It has been tasked with conducting an annual review of the detainees held at the camp and
assessing whether they represent an ongoing threat to the United States and therefore whether they merit continued
detention or not. As such, the Administrative Review Board seems to stand in for the juridical reader that Slahi
invokes and addresses in Guantánamo Diary.
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comment suggests that while the activist actions he overtly nominates may secure immediate
release and perhaps even redress for him and the other detainees—an objective he cannot not
desire and that he therefore does indeed advocate for—these forms of activism are constrained in
their ability to discharge the task of proliferating justice in more expansive, longitudinal ways.
Slahi’s utterance of the aforementioned statement, then, can be read as an embryonic reach
toward an alternative horizon—his attempt at soliciting a response from his audience that
stretches beyond commonsense routes of liberation toward a nebulous something-else.
This dissertation seeks to answer the call that Slahi’s text—as an illustrative instance of
testimonial narratives that bear witness to state-inflicted wounding more broadly—issues. My
project thus sits within the ambivalence that Slahi voices, in order to think through the
alternatives that his comment gestures toward. The central questions that this dissertation thus
preoccupies itself with include: how might readers of testimonial texts—public readerly
subjectivities as well as professionalized ones such as literary critics—exceed the modes of
engagement and response that have been made intuitive for them? In favor of what instead? My
dissertation thinks through whether commonsense readerly responses—that may be productive of
immediate relief for the testifiers of these narratives—are able to usher in more livable,
liberatory futures, rather than simply smuggling in renovated forms of oppression behind the
smokescreen of promises of freedom and justice. It inquires into whether these commonsense
responses are capacious enough to secure emancipation in more comprehensive, sustainable
ways, rather than simply tending to the most spectacular wounds. And if not, what other modes
of response are possible that may be better suited to do this work? At its most specific, this
dissertation asks after typical modes of response to testimonial narratives—how they have come
to dominate our thinking about what justice and freedom mean and how they can be achieved—
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and what else might be possible beyond these hegemonic registers.
TESTIMONIAL NARRATIVES AND SECONDARY WITNESSING
Scholarly accounts of witness narratives theorize them as being authored for a range of
purposes—both personal and social. While trauma studies approaches—that have largely been
pegged to Holocaust narratives—hold that testifying to harm-infliction is important because it
catalyzes a process of personal reconstitution8 for testifiers, this dissertation is interested in the
socializing intentionality folded into the articulation of narrative testimony. Testimonial texts
recount the infliction of injury and suffering to not only raise public consciousness about the
oppression faced by testifiers, but also to evoke reparative responses from their readers, as
evinced in John Beverley’s theorization of the ‘testimonio’9—the appellation he bestows upon
Latin American testimonial literature produced around the 1960s that “developed in close
relation to the movements for national liberation and the generalized cultural radicalism of that
decade” (Beverley 31). Explicitly identifying the testimonio—functioning as a metonym for
testimonial writing more broadly in the way that I mobilize the term here—as being of a piece
with what Barbara Harlow called ‘resistance literature,’ Beverley notes that it interpellates
readers in such a way so as to “[place them] under an obligation to respond” (1). He goes on to
note that readers “may not act on that obligation, [they] may resent or welcome it, but [they]
cannot ignore it. Something is asked of [them] by testimonio” (Beverley 1). This social impetus
8

Trauma theorist, Cathy Caruth, writing about the trauma experienced by Holocaust survivors, explains that
traumatic events are not fully assimilated during their occurrence and are only processed in a belated manner—
“trauma is the confrontation with an event that, in its unexpectedness and horror, cannot be placed within the
schemes of prior knowledge” (153). Representing the traumatic episode in narrative form, then—in a form that
“allows the story to be verbalized and communicated” (Caruth 153)—enables it to be “integrated into one’s own …
knowledge of the past” (Caruth 153).
9
Beverley defines the testimonio as “a novel or novella-length narrative in book or pamphlet (that is, printed as
opposed to acoustic) form, told in the first person by a narrator who is also the real protagonist or witness of the
events he or she recounts, and whose unit of narration is usually a ‘life’ or a significant life experience. Testimonio
may include, but is not subsumed under, any of the following textual categories, some of which are conventionally
considered literature, others not: autobiography, autobiographical novel, oral history, memoir, confession, diary,
interview, eyewitness report, life history, novela-testimonio, nonfictional novel, or ‘factographic’ literature” (31).
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of prompting a readerly response, encoded in testimonial narratives, is reiterated by Kay Schaffer
and Sidonie Smith in their theorization of witness narratives as well; they write: “these narratives
from diverse cultural locations … accumulate … into a chorus of voices demanding response and
responsible action” (2).
In this dissertation, I index this readerly engagement with testimonial narratives—that
involves both responding to these texts and transmitting them forward—through the phrase
‘secondary witnessing’. My use of this term is both informed by and departs from others who
have explicated this process of readerly interaction with testimonial texts in their own work.
Silke Arnold-de Simine distinguishes ‘secondary witnessing’ from primary witnessing by
emphasizing the secondary witness’s absence from the event being testified to—the secondary
witness testifies to suffering he/she has only ever ‘witnessed’ secondhand, while Tiffany Ana
Lopez invokes the process of ‘secondary witnessing’ through the term ‘critical witnessing’—“the
process of being so moved by a reading experience so as to engage in a specific action intended
to forge a path toward change” (T. Lopez 64). ‘Secondary witnessing,’ as I deploy it in this
dissertation, therefore marries these theoretical notions to describe the process of readersecondary witnesses receiving and responding to narratives testifying to experiences of corporeal
brutalization that they themselves have not undergone.
LIBERALISM AND SECONDARY WITNESSING
In this dissertation, I seek to study how and to what ends liberal discourses, technologies,
and institutions10 have made specific secondary witnessing postures and praxes commonsense11,
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I modify these discourses, technologies, and institutions with the adjective ‘liberal’ to point to both how they’re
themselves rooted in liberal (in its tripartite signification) onto-epistemologies as well as how they materialize
secondary witnessing commonsenses that draw on these liberal histories, ways of thinking, and being. Moreover, I
write about these liberal infrastructures—used as a catchall for these liberal discourses, technologies, and
institutions—in broad strokes in this Introduction, because they take specific (and disparate) shape across each
chapter of this dissertation. Each secondary witnessing commonsense I grapple with over the course of this
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while also sinking into those that have been rendered superfluous in the process. In removing the
blinkers that these liberal infrastructures have installed on our sense of the possible when it
comes to secondary witnessing, I aim to proliferate the forms that secondary witnessing can take,
such that it can work to usher more emancipatory futures into being.
What do I mean by ‘liberalism’ (or, ‘liberal,’ in its adjectival function)?
‘Liberalism,’ as it features in this dissertation, has a tripartite signification, and although I
parse each constitutive strand here for explanatory precision, I posit that in practice, these three
strands are tightly interwoven, such that they exert their force in both distinct and conjoined
ways. First, ‘liberalism’ functions as a shorthand for liberal-colonial modernity—it signifies the
logics and practices inaugurated and normalized by the Enlightenment, the ontologies and
epistemologies that emerged alongside and authorized the global processes of colonialism,
imperialism, and racial capitalism. These onto-epistemologies are far from obsolete; in fact, it is
their very ongoingness, their very contemporaneity, that I seek to call attention to here. Kandice
Chuh, drawing on a phrase coined by Michel Serres, notes that the current conjuncture is marked
by the unstable tense of ‘crumpled time,’ “wherein the presentness of the past is acutely
apprehensible” (Chuh 20), further explaining that attending to this crumpled temporality involves
“reckoning with the conquest and colonialism, racism and cis-heteropatriarchy, upon which
bourgeois liberalism is not only founded but also continues to operate” (Chuh 20). It is this very
continuity of colonial/imperial/racial capitalist logics into the present that I intend to bring

dissertation is invigorated and buttressed by distinct liberal discourses and apparatuses, and this heterogeneity
compels me to speak about these infrastructures in general terms in this Introduction.
11
At multiple points in this dissertation, I discuss how liberal discourses, technologies, and institutions have made
particular secondary witnessing postures and practices commonsense over and above others. When I do this, I
acknowledge that a substitution of agency is taking place. These liberal discourses and apparatuses are only able to
accomplish this work through their material stand-ins—the people and organizations on the ground that are
upholding, promulgating, and thereby strengthening the hold of specific secondary witnessing practices. Therefore,
as and when I mobilize the language of agency vis-à-vis these liberal infrastructures in this dissertation, I do so for
syntactical suppleness, even as I concede that the true locus of their agency lies in their material life.
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forward through this first definition of ‘liberalism’.
Next, ‘liberalism’ also draws neoliberalism into its folds. Neoliberalism, in its most
succinct form, names the seepage of market thinking into all realms of human activity and
existence12. In this capacity, it materializes as a form of biopower that apportions thriving and
vulnerability differentially to populations based on their alignment, or lack thereof, with market
logics; those that fail to establish their market value, both present and speculative13, are
abandoned to less-than-optimal life conditions till they eventually perish. Additionally,
neoliberalism, in conceptualizing of persons as what Foucault dubs ‘homo oeconomicus’—an
“entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital” (The Birth of Biopolitics 226)—also
deems individuals as being responsible for their own survival, to the point where those that
“[fall] short of proper investment in the enterprise of [themselves] … [end up] paying for [their]
own slow death” (Puar 18)14. The fact that the sword of neoliberalism’s biopolitical workings
dangles disproportionately over the heads of marginalized populations15 renders palpable its weft
with the first iteration of ‘liberalism’—the ongoing perpetuation of colonial logics—that I note
above.
Finally, the term ‘liberalism,’ as I use it in this dissertation, also extends to the
chronotrope Elizabeth Povinelli christens ‘late liberalism’—a mode of governance that emerged
in the wake of, and responded to, the legitimacy crisis posed by anticolonial and other radical
social movements. An idiosyncratic feature of late liberal forms of governance is that
12

Foucault defines neoliberalism as “the generalization of the economic form of the market beyond monetary
exchanges … as a principle of intelligibility and a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual
behavior” (The Birth of Biopolitics 243).
13
Lisa Marie Cacho comments that in the neoliberal era we inhabit today: “Human value registers as human capital,
and social worth is evaluated from the perspectives of ‘real’ and ‘speculative’ markets” (161).
14
Since neoliberal thinking privileges the allocation of resources through market mechanisms rather than state
interference, it has also involved the gutting of social welfare programs.
15
Patricia Stuelke agrees that despite vociferous claims of how racial and gendered violences have been confined to
the past, neoliberal racial capitalism tends to “‘exacerbate the production of premature death’ for minoritized
subjects” (21).
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bio/necropolitical power—the active putting to death or passive letting die of populations—is
rarely exercised in overtly genocidal ways; rather, it operates through affirmative discourses that
champion freedom, recognition, and empowerment. The work of scholars such as Glen
Coulthard16 and Jasbir Puar17 has made great strides in cautioning against the naïve celebration
of recognition, warning that “colonial rule [has] made the transition from a more-or-less
unconcealed structure of domination to a mode of colonial governmentality that works through
the limited freedoms afforded by state recognition and assimilation” (Coulthard 15-16). Late
liberalism is also characterized by bio/necropower’s co-optation of the language of radical social
movements and the defuncting of their subversive potential through this appropriation. Patricia
Stuelke laments that discourses of reparation, for instance, have become co-opted by late liberal
power structures such that they’re no longer able to bring into being equitable ways of living;
instead, in being usurped, they have “enabl[ed] the paring back of visions for social
transformation” (Stuelke 16). Finally, Povinelli, in her theorization of late liberalism, overtly
calls attention to how late liberalism isn’t fully distinct from neoliberalism; in fact, they often
fortify each other. An example of this would be how the rhetoric of downward distribution of
resources, advanced by leftist social movements, was usurped to justify exporting free-market
capitalism to the Global South from the 1970s onward, which only exacerbated dispossession
and “effectively created, as Equipo Maíz described, ‘more poor people among the poor’”
(Stuelke 19-20).
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Coulthard, in his monograph, Red Skin, White Masks, exhorts Indigenous communities to shun state recognition—
that in effect “reproduce[s] the very configurations of colonial, racist, patriarchal state power that indigenous
peoples’ demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend” (3)—instead urging them to lean into what
he dubs a ‘resurgent politics of recognition,’ a form of community empowerment through individual and collective
self-fashioning.
17
Puar, in The Right to Maim, warns against the uncritical celebration of disability rights and empowerment because
reifying this state recognition of disability helps obscure and perpetuate its production of debility—the slow wearing
down of other marginalized populations as a way of ‘letting them die’.
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Unpacking the West-Global South axis of testimony production and secondary witnessing
In this dissertation, I posit that both testimony production and processes of secondary
witnessing tend to be organized by liberal infrastructures along a West-Global South axis. These
terms, ‘West’ and ‘Global South,’ as I deploy them here, take on a dual connotation: in that,
they’re both pegged to and exceed their geographical correlates. On one hand, the geographical
regions these terms name do important historicizing work, as clarified by scholars such as
Wendy Hesford, Alfred Lopez, and Patricia Stuelke. Hesford specifies that the West names “a
locus of power from which some nations have imposed values, norms, and narratives on other
parts of the world … [It represents] ‘a locus of symbolic and grounded power relations
emanating from the United States and Europe’” (4), while Lopez and Stuelke both meld the
meaning of the Global South with the fallout of globalization processes, noting that the Global
South is marked by the presence of marginalized subjects suffering the consequences of Eurocentered neoliberalization/globalization. On the other hand, the West and Global South are
discursive constructs that stretch beyond the hemispheric regions they correspond to, such that
the Global South can even be said to exist within the U.S.—a country that might typically be
imagined as representing the West/Global North—for instance.
This West-Global South axis undergirds the production and circulation of testimonial
narratives. By that, I mean two things. First, that these witness narratives tend to be prompted by
suffering inflicted by Euro-America (the ‘West’) on individuals and populations from the Global
South, in both synchronic and diachronic terms18. In its most direct forms, such West-inflicted
injury-production materializes as torture practiced on Middle Eastern and North African bodies
by the U.S. in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, for example, whereas in its more indirect
18

Michael Rothberg exports the concepts of synchronicity and diachronicity from the realm of linguistics to speak to
two distinct temporalities of harm-production. While synchronicity captures the enactment of harm in a discrete,
present moment, diachronicity elaborates longer histories of oppression and persecution.
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iterations, West-catalyzed harm manifests as what Aníbal Quijano calls ‘coloniality’19 or as neoimperialist interventions that prop up dictatorial regimes, which maintain their strongholds
through the exercise of corporeal injury on dissident bodies. Second, the naming of this WestGlobal South axis also enables me to point to the fact that the texts that I read in this dissertation
have all been made available in mediated English—while some have been originally authored in
English and later edited, others have been translated into English; they have thus been produced,
in these particular iterations, with attention to a specific Western, Anglophone readerly subject
(one that is globally dispersed, rather than being firmly located in the geographical West),
through the intervention of a whole slew of Western mediators—editors, translators, and
publishers. The import of this is best captured by Schaffer and Smith when they write: “At this
historical moment, telling [testimonial] stories in print or through the media by and large
depends upon a Western-based publishing industry, media, and readership. This dependence
affects the kinds of stories published and circulated, the forms those stories take, and the appeals
they make to audiences” (24). This then suggests that these testimonial narratives are caught
within the circuits of liberalism, rather than sharing a relationship of complete exteriority to it, a
point that comes to bear on my discussion of secondary witnessing practices throughout this
dissertation—and yet, I maintain that these texts are not exhausted by this liberal
overdetermination. In fact, attending to this liberal inflection—especially in terms of the readerly
expectations these narratives anticipate and write to and against (often in tacit ways)—is largely
the way in which this dissertation parses the terrain of secondary witnessing attitudes and
practices that have ascended to hegemonic status.
As evinced above, foregrounding this West-Global South axis is particularly important in
19

Quijano defines ‘coloniality’ as the perpetuation of colonial situations—the systematic epistemic, political,
cultural, sexual, and/or economic exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant populations,
according to Eurocentric logics—in the absence of formal colonial relations.
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the context of my forthcoming discussion of secondary witnessing practices. Specifically, it
becomes significant to note that beyond just influencing the production and circulation of
testimonial narratives, liberal discourses and institutions have also long instructed Western
publics on how to respond—how to bear secondary witness—to the accounts of injury and
suffering, emerging from the Global South, that are placed before them. While these liberal
infrastructures have historically worked to inculcate particular secondary witnessing postures in
those located in the geographical West—because of how this has served interests such as the
advancement of colonial missions20 and defused resistance to imperialist ventures21, for
instance—these commonsenses have also disseminated more broadly, riding the current of
globalized information flows, and are no longer confined to the geographical West. As such,
when I refer to a ‘Western’ readerly subject in this dissertation, the ‘West’ functions as a
placeholder that describes subjects located in the geographical West, while also invoking those
who, despite not inhabiting this hemispheric zone, may have also internalized these globalized
secondary witnessing commonsenses.
Liberal secondary witnessing practices and their façade of freedom and justice
To reiterate, then, in organizing the relationship between testifiers and reader-secondary
witnesses, liberal discourses and institutions have long educated the latter in how to receive and
respond to testimonies of pain and suffering. While this liberal instruction has ostensibly been
offered in the spirit of rehabilitation and emancipation for the oppressed, in effect, it has
regularly smuggled in further harm under the veneer of redress—a provocation I take up
seriously in this dissertation. I pause here to provide a broad overview of the vast scholarly
20

See Barnett for his discussion of ‘imperial humanitarianism’.
See Fernandes for an exploration of how stories of suffering are often recruited and instrumentalized by
imperialist nation-states as a ‘soft power’ strategy; in that, by enlisting voices from the Global South to attest to the
persecution they face in particular compassion-eliciting ways, the Western public’s resistance to imperialist politics
and military action—ostensibly undertaken in the name of emancipation—has often been dissipated.
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corpus on both human rights and humanitarianism, as examples of liberal secondary witnessing
discourses, that enables me to make this claim.
Human rights scholars have extensively documented how the discourse of human rights
has shored up power differentials and social hierarchies under the façade of promulgating
freedom and justice. Wendy Hesford unfolds how human rights discourse has colluded with
neoliberal politics to produce a ‘global morality market’ that “privileges Westerners as world
citizens” (9)—affording them the ability to “[turn] other nations into spectacles of violence” (7),
even as the West’s human rights violations are obfuscated, a proposition underscored by Makau
Mutua when he writes that human rights discourse operates through the Savage-Victim-Savior
metaphor, where the savage is always ever the non-Western state/culture22 and the savior the
West—the latter masquerading as a culture that can save non-Western victims from their own
culture’s inherent depravity by civilizing it. In this way, Mutua shines light on how human rights
discourse riffs on and perpetuates colonialist logics. Moreover, Mutua argues that human rights
discourse also serves as an instrument of neoliberalization, especially because the ‘disciplining’
action it prompts takes shape as the West’s exporting of the trifecta of human rights, free
markets, and democracy to the Global South—a political move that effectively reifies both free
markets and democracy as the only ‘good’ ways of moving through the world, notwithstanding
the new kinds of destruction they unleash.
Another way in which human rights entrenches neoliberal onto-epistemologies is by
promoting individualist modes of self-conception. As Roberto Esposito and Virginia Held
lament, rights exemplify modernity’s attempt to immunize people from communitarian forms of
living and being—they presume that people can be conceived of as individuals and that what

22

Mutua notes that while the ‘savage’ is typically figured as the non-Euro-American state, since ‘state’ operates as a
placeholder for culture, what is really being indicted here is non-Western culture.
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separates people should be afforded epistemological and moral precedence over that which
connects them. This prioritization of separation and de-linking over an affirmation of our
constitutive relationality has, in turn, spurred deep investments in autochthony and
borderization23. Further, scholars such as Jasbir Puar24 and Chandan Reddy25 have pointed out
that while rights masquerade as protections that operate at a transnational level, beyond the ambit
of individual nation-states—thus casting the state as an entity whose bio/necropolitical power
will be checked—since rights tend to be administered through the state itself, in effect, they
validate the state as protector rather than violator. Last but not the least, the harm human rights
discourse has enacted has not merely been abstract and anemic; instead, it has stimulated
imperialist projects, such as the U.S.’s invasion of Afghanistan and the NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia26, that have been vicious, bloody, and crippling in enduring ways.
Humanitarianism—practiced in terms of both sentiment (such as pity, sympathy, and so
on) and action (such as relief efforts)—tells a similar story. Michael Barnett, in his study of
humanitarian practices and their evolution over time, illuminates how charity and compassion
spurred rampant civilizing-colonizing missions in the Global South through the means of
evangelical Christianity, as well as how liberal peacebuilding initiatives have attempted to
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See Mbembe for an analysis of how a particularly liberal-modern emphasis on separation has further deepened
global-historic violences such as racism and xenophobia, thus effectively serving as a necropolitical ontoepistemology.
24
Puar argues that rights enable nation-states to masquerade as protector (of certain vulnerable communities),
obfuscating how these very nation-states are simultaneously deepening—in a slow, endemic manner—conditions of
precarity for other communities. Advising caution in celebrating the state’s granting of disability rights, she
demonstrates that such state-enacted disability empowerment works to cover up its simultaneous production of
debility in other populations.
25
It is to signal this very paradox that Chandan Reddy refers to the state as the ‘liberal egalitarian national state’.
Reddy argues that in granting protections to some communities and restricting the violence inflicted on them, the
liberal state installs itself as “the ultimate embodiment of the values that enable and guarantee equality … the final
outcome of struggles for equality” (Reddy 8). In doing so, the state deflects attention from how it continues to
disburse harm toward other communities or in other parts of the world.
26
See Douzinas for a discussion of how human rights, as exemplary of other liberal cosmopolitan discourses, has
followed the same trend of starting as a universalist critique of local injustices, only to end up as a vehicle of
imperial rule.
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remake ‘weak’ non-Western states in the image of Western nation-states, often leaving further
destabilization in their wake. Other scholars such as Didier Fassin27 and Pooja Rangan28 have
spotlighted how humanitarianism, despite its lofty pledges of dismantling social hierarchies,
have simply instituted new metrics of valuation, effectively creating new forms of exclusion and
dehumanization. Finally, Michel Agier, through an ethnographic study of refugee camps, shows
how these aid camps—allegedly instituted to protect and tend to the wellbeing of those rendered
stateless—take on police functions, working to restrict the movement of these vulnerable
populations and distance them from the citizenry of the nation-states that these camps border. It
is to emphasize this police function, counterintuitively discharged by humanitarian missions, that
Agier deems them to be a form of ‘humanitarian government’.
Using this trail of unfulfilled promises—to usher more equitable realities into being that
promote thriving for all—as a springboard, then, this dissertation joins the chorus of human
rights and humanitarianism scholars in cautioning against an uncritical acceptance of the means
of emancipation made commonsense by liberal infrastructures. In attempting to secure liberation
through these methods, the freedom projects we devote ourselves to tend to resurrect the very
webs of power we seek to dismantle, as evinced above; in Wendy Brown’s words: “Ideals of
freedom ordinarily emerge to vanquish their … immediate enemies, but in this move they
frequently recycle and reinstate rather than transform the terms of domination that generated
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Fassin, in “Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life,” notes that the inequalities between humanitarian aid-workers
and the populations they assist manifest on three levels: the level of meaning: some are left exposed to death,
whereas others can choose to sacrifice themselves; the level of protection afforded to each; and finally, that of
narration: where humanitarian workers can narrate their lives autobiographically (they can represent themselves as
subjects who chose to intervene in a crisis), the lives of persecuted people are only ever narrated biographically
(they are depicted as passive objects of aid).
28
Rangan writes about participatory documentaries that seek to humanize vulnerable populations by handing them
the camera and asking them to showcase their own lives, a representational move that intends to elicit the audience’s
compassion for these dehumanized subjects. However, Rangan ruefully observes that these documentaries simply
institute new norms, thereby “simultaneously expand[ing] the community of humanity and expung[ing] it of
difference” (9).

21

them” (7).
Despite the repeated illumination of the harms enacted by the secondary witnessing
methods made commonsense by liberal discourses—including but not limited to human rights
and humanitarianism—these methods continue to persist and are often imagined to be the only
ways of addressing the varied forms of dispossession and violation that testimonial utterances
hold up before the world. I attribute the tenacious hold that these praxes and postures have on our
collective imaginations to the way in which liberal discourses and institutions have trained us to
apprehend injury as well as the attachments they create to specific freedom practices over and
above others.
Firstly, liberalism-inflected testimonial communications prime publics to register injury
in the mode of emergency or crisis; in that, testimonial articulations—refracted as they often are
through a myriad liberal institutions, spanning editors and NGOs, among others—tend to be
framed in a way that provokes this sense of urgency29. More specifically, this urgency is often
stimulated by the sentimentalist framing of testimonial accounts that conveys to their audiences
that the slower that they are to respond, the more brutality will be inflicted on testifiers’ already
battered bodies; the immediate alleviation of suffering should therefore displace all other
considerations. Elaine Scarry’s scholarship is particularly helpful in identifying the work that this
manufactured sense of emergency does30. She writes that in the current conjuncture, a demand
for rapid action is often invoked to short-circuit critical thinking31—a critical thinking that may
give us pause and coax us to resist the actions that our support/assent is being conscripted for—
29

Pooja Rangan’s Immediations is preoccupied with this very framing, as it occurs in the context of participatory
documentaries. In fact, she coins the term ‘immediations’ to invoke these very frames of constructed urgency
through which humanitarian crises tend to be filtered—“I call these [audiovisual] tropes immediations in order to
emphasize the mediated quality of their emphasis on immediacy” (Rangan 4), she explains.
30
See Thinking in an Emergency.
31
Sujatha Fernandes identifies this as being a particular pitfall of testimonial narratives solicited and/or
instrumentalized to meet specific predetermined advocacy ends. She, echoing Scarry, also critiques how these
narratives are often ‘curated’ in ways that call forth rescue responses, rather than sustained critical reflection.
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and to promote non-thinking instead. While my dissertation upholds Scarry’s analysis, it
specifically understands the non-thinking that she alludes to less as an absence of thinking and
more as habituated thinking—as thinking that under duress, yields to what liberal discourses,
technologies, and institutions have cultivated as commonsense. As such, when confronted with
accounts of violation, we are trained to veer away from pause, from experimenting with new
approaches to securing liberation, and are instead encouraged to default to the secondary
witnessing practices that liberal infrastructures have made intuitive.
Another way in which these liberal infrastructures train us to adhere to the particular
secondary witnessing postures they endorse is by regulating the meaning of ‘freedom’. In that,
‘freedom’ is disarticulated from a persecutory ‘violence’ such that the two are always figured as
antonymic to each other. The notion that freedom can sanction and even materialize as
oppressive violence is rendered nonsensical. Yet, scholars such as Chandan Reddy32, Saidiya
Hartman33, and Elisabeth Anker34 have all called attention to how persecutory violence has
frequently subtended behaviors and practices endorsed as being freedom-producing.
Finally, liberal discourses and institutions cultivate deep attachments between Western
readerly subjects and the secondary witnessing praxes they offer up by obscuring other
possibilities from view, by promoting what Arturo Escobar calls ‘One World-world thinking’.
Escobar explains this One World-world paradigm by observing that liberal infrastructures tend to
“[create] a single reality from which all other realities and senses of the real are excluded, thus
profoundly limiting the scope of the political” (3). In other words, liberal discourses and
32

Chandan Reddy describes how the liberal-colonial state tends to practice ‘freedom in violence’—freedom is often
granted (to certain populations) simultaneous with the enactment of more violence (on other populations).
33
Saidiya Hartman explores how the granting of personhood and rights to slaves intensified the violence inflicted
upon them. Formal equality and black subjugation, Hartman argues, were not divorced from each other, but
thoroughly entangled.
34
Anker, in Ugly Freedoms, proposes that freedom itself can be a form of violence. She cites gun carrying and the
anti-mask protests that have taken place during the COVID-19 pandemic as examples that speak to how “harms and
exclusions are not only the violent effects of freedom but can also be considered free practice” (7).
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institutions fashion a world dominated by their own figuring of the world; no other kinds of
world may co-exist with this hegemonic world. Escobar further explains that the worlding
induced by these liberal infrastructures ascends to hegemonic status because it simultaneously
operates at the level of the imagination, of the potential—“other possibles [are] turned into
‘impossibles’” (Escobar 3). These other possibles, that lie beyond the pale of what these liberal
infrastructures make commonsense, are painted as too romantic, too impractical, too delayed and
in this too-muchness, they are delegitimated. Moreover, the real and possible forms of secondary
witnessing proposed by these liberal discourses, technologies, and institutions are further made
enticing due to the ‘good life’ of freedom, justice, and equity that they promise (no matter how
meager/deferred/unrealized this promise is). This affective attachment to liberal secondary
witnessing practices can be conceived as a form of what Lauren Berlant calls ‘cruel optimism’—
"when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing” (Cruel Optimism 1).
Liberal infrastructures suture the secondary witnessing praxes that they endorse to noble
fantasies of redress and freedom—they thus leverage the affect of optimism to broker public
attachment to these praxes, and even when these praxes fall short of achieving the ends that they
strive for, the optimism these liberal infrastructures breed prompts us to return to them time and
time again; it is this repeated hopeful return to something that actively forestalls collective
flourishing, instead of bringing it into being, that emerges as particularly ‘cruel’ here.
My dissertation thus takes as its exigency the fact that if, despite our repeated efforts at
producing collective flourishing, we are unable to do so, since the means to liberation themselves
have been enlisted toward the ends of power-amplification and harm-production, we need to
dream the paths to freedom and justice anew. This project therefore takes to heart Escobar’s
fervent exhortation to “resist the hegemonic operations positing one world, one real, and one
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possible” (x)—to instead pluralize our sense of the possible, which in turn can induce other,
more livable reals into being.
Unsettling the ends of secondary witnessing
Doing this work of proliferating alternative possibles for secondary witnessing also
involves nurturing an imaginative openness to what the liberatory ends—the ‘justice’ or
‘freedom’—that they portend might look like. Emancipatory objectives such as justice and
freedom, in their current iterations, have been overdetermined by liberalism’s gloss—their
significations have been congealed so that they might serve to further legitimate the secondary
witnessing praxes that liberal discourses and institutions make commonsense.
Firstly, ‘freedom’ has been stiffened into a stable, immutable concept, only ever
signifying narrow, crisis-mode reparations such as the ones Slahi explicitly names in his
narrative (the release of detainees, for instance). However, as Wendy Brown helpfully points out:
“Freedom is anything except an Idea.” Freedom is neither a philosophical absolute nor a
tangible entity but a relational and contextual practice that takes shape in opposition to
whatever is locally and ideologically conceived as unfreedom … Rendering …
formations of freedom as “concepts” abstracts them from … the institutions against
which they are oriented, the domination they are designed to contest, the privileges they
are designed to protect. (6)
In other words, ‘freedom’ can only be truly achieved when it loosens the binds of the specific
fetters it targets and responds to—it cannot, by definition, be one-size-fits-all, although
liberalism would have us believe otherwise.
Additionally, as Roberto Esposito notes, ‘freedom’ also tends to be scripted by liberal
institutions as a “a good to be acquired, appropriated, and constituted as subjective property such
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that the subject becomes the proprietor of himself or herself” (5). In thus being offered up as
‘proper’ to an individual subject, ‘freedom’ is divorced from the possibility of being
communitarian. In that, achieving freedom becomes an individual, acquisitive endeavor that is
alloyed with the logics of liberal subjectivity, rather than emerging as a “connective, aggregating,
unifying endeavor” (Esposito 52). Approached through this liberal framing, freedom loses its
ability to manifest as a relationally produced experience, something that exists in common, as a
shared state of being.
Lastly, the notion of ‘justice’ too has been rigidly scripted by liberal discourses and
institutions, specifically by being sutured to the legal sphere. In depicting justice as something
that can only be achieved through legal means, liberal infrastructures reify the rule of law, while
simultaneously draining ‘justice’ of its multidimensionality. Through this slippage between law
and justice, the striving for equity and restitution that attaches to the notion of ‘justice’ is
transferred to the law—it thus validates the law as a neutral, virtuous instrument35, effectively
erasing every trace of its cruelty36. Furthermore, when justice is reduced strictly to legal avenues,
it’s deprived of the capability to emerge in other forms, by other means. Justice becomes
“inflexible, unfree, and a mere mechanistic calculation” (Demos 17), to be disbursed by judicial
figures in a courtroom, rather than something that might be collectively imagined or that might
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Lisa Marie Cacho specifically encourages stepping away from legal redress because the very Euro-American legal
systems before which appeals are made are often the ones responsible for the dispossession minoritarian populations
experience in the first place—“When subjugation is engendered, justified, and maintained by the law, legal
recognition cannot be a permanent or meaningful solution to subjugation” (Cacho 8), she advises. T.J. Demos also
notes that when justice is made coterminous with law, the disjuncture between the two (as evinced in
institutionalized slavery, for example) gets effaced.
36
Colin Dayan devotes The Law is a White Dog to explicating the injuries that Euro-American law, through a
reliance on legal fictions, has historically inflicted—especially that of depriving people of personhood and
consigning them to a form of death-in-life. Austin Sarat and Robert Cover identify legal interpretation and the
passing of the legal decision as particularly revealing acts, where law’s pretensions—its “value-declaring, rightsenhancing, community-building” (Sarat 3) fictions—are stripped away, and its production of pain and death is
rendered clearly legible.
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emerge through acts of care37.
Given these impoverished denotations of ‘freedom’ and ‘justice,’ then, the secondary
witnessing practices they sponsor are bound to be impoverished as well. To nurture alternative,
more capacious secondary witnessing postures, it’s imperative to untether ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’
from their liberal overdeterminations, to let them develop in multiple and shifting registers, with
and against the specific power formations and injustices they encounter. My dissertation is
therefore invested in exploring how we might fashion other, more livable futures through our
secondary witnessing endeavors, without defining in advance the specific forms that this
livability—the freedom, justice, and flourishing this term holds together—might take.
ILLIBERAL SECONDARY WITNESSING
Where should we look to excavate alternatives to the secondary witnessing stances made
hegemonic by liberal discourses, technologies, and institutions? Before I proceed, I pause here to
note that my use of these non-specific terms—‘alternative,’ ‘other,’ and so on—in this
Introduction, with reference to the secondary witnessing postures and praxes that lie beyond the
ones affiliated with liberal onto-epistemologies, is intentional. In that, these terms function as
pliancy-conferring placeholders—they point to the limits of liberal secondary witnessing
commonsenses, while simultaneously allowing illiberal secondary witnessing possibilities to
remain amorphous, to develop vis-à-vis specific accounts of them. In each chapter of this
dissertation, these illiberal secondary witnessing practices take unique shape, and I believe that
using more specific descriptors in this Introduction, that might distill their commonalities, would
in fact be a reductive exercise, depleting these illiberal secondary witnessing practices of both
their idiosyncratic nuances as well as their heterogeneity.
37

Care theorists have often depicted justice, in its capacity as a moral framework, as being the opposite of care;
however, Virginia Held complicates this binary, showing that care can in fact function as the broader ethic within
which justice is sought.
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My dissertation, then, taking up the invitations of scholars such as Judith Butler, Lisa
Marie Cacho, and A. Naomi Paik, digs in the refuse pits of the secondary witnessing stances that
liberal discourses and institutions have jettisoned as worthless or impractical—the ‘possibles’
that they have rendered ‘impossible’—to identify these alternatives. Butler, in Frames of War,
deploys the frame as an analytic to think through both how certain ways of apprehending war are
made commonsense by U.S. empire to secure popular assent to its waging, as well as to suggest
the ways in which we can refuse this recruitment. They leverage the frame as a particularly
handy heuristic because it does the dual work of explaining how certain elements are focalized,
amplified, and made to stand in for reality, whereas others are cast outside the frame, rendered
redundant, and thus delegitimated. Butler advocates turning to these “discarded negatives of the
official version[s]” (Frames of War xiii) of reality to build a more capacious politics of
resistance—a recommendation I take seriously in this dissertation. Other theorists such as Paik
and Cacho have also issued similar calls to cleave our activist endeavors from dominant
emancipation tactics (such as petitioning for rights to be restored), in favor of embracing what
seems unthinkable or impractical in the current conjuncture, as a means of securing collective
liberation.
To undertake this work of salvaging the secondary witnessing practices that liberal
discourses, technologies, and institutions have de-realized, then, my dissertation leans on
Kandice Chuh’s articulation of the ‘illiberal’. Chuh uses this term, the ‘illiberal,’ to describe the
modes of thinking and being that occupy an oblique relationship to a liberal sensis communis—
the commonsense that liberal infrastructures promote, circulate, and make hegemonic; as she
notes, the ‘illiberal’ names “an attempt to give positive weight to alternatives to liberal[ism] …
[such that] they may shift the grounds of sensibility, from what we are called to stand against to
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what we will stand for” (Chuh 2). As an adjective that modifies ‘secondary witnessing,’ the
‘illiberal’ encourages the defamiliarization and dismantling of commonsense secondary
witnessing onto-epistemologies and practices; it exhorts us to provincialize the secondary
witnessing methods that liberal discourses and institutions have trained us to accept as intuitive.
Moreover, beyond delineating a restorative otherwise to the stifling logics and praxes correlated
with liberalism, Chuh’s articulation of the ‘illiberal’ emerges as particularly valuable for my
study because in attaching a prefix (‘il’) to the liberal, this term insinuates a relationship between
the two, rather than maintaining them as wholly distinct. The ‘il-liberal’ invites a consideration
of how liberal and illiberal secondary witnessing may be unstable realms of practice, each one
always capable of folding into the other—a volatility that I further address later in this
Introduction.
My archive: global testimonial narratives of state-inflicted torture and genocide
My dissertation reads for these il/liberal secondary witnessing practices in global
testimonial narratives attesting to torture and genocide38, inflicted directly by the state or
indirectly, through militias and other apparatuses of violence that the state transfers its
necropower to. The testimonial narratives that I read in this dissertation span the 20th and 21st
centuries and emerge from distinct geopolitical conditions—what unifies them is that they all
attest to state-inflicted torture and genocide. These temporal and geopolitical disparities may
prompt skepticism about whether these texts can be meaningfully studied together, as I do in this
dissertation. I seek to allay these doubts in two ways. Firstly, these texts, in eliciting and
addressing a particular Western (geographically specific and nonspecific) readerly subject, tap
38

The archive I choose to work through in this dissertation—considering its sensational subject matter and the
overwrought sentimentalism it encourages—might itself read like a capitulation to a hegemonic liberal definition of
‘violence’. However, in deliberately choosing to engage these texts, that attest to spectacular performances of injuryproduction, I seek to invite consideration of how, despite being routed through and informed by liberal frames, these
testimonial narratives are not exhaustively determined by them. These texts are polyvalent, and it is this very
plurality that I find to be particularly generative for the work that this dissertation attempts to do.
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into and attempt to undo (or at least provincialize) particular liberal secondary witnessing
commonsenses, thus warranting their study together in a single project. Secondly, and relatedly,
the archive I have compiled in this dissertation has emerged through a text-first approach. By
that, I mean that instead of questions taking the lead—that I then seek to address through the
reading of a pre-constituted archive—I have arrived at the particular set of research questions
that I pose in this dissertation through my reading of these testimonial texts. Considering that
these texts, in writing to and/or against specific il/liberal commonsenses, have brought me to the
questions that I work through in this project, I have sought to curate my own archive of
testimonial writing on the basis of the inquiry at hand, instead of hemming in the scope of my
project by retroactively imposing these questions on a different pre-given archive, simply
because it may appear more temporally/geopolitically homogenous. Moreover, in this
dissertation, I turn to a subaltern39 narrative archive for my inquiry into il/liberal secondary
witnessing both due to its plurality—its ability to simultaneously encode dominant and
minoritarian logics—as well as its hospitality to subversive ‘human rights imaginaries’.
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I use the term ‘subaltern’ here to tap into its various connotations, even as I acknowledge it as being a somewhat
imperfect term for the subjects that I use it to refer to—those that have experienced torture/genocide and attest to
these acts of wounding and massacre through testimonial narratives. First, I use the term ‘subaltern’ here because of
how it captures a condition of dire oppression and dispossession—in the particular context of my dissertation, a
form of deprivation produced in a highly corporeal manner, through acts of injury- and death-production. Second, as
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak influentially argued, ‘subalterns’ are characterized by a marginalization so extreme that
they’re deprived of voice, they’re divested of authentic representation. Since the oppressed individuals I refer to as
‘subalterns’ in this dissertation are in fact producing testimonial articulations, it may seem that my use of the term
‘subaltern’ in this context is facile and inaccurate. However, by using this term, I intend to acknowledge how the
voices of these testifiers are inevitably funneled through, inflected and sometimes even displaced by the hegemonic
liberal institution of the publishing industry and its operations, as I discuss in this Introduction, as well as by the
publishing industry’s understanding of readerly expectations and desires—the oppressed are therefore unavoidably
constrained in their ability to represent themselves, their communities, and their circumstances. Moreover,
‘subaltern’ testifiers often anticipate and write to readerly assumptions—cultivated by hegemonic liberal discourses
and technologies as commonsense—themselves, in a bid to secure recognition and eventually liberation, as I note in
this dissertation, effectively muzzling themselves. Finally, as Susan Lanser describes, the testifying voice in these
narratives is often a collective one, even when it is represented as a singular ‘I’; entire communities’ experiences are
often compressed into and channeled through a single voice or perspective—and sometimes even effaced in this
process. Those that suffer state-sponsored torture and genocide and testify against it, then, in effect, achieve meager
representation—making the term ‘subaltern’ seem at least somewhat appropriate in this context, even if only loosely
so.
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The polysemous nature of the literary is explored in the work of both Michael Richardson
and Mark Sanders. Richardson, in theorizing why literature is often employed to testify to
torture—an endeavor marked by the fundamental paradox of needing to bring this experience
into language, even as it resists representation40—explains that literature functions as a gestural
medium; in that, it allows for the proliferation of multiple shifting meanings rather than being
tied to precision and fixity, as juridical language is, thus empowering the tortured “to speak in
the name of not being able to speak” (Richardson 21). Mark Sanders echoes this polyvalent
capacity of the literary in his study of post-apartheid testimonies presented before the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. He argues that testimony bears the stamp of both
the legal and the literary, and where the legal, in being focused on the empirical, may stupefy
testimony, its literariness returns a suppleness to it—allowing it to meander and illuminate new
meanings.
This polyvalent capacity of the literary is vital to my project because I hold that
testimonial narratives are double-voiced—they loudly enunciate commonsense, liberal
platitudes, and yet, even as they do so, they also whisper—in an almost infrasonic register—
about illiberal possibilities. Testimonial life narratives provide a ready example of this: on one
hand, these narratives read almost as autobiographies—what Leigh Gilmore defines as “a
Western mode of self-production … a corollary to the Enlightenment and its legacy …
featur[ing] a rational and representative “I” at its center” (2); yet, on the other, owing to the fact
that this first-person testifying ‘I’ is often a collective subject41 taking singular form, these
narratives thwart the liberal frame that they, at first glance, seem to inhabit. Testimonial
40

See Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain for a more sustained exploration of why the experience of torture resists
representation. Scarry posits that the physical pain produced by torture resists articulation in language since it cannot
be objectified—it cannot be represented as of or for any external object in the world—and is, as such, a largely
internal experience.
41
See Lanser’s discussion of the communal voice.
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literature’s Janus-faced ability to hold both the liberal and illiberal within itself becomes further
pertinent when it comes to secondary witnessing. On one hand, these testimonial narratives
overtly solicit liberal forms of secondary witnessing from their audiences—first, because these
secondary witnessing practices promise immediate restoration, and who, held in a state of sheer
precarity, would refuse this prompt rescue, and second, because, as I mention earlier, they are
incontrovertibly marked by their travel through liberal circuits; on the other hand, even as they
petition for liberal solutions from their readers, these testimonial narratives also often hint at
illiberal secondary witnessing possibilities, albeit in a more muted vein.
Why are these illiberal alternatives only perceptible in an infra register, one might ask?
Elizabeth Povinelli’s work is particularly instructive here. She observes that alternative social
projects are constantly confronted with the threat of being pushed into extinction by liberal
infrastructures and the onto-epistemologies they aggressively attempt to make normative; as
such, these alternative social projects are constantly saddled with the burden of enduring and
finding a way to persist amidst this onslaught. It is as a symptom of this constant struggle to not
be quashed that these alternative onto-epistemologies often only take shape as potentialities—
inhabiting the dual ontotheoretical mode of being “neither something nor nothing” (Povinelli 8).
Since these illiberal alternatives are only ever palpable in this nascent register—submerged under
their overbearing liberal counterparts—discerning them calls for a range of limber interpretive
moves. Therefore, as I engage these testimonial narratives in my dissertation, I shuttle between
an assortment of reading strategies to become sensitive to and amplify the illiberal secondary
witnessing possibilities that they murmur about in hushed tones—sometimes I read along the
grain, at other times I read against it, and at yet others, I read across texts, using the friction that
emanates from this comparative practice as a seed that may germinate new, illiberal secondary
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witnessing possibilities.
Furthermore, as I noted earlier, the aesthetic productions of subaltern populations—
including but not limited to testimonial narratives—are specifically well-suited to the task of
proposing alternatives to hegemonic liberal logics and practices. Crystal Parikh notes that
minoritarian literature acts as a fertile site for the discernment of ‘human rights imaginaries’—
ethico-political visions that embody the liberatory ideals that institutionalized freedomdiscourses such as human rights and humanitarianism vouch for, while simultaneously exceeding
these liberal frameworks, a notion that Arturo Escobar echoes as well when he writes that it is
from subaltern populations that we “get a wide variety of proposals for ‘worlding’ life on new
premises … for constructing other worlds” (4). It is for this very reason that this dissertation
sinks into a subaltern testimonial archive to discern illiberal secondary witnessing possibilities
that, in stretching beyond the frontiers established by liberal infrastructures, can pave the way
toward more egalitarian futures.
The metaphoric pedagogies of illiberal secondary witnessing
My dissertation contributes to the scholarship around testimonial narratives and
secondary witnessing by contending that narratives of witness make illiberal secondary
witnessing praxes and postures legible through what I call metaphoric pedagogies.
In this dissertation, I explicitly refer to the nascent illiberal secondary witnessing
propositions embedded in the testimonial narratives I read as ‘pedagogies’ to clarify my project’s
critical relationship to these texts and the testifiers that speak through them—of treating them as
interlocutors, rather than reproducing the epistemological exclusion that their oppression
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consigns them to, as A. Naomi Paik calls out in in her work42. Kandice Chuh and María Puig de
la Bellacasa both point to how knowledge production and critical thinking are inherently
relational acts—this relationality can be affirmed, such that critic-scholars approach writers and
their texts through a deep recognition of mutuality and responsibility, or, conversely, this
relationality can be disregarded, so that texts operate in a merely evidentiary capacity to prop up
critic-scholars’ arguments; critic-scholars, in this latter scenario, end up wielding a violent
mastery over the texts/writers they work through in their scholarship. My dissertation seeks to
align itself with the former, and my use of the term ‘pedagogies’ intends to foreground this
stance.
Beyond the desire to engage testifiers and their witness narratives in an accountable
manner, I use the term ‘pedagogies’ here to explicitly indicate that the critical inquiry I undertake
in this dissertation proceeds by following these testifiers’ lead. The key reason that I cede
authority to these testifiers, whose narratives of witness I read in this dissertation, is because they
possess what José Medina calls ‘meta-lucidity’. Medina maintains that the oppressed, by the very
virtue of their oppression and exclusion, have access to perspectives that appear foreign, or even
nonsensical, to privileged groups. They are able to acutely apprehend the limitations of dominant
epistemological paradigms and thus recognize that “there can be more than what is seen”
(Medina 192). Naming the infra illiberal secondary witnessing possibilities that are folded into or
evoked by these testimonial texts ‘pedagogies’ is therefore my way of centering testifiers’ metalucidity, while also cultivating a posture of epistemic humility vis-à-vis their testimonies.
The term ‘metaphoric’—part of my aforementioned phrase, ‘metaphoric pedagogies’—
intends to spotlight the figurative form in which illiberal secondary witnessing possibilities are
42

Paik explains that rightlessness isn’t simply a legal condition. Rather, it involves various kinds of removal, one of
which occurs on epistemological grounds—those made rightless are rendered not worth listening to, “what they
know does not matter” (3).
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made legible by the testimonial texts that this dissertation engages: the analogies, similes, and
metaphors, sometimes implicit and at other times explicit, in which they take shape. I organize
this project through an unpacking of three metaphoric constructions, proposed by the testimonial
narratives that I read, to explore the illiberal secondary witnessing logics, attitudes, and practices
that they elicit or gesture toward.
The ‘metaphoric’ functions as a particularly capacious heuristic for sensing and grappling
with the nascent illiberal secondary witnessing propositions embedded in testimonial narratives
for several reasons. First, the ‘metaphoric’ operates as a pedagogical device—it makes things
sensible that are otherwise harder to detect and decipher. This pedagogical potential, possessed
by the metaphor, is evinced in Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain. Scarry comments on how the
experience of pain is highly interiorized, so much so that it is extremely difficult to communicate
it exactly to an un-pained bystander43: “For the person whose pain it is, it is ‘effortlessly’ grasped
(that is, even with the most heroic effort it cannot not be grasped); while for the person outside
the sufferer’s body, what is effortless is not grasping it (it is easy to remain wholly unaware of its
existence; even with effort, one may remain in doubt about its existence or may retain the most
astonishing freedom of denying its existence” (The Body in Pain 4). In such a scenario, the
weapon and the wound, as analogical devices, lift pain out of the sufferer’s body and make it
visible; by evoking pain through metaphoric ‘as if’ constructions that reference the weapon that
caused pain or the wound that it inflicted, the intensely private—and what Scarry deems as being
a previously ungraspable—experience of pain becomes tangible. Similarly, being cast in
metaphoric form facilitates discernment of the incipient illiberal secondary witnessing postures
and practices evoked in and through testimonial narratives.
43

Elizabeth Dauphinee, in her essay, contests Scarry’s argument, claiming that pain can in fact be a social and
shareable experience. However, working through Scarry’s argument is still worthwhile here for its explication of the
metaphor’s pedagogical workings.
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The metaphoric is also particularly valuable for my study of illiberal secondary
witnessing because the ‘as if’ formulation in which it finds expression encourages a subjunctive
orientation—a suspension of ‘what is,’ in favor of tarrying with alternative visions, with what
‘can be’ instead. Mark Rifkin, writing about the speculative—the mode that the metaphoric
inhabits through its ‘as if’ structure—proposes that it incites the relativization of the hegemonic
real. In that, the speculative suspends dominant figurations of a singular plausible reality, instead
coaxing publics to sit with the possibility of there being “multiple nodes of understanding that all
may be true while also being nonidentical” (Rifkin 7). The metaphoric, in its speculative and
subjunctive capacity, is thus particularly suited to the provincialization of hegemonic liberal
secondary witnessing commonsenses, while also encouraging an imaginative hospitality to
alternative secondary witnessing stances heretofore too quickly discarded as quixotic or
unfeasible. As I’ve highlighted through this Introduction, liberal discourses, technologies, and
institutions severely constrain our imaginative capacities, cultivating an unconscious imaginative
resistance44 to illiberal alternatives as a way of maintaining the dominance of their own ‘real’,
and it is this very chokehold that the speculative/subjunctive register of the metaphoric helps
slacken.
On the flip side, approaching the illiberal through the mode of the speculative/subjunctive
risks reinforcing the proposition that these illiberal secondary witnessing possibilities can only be
engaged within the realm of idle daydreams—they can only be entertained as fantastical
‘possibles’ rather than plausible ‘reals’. However, as José Medina contends, our imaginings are
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José Medina explains that imaginative rigidification is a structural, not individual, phenomenon, effected to
preserve dominance. To foster more equitable forms of living and being, the ease or difficulty with which we can
imagine alternatives should be critically interrogated and transfigured through a broadening of our imaginative
horizons, he writes.
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intimately connected to the actual world45: “critical reimagining is not a purely intellectual
exercise, but rather, a complex rearticulation that engages our emotions and our will and
ultimately affects our capacity for action” (Medina 253). When we imagine alternatives, Medina
stresses, we’re effectively interacting with them as worlds that hold the potential to become real.
In fact, in imagining these alternatives, we’re affectively and morally implicating ourselves in
them, and are thus more likely to work to bring them to fruition. Imagining illiberal alternatives
is therefore a vital precursor to their actualization.
A third salient feature of the metaphoric that I seek to spotlight here, due to its relevance
to il/liberal secondary witnessing, is its open-endedness. Scarry’s work is once again helpful for
giving this idea more tangible shape. She writes that the expression of pain via the analogical
vehicle of the wound/weapon is unstable—while these analogical devices are mobilized to refer
back to the pained body, they are volatile and can instead gesture to power (to the wielder of the
weapon or the inflictor of the wound) instead. Metaphoric devices are thus anything but
deterministic; they hold together a multiplicity of unsettled meanings. In Scarry’s example, this
instability exclusively connotes risk; in my dissertation, however, it simultaneously emerges as
both a peril and a trove of possibility. In its open-endedness—quite literally, in fact—the
metaphoric reveals itself to be committed to means rather than ends, emphasizing that the ends
that these means achieve cannot be definitively posited in advance. Illiberal practices—in their
reliance on the metaphoric—also take shape as being means- rather than end-centered. On one
hand, this accounts for their adaptive and responsive capacities; on the other, it makes them
vulnerable to being misappropriated to promulgate liberal secondary witnessing ends instead.
45

In fact, liberal apparatuses such as Euro-American law have themselves routinely bridged the imaginative and real
worlds, showing the ease with which amorphous possibles can be given tangible form. Colin Dayan, in The Law is a
White Dog, contends that law functions as an alchemical technology that regularly transforms the supernatural and
fictional into the real. She notes that the fantastical notions of racial (im)purity and the corruption of blood, for
instance, were materialized through their encoding in the law.
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The metaphoric’s openness thus again provides a rich opportunity to linger with the folding of
the liberal into the illiberal and vice versa that I mentioned earlier.
THE CONTOURS OF ILLIBERAL SECONDARY WITNESSING
Before I delve into a more detailed delineation of the specific forms that the chapters in
this dissertation take, I pause here to trace a few idiosyncratic features of the illiberal secondary
witnessing logics, attitudes, and practices that this project advocates for.
The primacy of the nonideal
The illiberal secondary witnessing stances rendered legible by testimonial narratives’
metaphoric pedagogies are oriented by what José Medina calls ‘the primacy of the nonideal’—"a
commitment to the priority of real in-justices over ideal justice” (12). In that, they’re thoroughly
mired in the work of attending and responding to the nuances of specific injustices—including a
self-reflexive evaluation of the damaging ideologies that they may themselves draw on and/or
further perpetuate—instead of uncritically turning to institutionalized justice-practices as a onesize-fits-all panacea. As I note in the preceding section, this alignment with the nonideal ensures
that illiberal secondary witnessing is welded more strongly to means rather than ends. By this, I
don’t mean to suggest that these illiberal praxes are completely unmoored from any liberatory
goals, but rather that the exact contours of what these emancipatory ends look like are not
prescribed in advance, but rather emerge through the deployment of the means themselves.
An emergent practice
In being focused on means rather than ends, illiberal secondary witnessing manifests as
an emergent practice. I use ‘emergent’ here in the way Raymond Williams explains it—as
something that is in the process of emerging, and is therefore incomplete, partially articulated.
This emergent nature of illiberal secondary witnessing can also be attributed to its constantly
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having to fend off the threat of being extinguished, as I explained earlier in this Introduction—it
thus always ever takes shape as an ephemerality, a potentiality, something that simultaneously is
and isn’t and is constantly changing form, in order to persist. Furthermore, Lisa Lowe notes that
processes that are emergent, in this way, are vulnerable to being “appropriated or incorporated
into the dominant” (19). This is a possibility that constantly haunts illiberal secondary witnessing
stances—they run the risk of being usurped into hegemonic liberal discourses and evolving into
institutionalized practices that ultimately again prop up liberal onto-epistemologies.
The Mobiüs strip of the il/liberal
I draw on the Mobiüs strip as a metaphor to depict how seamlessly the illiberal can fold
into the liberal and vice versa. I offer the ethos of care here as a way of fleshing this slippage out
in a more concrete manner. As I will describe next, the practice of illiberal secondary witnessing
is thoroughly grounded in an ethos of care—an ethico-political attitude that, in being arrayed
against the liberalism-inflected stance of legal justice, for example, becomes tinged in an illiberal
hue. However, this very practice of radical care can just as easily be appropriated for liberal
ends. As María Puig de la Bellacasa observes, calls for care are regularly issued for thoroughly
capitalistic ends, such as the marketing of green products, for instance. On one hand, this signals
that no attitude or practice can be enshrined as always ever illiberal—a constant reflexivity needs
to be exercised to ensure that the said attitude or practice has not been appropriated toward
liberal ends. On the other, simply because care may be co-opted toward re-entrenching liberal
objectives and onto-epistemologies doesn’t necessarily mean that it must be jettisoned from an
illiberal secondary witnessing praxis. Rather, care practices can be refashioned and redeployed to
ensure their return to the realm of illiberality.
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A dual temporality
The illiberal secondary witnessing that this dissertation sinks into fluctuates between dual
temporalities. On one hand, this kind of secondary witnessing is rooted in the present—it
demands quotidian practice, an everyday engagement that extends beyond readers’ immediate
interactions with testimonial texts. On the other, owing to its enmeshment with the liberal—in
terms of both the risk of being co-opted by liberal discourses/institutions as well as its continuing
obligation to illuminate an otherwise to the renovated harms that these liberal infrastructures
materialize—this kind of secondary witnessing manifests as a longitudinal engagement, a futureoriented horizon that can only ever be reached toward, rather than be definitively attained.
An ethos of care prompted by a radical recognition of entanglement
Illiberal secondary witnessing, instead of being motivated by liberal iterations of freedom
and legal justice, tends to be firmly rooted in an ethos of care. As I explained earlier in this
Introduction, these liberal paradigms of freedom and justice tend to stand on an individualist
foundation. However, illiberal secondary witnessing materializes through a radical affirmation of
relational postures—responsibility, entanglement, implication, and so on. The restorative
practices—whether they be deemed rescripted forms of freedom, justice, or a new ethicopolitical formation altogether—that an acknowledgement of this relationality catalyzes, therefore
manifest as care practices46.
The self-transformation of illiberal secondary witnesses
Embracing the illiberal secondary witnessing practices that the testimonial texts that I
read in this dissertation make palpable, through their metaphoric pedagogies, is a process that
fundamentally transforms secondary witnesses. In other words, illiberal secondary witnessing is
46

Virginia Held posits that when public morality practices take social connectedness—instead of the contractual,
independent, autonomous, self-interested individual in the marketplace—as their premise, they become refracted
through an ethos of care (as opposed to the affectively-impoverished infrastructure of liberal justice, for example).
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a not an endeavor that can be undertaken through a relationship of exteriority—by conceiving of
it as separate from oneself, as a formation out there in the world that one can enter and exit at
will, without risking one’s own constitution as a subject; rather, in adopting these illiberal
attitudes and practices, one submits their sensibilities and thinking to a radical transmutation.
Illiberal secondary witnessing is therefore inherently a process of self-reconstitution.
Michel Foucault echoes this claim in his work on critique47: he theorizes that critiquing a
hegemonic system that one is embedded in—asking after how certain forms of knowledge are
established to be true over and against others, and thus probing the limits of what is knowable—
is a process of self-invention, because in undertaking the work of critique, one inquires into
one’s own self-constitution. Judith Butler, in their gloss on Foucault’s essay on critique48,
confirms this reading when they write: “it seems that there are now two dimensions of his notion
of critique, and they are interrelated: on the one hand, it is a way of refusing subordination to an
established authority; on the other hand, it is an obligation to produce or elaborate a self … And
it seems to follow that the refusal opens up the space for this invention, or that, in some way,
refusal, disobedience, is linked to self-invention” (“Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity” 787–88).
Questioning a hegemonic system and the onto-epistemologies it seeks to naturalize by
identifying and tarrying with its exclusions—the very work involved in developing an illiberal
secondary witnessing practice—is therefore a process that involves high personal stakes.
The co-existence of il/liberal secondary witnessing practices
Illiberal secondary witnessing exists as potentiality—it entails postures and practices that
are presently, and for a long time coming, will have to strive to become something. In the
meantime, people continue to be unjustly detained, tortured, and massacred. Committing oneself
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See “What is Critique?”.
See “Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity.”
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to illiberal secondary witnessing attitudes and practices alone, while standing by and watching
these individuals and communities be detained, wounded, and slaughtered from the sidelines,
simply rehearses the liberal political logic that Uday Mehta indicts—a political logic premised
on deferral and waiting, that sanctions present harm in service of some abstract promised future
emancipation.
I submit, then, that illiberal secondary witnessing can in fact be undertaken alongside
liberal secondary witnessing (such as campaigning for the prompt release of Guantánamo
detainees, for instance), as long as one remains cognizant of the latter’s limits and as long as
illiberal secondary witnessing still forms the horizon that one reaches toward as an everyday
doing. It’s vital to remember here that the goal of illiberal secondary witnessing has never been
to displace liberal secondary witnessing practices and ascend to dominance in their place; rather,
it has always been to bracket liberal secondary witnessing as one among many other possible
freedom-paths, to illuminate alternative means and ends and thus reinforce that the possibilities
made intuitive by liberal discourses, technologies, and institutions are not exhaustive pathways to
liberation. Securing freedom and justice, in their various iterations, will always entail multiple
kinds of imperfect secondary witnessing labor, undertaken across a range of timescales.
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION
As I mention earlier, this dissertation proceeds by tackling three distinct metaphoric
articulations made legible, overtly or as implicit subtext, in testimonial narratives recounting
state-inflicted torture and genocide.
Chapter One concerns itself with the spatial metaphors organizing the relationship
between testifying narrators and their reader-secondary witnesses. I first unpack how liberal
infrastructures of secondary witnessing—such as humanitarianism, human rights, and the camera
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through which they are refracted—prime readers to conceive of the spatial relationship between
themselves and testifiers as marked by either distance or a proximity born out of the secondary
witnesses’ imaginative projection to the site of atrocity. However, the testimonial texts that I read
in this chapter, Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary and Horacio Castellanos Moya’s
Senselessness, route the relationship between testifiers and secondary witnesses through a new
spatial metaphoric: that of proximity as well, but a proximity born out of the testifiers being
imported into the readers’ milieux—‘as if they (the testifiers) are here, in the reader-secondary
witnesses’ world’. After working through the pedagogical import of this revitalized spatial
imaginary—how it might alert reader-secondary witnesses to their implication and constitutive
vulnerability, while also shifting their focus to their own milieux and the routinized, harmful
logics proliferating unchecked there, that then go on to accrete and explode into the spectacular
performances of wounding and death-production that testifiers attest to in their narratives—this
chapter closes by inquiring into the specific praxes that testimonial narratives coax readers to
engage in, as a way for them to further sensitize themselves to and act upon these realizations
that this transformed spatial metaphoric prompts. The two illiberal secondary witnessing
practices I highlight in this chapter are: first, that of affective-embodied reading alongside a
heightened readerly attention to textual moments of estrangement, where testimonial narratives
actively complicate a readerly sense of intimacy with them, and second, the practice of staging
demonstrations against both spectacular and routinized forms of oppression—demonstrations
whose means are also its immediate ends.
Chapter Two takes as its central object the proliferating metaphors of animalization and
objectification—‘as if animal/object’—that Mustafa Khalifa’s The Shell leans on to
communicate the impact of torture on detainees held in a state-run Syrian military prison. In this
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chapter, I first examine how and to what ends liberal discourses, such as those of human rights
and speciesism, for instance, have made the impulse to return the dehumanized to ‘humanity’
commonsense as a secondary witnessing practice. Then, following Khalifa’s infrasonic
insinuation to linger with this moment of the human’s unmooring from humanity—by sitting
seriously with the speculative proposition, ‘as if the human were animal/object’—I explore what
secondary witnessing attitudes and practices may emerge from this reflective pause. This chapter
finally turns to the eponymous Guatemalan Mayan peasant woman’s testimonio, I, Rigoberta
Menchú, to illuminate the dehumanist, ecological, illiberal secondary witnessing stances—such
as living care-fully, horizontally, respectfully, and responsibly with non-human animals and the
earth—that it instructs reader-secondary witnesses in.
Chapter Three turns to how the American university, as a (neo)liberal institution,
disciplines literary criticism, as a particular kind of secondary witnessing practice undertaken
under its aegis. More specifically, in this chapter, I examine how critical literary scholarship,
despite its best and most radical political intentions, is often paralyzed by the university into
ossified forms that prevent it from being truly responsive and responsible to the testimonial
accounts it engages with. This chapter draws Mustafa Khalifa’s The Shell into conversation with
Nawal el Saadawi’s Memoirs from the Women’s Prison to engage in a close reading of the
implicit metaphoric formulations through which the narrators of these texts represent their
experiences of mind and body, as constitutive of selfhood. By juxtaposing these testimonial
representations of detainees’ experiences of selfhood with extant theorizations of subjectivity, in
body(-)mind49 terms, and probing into the disjunctures between them, this chapter seeks to
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While the term ‘bodymind’ has often been used by scholars such as Sami Schalk to refer to embodiment, the
hyphenated ‘body-mind’ gestures to a dualist subjectivity. I add parentheses around the hyphen to keep the
relationship between ‘body’ and ‘mind’ unsettled—to gesture to how testimonial narratives host experiences of both
embodiment and dualism.
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unpack how literary scholarship can work to be more rehabilitative as a secondary witnessing
practice, even as it remains tied to the (neo)liberal university. In this chapter, I therefore work
through testifying narrators’ metaphorical representations of their experiences of selfhood to ask
after the kinds of vulnerable and receptive reading and writing praxes that scholars, as secondary
witnesses, can adopt to host narrators’ autopoietic endeavors more responsibly in their literary
scholarship.
Finally, I conclude this dissertation by reading Boubacar Boris Diop’s testimonial novel,
Murambi, to lift up how an affirmation of one’s non-comprehension, as a reader-secondary
witness, of the multi-scalar harm unleashed by the spectacular events of injury and butchery that
testimonial narratives attest to, can function as an illiberal secondary witnessing practice.
Through this epilogue, I militate against the notion that reading and responding to testimonial
narratives—the very work of secondary witnessing—can only proceed through a purportedlythorough understanding of the suffering inflicted by acts of torture and genocide. Illuminating
how the readerly presumption of such an understanding can be rather naïve and blustering, if not
outright damaging for testifier-survivors, I go on to parse how foregrounding one’s noncomprehension can in fact facilitate a more responsible, illiberal secondary witnessing encounter;
in that, affirming non-comprehension holds the potential to empower reader-secondary witnesses
to remain in prolonged attunement with testifiers and the events of harm that they attest to, it
allows space for them to ask after the conditions that enabled these acts of wounding, and to
learn more, while acknowledging the impossibility of ever learning everything about an atrocity
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CHAPTER 1
‘As if we, the testifiers, are in your, the reader-secondary witness’s, world’: Spatial
metaphors and their pedagogical orienting of il/liberal secondary witnessing attitudes and
practices in Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary and Horacio Castellanos Moya’s
Senselessness
“In The Weight of the World, Pierre Bourdieu sees suffering as the contemporary
expression of ‘a social order which … has … multiplied the social spaces and set
up the conditions for an unprecedented development of all kinds of ordinary
suffering (la petite misère).’”
—Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason
“Minority prison narratives tend to be peripatetic, discursive, and multivocal since
they bear the burden of educating the liberal and liberated white reader as to the
social circumstances that surround the narrative.”
—D. Quentin Miller, “On the Outside Looking In”
As I noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, Mohamedou Ould Slahi is a
Mauritanian citizen who was detained without charge and tortured for almost 15 years, from late
2001 to 2016, first in several ‘black sites’1 across the world and then in Guantánamo Bay—a
military prison set up by the United States government, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
to detain and interrogate Middle Eastern and North African men suspected of involvement in the
attacks. Slahi’s memoir, Guantánamo Diary, recounts his experience of deprivation, brutal
torture, and sexual abuse in these detention camps.
As noted by the memoir’s editor, Larry Siems, Slahi began to write this memoir by hand
in the summer of 2005, in English that he had largely acquired in U.S. custody, after he was able
1

The Associated Press defines black sites as “clandestine jails where prisoners generally are not charged with a
crime and have no legal recourse, with no bail or court order.” The U.S. government instituted a number of these
‘black sites’ globally, in countries including but not limited to, Jordan, Poland, and Afghanistan, as part of the War
on Terror. These ‘black site’ detention centers were controlled by the CIA and were used to interrogate and torture
men (mostly of Middle Eastern and North African descent) suspected of involvement in the 9/11 terror attacks.
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to meet with his attorneys, Nancy Hollander and Sylvia Royce, from the pro bono legal team he
was eventually assigned. Each page that he wrote had to be submitted to the U.S. military for
review—a process that resulted in more than 2500 black-bar redactions being imposed on his
narrative, obscuring the identities of his guards and interrogators, and interrupting the flow of his
testimony with a stark reminder of the U.S. government’s surveilling presence. Despite this
severe censorship, once Slahi’s memoir was completed, it was stamped “SECRET”2 and
“NONFORN”3 and stored away in a security facility near Washington, DC, “accessible only to
those with a full security clearance and an official ‘need to know’” (Slahi xvi). It was only after
seven years of vigorous litigation, campaigning, and negotiations by Slahi’s legal team that the
manuscript was finally cleared for public release in 2012. Guantánamo Diary was published in
2015, while Slahi was still being held in the Guantánamo Bay detention camp without charge.
Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary, as a testimonial narrative chronicling his and the other
detainees’ brutalization in the eponymous detention camp, at the behest of the U.S., hosts
extensive descriptions of the multiple episodes and forms of torture experienced by the detainees
in the prison. Slahi’s descriptions of torture are particularly visceral—they rehearse the assaults
visited upon the detainees’ bodies in excruciating detail, thus sometimes explicitly and often
implicitly, amplifying the textures of the pain felt by the detainees’ bodies in these moments. At
one point in the narrative, Slahi describes seeing “an Afghani detainee … hanging from his
hands” (16), with the “medics ‘fix[ing] him and [hanging] him back up” (16) every time he
passed out from the agony. At other points, he describes how detainees were ruthlessly
physically assaulted by the guards and interrogators—“[An interrogator] put a poor detainee next

2

Larry Siems notes that this is a classification level assigned to “information that could cause serious damage to
national security if it becomes public” (Slahi xv).
3
This security classification ensures that material so stamped “can’t be shared with any foreign nationals or
intelligence services” (Slahi xv).
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to my interrogation room, and his colleague started to beat him with a hard object until he burst
out crying like a baby” (Slahi 182) and “I heard heavy bodies hitting the floor” (Slahi 185) 4.
While intense, relentless pain haunts most of the episodes of torture that Slahi offers up to his
readers, also present in these vivid descriptions are other bodily sensations, such as that of
asphyxiation, for instance; Slahi recounts experiencing this asphyxiation when he was strapped
to a seat in the airplane transporting him to Guantánamo: “The belt was so tight I could not
breathe … I almost got smothered. I had a mask over my mouth and my nose, plus the bag
covering my head and my face, not to mention the tight belt around my stomach: breathing was
impossible. I kept saying, ‘MP5, Sir, I cannot breathe! … MP, SIR, please.’ But it seemed like
my pleas for help got lost in a vast desert” (Slahi 29).
This harrowing spectacle of torture, placed before readers, is reminiscent of torture porn,
a subgenre of the horror film. Film scholar Aaron Michael Kerner, in his study of torture porn
produced post-9/11, explains the subgenre as a fictional one where “victims are typically
confined or otherwise imprisoned in some fashion and … are not just impaled or cut; they are
frequently dismembered or mutilated.” (4); these ‘victims’ are subjected to an infliction of pain
and abuse that is represented to audiences in particularly lurid terms. Kerner notes that the
primary goal of the torture porn subgenre—one he attributes film theorist Linda Williams’
moniker of ‘body genre’ to—is to impart a sensorial experience to the audience, to “[turn] their
stomachs” (Kerner 8)6:

4

These moments crystallize how torture is often communicated to readers as a holistic sensorial experience in
testimonial narratives—an aspect that I explore further later in this section.
5
MP is the abbreviated term for Military Police.
6
This corporeal experience of discomfort—evoked in audience members—is not, however, necessarily one devoid
of pleasure, as suggested by Kerner’s invocation of pornography. In fact, Kerner notes that the experience of
watching a torture porn film can be rather ‘thrilling’—an affective label that holds together these paradoxical forms
of arousal. Even as the spectacle of suffering may elicit these conflicting and complicated responses in audiences, I
want to linger here with the corporeal discomfort that these scenes of torture may prompt, as a spectatorial state that
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Obviously, the spectator’s body is never in peril, but scenes of torture … encourage
spectators to cringe, to furrow their brows, to avert their eyes, to squirm, or returning to
the Latin root of ‘torture’, ‘to twist’ or to writhe. The aesthetics of torture porn elicit
sensations from the spectator, and the spectator effectively ‘replicates,’ if only in faint
outlines, what is onscreen … ‘the body of the spectator is caught up in an almost
involuntary mimicry of the … sensation of the body on the screen.’ (Kerner 39).
Similarly, the visceral aesthetic of the descriptions of torture that Slahi provides in his memoir
establishes the conditions for an experience of corporeal mirroring in his readers. Jennifer
Ballengee, writing about the rhetorical impact of torture, corroborates this perspective.
Representing grisly scenes of torture solicits reader-secondary witnessing subjects that “react
with [their] bodies, with what [their] bodily memory tells [them] about pain: the worst that [they]
have experienced, the worst that [they] can imagine” (Ballengee 9), she comments, and it is
precisely this “bodily association that one human body [may feel] … in response to another
human body” (Ballengee 7) that makes representations of torture impactful. By depicting
macabre scenes of torture, then, Slahi’s testimonial memoir furnishes the conditions for an
affective bridge to emerge that can link the detainees’ and readers’ bodies; through these highly
charged scenes and their frenzied attempt to share sensation, Slahi’s memoir thus conjures a
secondary witness that might register the sensations felt by the detainees’ bodies, albeit in highly
watered-down form. As Jill Bennett, writing about the representation of trauma in art reaffirms,
“affective responses … are not born of emotional identification or sympathy; rather, they emerge
from a direct engagement with sensation as it is registered in the work” (qtd. in Richardson 97).
While several of these theories, that explain the corporeal mirroring that may occur

is rife with generative potential for illiberal secondary witnessing, rather than dismissing it on account of the
perverse pleasure it may be alloyed with.
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between intradiegetic characters and audiences, attribute this power to the image—in terms of
filmic/photographic representations of torture—going so far as to state, as Michael Richardson
does, that narrative can crowd out or muffle this affective/visceral impact, I diverge from this
theoretical premise here. Instead, I posit that testimonial accounts such as Slahi’s, precisely
because they are presented in narrative form, hold the potential to exert augmented affective
force by virtue of staging a holistic sensorial experience. They marshal the visual, in terms of
describing sights of injury-infliction and painting images of the scene of harm for readers, but
also testify to the auditory, kinesthetic, and perceptual contours of episodes of torture. In this
way, the mirroring that narrative testimonial texts such as Slahi’s seek to provoke in readers
emerges from, is conveyed as, and also aims to register as a holistic corporeal experience.
On one hand, this corporeal mirroring that Slahi’s testimonial narrative elicits, through
graphic depictions of torture, seems to pull the reader into Slahi’s universe, into the Guantánamo
Bay military prison where detainees are being subjected to heinous torture by American
interrogators. On the other hand, however, the endeavor to stimulate distressing sensations in
readers’ bodies can also be interpreted as the act of Slahi and the other Gitmo7 detainees entering
the readers’ world, of imposing themselves on the readers’ otherwise safe and sanitized milieux.
The second text I bring to this chapter—Senselessness, a novel by Salvadoran writer Horacio
Castellanos Moya, that represents the process of secondary witnessing to testimonial accounts of
atrocity—vitalizes this latter reading.
Senselessness—the 2008 English translation of the novel Insensatez, which was itself
published in Spanish in 2004—tells the story of an anonymous narrator, who has been exiled
from an unnamed Latin American country for authoring a journalistic piece denouncing the
country’s government, and is at work for the Church in another unnamed Latin American
7

The Guantánamo Bay detention camp is commonly referred to as GTMO or Gitmo.
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country8, copyediting an eleven-hundred-page report that testifies to the genocide committed by
the country’s military regime against its Indigenous population. Despite the dearth of identifying
details in the text, this novel testifies to a number of extratextual events: the assassination of the
Bishop overseeing the publication of the report in Castellanos Moya’s novel bears remarkable
similarity to Monseñor Juan José Gerardi’s murder in 1988, “days after he announced the
publication of a fourteen-hundred-page, four-volume report on the atrocities committed by the
military during Guatemala’s endless civil war” (Peterson); the narrator’s exile is also comparable
to the ten-year exile Castellanos Moya imposed upon himself after he received death threats in
response to his third novel, Revulsion: Thomas-Bernhard in San Salvador, wherein the
protagonist delivers a 119-page diatribe against El Salvador (“Our Reality Has Not Been
Magical”). Senselessness, however, largely focuses on the diegetic narrator’s experience of
reading and editing the report that testifies to the massacre enacted by the military regime—it
delves deep into the physical, psychological, and emotional toll that this process of reading and
editing testimonies takes on the narrator and how he responds to the pain and trauma he
encounters in the pages of this report. Senselessness is, in this way, a novel thoroughly
preoccupied with representing the act of secondary witnessing.
A reader-secondary witness almost like the one that Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary elicits,
the narrator of Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness is also impacted by the testimonies he
encounters. Soon after he reads the graphic testimony of a Cakchiquel man who had witnessed
his family being butchered by the military, the narrator starts feeling smothered and trapped—“I
stood up and began to pace like a caged animal around that office whose only window facing the
street was walled up” (Castellanos Moya 4), he reflects. Each time he reads another such visceral
8

Despite this country remaining anonymous in the novel, it can be inferred to be Guatemala through a handful of
sparse references available in the text, such as a throwaway mention of the victims of the military genocide being
the Cakchiquel people—a group of indigenous Mayan people inhabiting the midwestern Guatemalan highlands.
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testimony, the narrator experiences the same bodily sensation of suffocation— “[the] testimony
… upset me so much that I couldn’t complete the task in one sitting and … decided to go out to
the palace courtyard to get some fresh air” (Castellanos Moya 95) he says, and then later, “the
testimony of the girl raped over and over again, the image that had made my hair and my soul
stand on end so intensely that I could not continue reading and the only thing I could think to do
was flee to the courtyard to get some sunshine and fresh air” (Castellanos Moya 98). This
suffocation, that the narrator of Castellanos Moya’s testimonial novel is represented as
experiencing, is reminiscent of the corporeal mirroring that I noted Slahi’s memoir as striving to
catalyze in readers through its gory descriptions of torture.
The fact that this corporeal mirroring—that Slahi’s memoir seeks to elicit from readers
and that Castellanos Moya’s novel represents the narrator as experiencing—gestures to the
testifiers entering the secondary witnesses’ world, rather than reader-secondary witnesses being
transported to the scene of injury, becomes further apparent over the course of Senselessness. As
the narrator immerses himself in the testimonies offered by the brutalized Indigenous population,
he begins to see parallels between the report and his own life—the testimonies quite literally
bleed out into the narrator-secondary witness’s own world. Soon after he reads about how
Teresa—a teenager who was arrested during the repression of student protests in the city and
subsequently raped repeatedly by the military men—went on to develop gonorrhea, he runs off
to the bathroom and notices that his penis is irritated and secreting white fluid after his latest
sexual encounter—he too has developed a venereal disease. Similarly, having read about how
Lieutenant Octavio Pérez castrated one of the already battered prisoners, he becomes
increasingly paranoid about Fátima’s—his most recent sexual partner’s—boyfriend, a major in
the Uruguayan army and a member of the UN peacekeeping force, also stationed in the same
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country as the narrator, finding out about his sexual encounter with her and what he might do to
him as a result. In fact, after being brought up close to the testimonies of cold-blooded murder
presented in the report, the narrator finds himself constantly paranoid—everywhere he goes, he
is anxious about being spied on by undercover military men and secret agents, who might
emerge at any time, haul him away, and subject him to the same fate that the Indigenous
testifiers in the report experienced; the testimonies he reads impact him so deeply so as to seep
out of the pages of the report and haunt his everyday life. This paranoia that the narrator of
Castellanos Moya’s novel experiences is amenable to being interpreted as what Michael
Richardson refers to as the “contagion of traumatic affect” (161). Richardson notes that when a
person harms another—especially in a way as egregious as torture—this act of wounding
releases traumatic affect, and that this affect is contagious—it leaks out and adheres to those that
come into direct or mediated contact with this incident, including the torturer and the reader
(who, in this case, is the narrator of Castellanos Moya’s testimonial novel).
These experiences of affective contagion and corporeal mirroring emphasize how the
impact of torture is brought to secondary witnesses and inserted into their everyday milieux. In
other words, by eliciting or representing secondary witnesses as co-experiencing the
affects/sensations of torture with the testifiers, diluted as the former’s perception of them may be
relative to the latter, these testimonial narratives emplace testifiers and secondary witnesses in
the same figurative space. This emplacement in a shared space is a radical subversion of the
tangible and figurative separation—between the ‘victims’ themselves and those that may bear
secondary witness to this harm—that spaces of injury-production such as detention camps seek
to institute. A. Naomi Paik, in her study of American prison camps, writes that one of the camp’s
central purposes is that of removal: the camp’s “genocidal violence [is] enabled by … a
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fundamental condition of imprisonment and removal from the political community” (Paik 5).
This physical estrangement is also significant because of the symbolic rupture it enacts: it creates
a moralized hermetic boundary between the “evil prisoners and the good world outside” (Bunyan
189; emphasis in original), rendering the torture of these individuals acceptable; moreover, if and
when those subjected to physical and mental injury in these faraway sites decide to testify
against it, the figurative remove also performs an epistemological removal—positioning these
people as “not … worth listening to” (Paik 3). Slahi attests to this physical and discursive
separation in his memoir as well. He writes about how he had seen the American Defense
Secretary, on TV, characterize the detainees removed to Guantánamo as “the most evil people on
the face of the earth” (Slahi 46)—a moralizing appellation that cleaved the detainees from the
regular ‘good’ population (a non-Muslim, non-brown one, in the post-9/11 sociopolitical
context)—thus, in effect, rendering them available for sanctioned violation.
Another key reason that torture is performed in clandestine spaces, at a remove from
those that might bear secondary witness to it, is explained by Michel Foucault in his influential
text, Discipline and Punish. Foucault notes that while torture was historically performed as a
public spectacle in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, two interlinked causes hurried its
recession from public view by the mid-nineteenth century: first, people often bristled and
revolted at the ferocity of the inflicted torture, especially when the conviction of the tortured
criminal was perceived as unjust, posing a political danger to the regime and revealing its
fragility—"the great spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the very people to
whom it was addressed” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 63); and second, because “the
punishment was thought to equal, if not to exceed, in savagery the crime itself … [it made] the
executioner resemble a criminal, judges murderers” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 9).
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This effort to detach the space of torture from the world occupied by potential secondary
witnesses, as well as the processes of affective contagion and corporeal mirroring that grisly
testimonial accounts seek to induce in readers—that re-insert testifiers into the reader-secondary
witness’s world—all gesture to the problematic of distance/proximity in how the relationship
between testifiers and reader-secondary witnesses is configured—a problematic I take up, in a
more sustained manner, in this chapter. The questions that kick off this chapter therefore are the
following: How do hegemonic liberal discourses—such as humanitarianism and human rights, as
well as the particular apparatus of the camera, through which they are often refracted—
encourage reader-secondary witnesses to imagine the metaphoric spatial relationship between
themselves and testifiers? In other words, how near or far from testifiers are reader-secondary
witnesses primed to feel? Where is the space of intervention for reader-secondary witnesses
designated to be by these liberal infrastructures? And how does this spatial understanding then
elicit particular secondary witnessing practices from these publics? Having worked through these
questions, I then move on to an exploration of how the two testimonial narratives that I read in
this chapter—Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary and Horacio Castellanos Moya’s
Senselessness—suggest an alternate metaphoric spatial organization to secondary witnessing
publics. How may this reoriented spatial imaginary elicit new secondary witnessing attitudes and
perceptions from readers? How may these attitudes and perceptions, in turn, solicit new
secondary witnessing practices from readers?
More specifically, in this chapter, I invite a consideration of how liberal discourses and
technologies instruct readers to imagine the spatial relationship between themselves and testifiers
as marked by distance. Some liberal discourses do, however, depart from this model to
encourage reader-secondary witnesses to imagine themselves as proximal to these testifiers; this
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proximity, though, is largely achieved through secondary witnesses being encouraged to
imaginatively transpose themselves to the site of atrocity—to pretend as if they are there, at the
site of atrocity, with the testifiers. After identifying the harms that both these liberal spatial
imaginaries enact, I explore how the testimonial narratives that I read in this chapter refract the
relationship between testifiers and secondary witnesses through a new spatial metaphoric,
hesitantly proposed as it may be9—that of proximity as well, but a proximity born out of the
testifiers being imported into the readers’ milieux. This is, therefore, a proximity generated
through the following metaphoric: as if the testifiers are here, in the reader-secondary witnesses’
world. I hold that the pedagogic significance of this rejuvenated spatial imaginary stems from its
alerting of readers to their implicated positionality and constitutive vulnerability, while also
shifting readers’ focus to their own milieux, thereby illuminating the quotidian harms present
there, that then accrete and go on to explode into these spectacular performances of injury- and
death-production that readers encounter in testimonial texts. As such, I propose that this new
proximal spatial metaphoric—as if the testifiers are in the reader-secondary witnesses’ world—
asks readers to draw on these realizations, of their implication and unwilled vulnerability, as
resources for redirecting their energy toward addressing these routinized logics of harm as an
illiberal secondary witnessing practice; it petitions them to intervene in their own immediate
milieux as illiberal secondary witnesses.
Finally, I highlight two practices that the testimonial narratives that I read in this chapter
coax reader-secondary witnesses to engage in, as a way for reader-secondary witnesses to further
sensitize themselves to and act on the illiberal secondary witnessing ethos that these texts render

9

To be more specific, it is Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary that invokes this alternative spatial imaginary—of testifiers
being embedded in the reader-secondary witness’s world—in this reluctant manner. See the section of this chapter
devoted to discussing this testimonial memoir for an unpacking of why this spatial imaginary is engaged in this
infrasonic register.
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palpable through the alternative spatial metaphoric of testifiers being co-present with readers in
the latter’s own milieux. The first one is that of an affective-embodied reading of testimonial
narratives, while also remaining alert to the moments where these narratives actively foil a
readerly sense of intimacy with them. On one hand, an affective-embodied reading practice holds
the potential to alert readers to their implication in the atrocities that these texts testify to, and to
their own constitutive vulnerability—both of which ultimately prompt more responsible
secondary witnessing engagements—while also urging readers to center their own immediate
milieux as the site of their intervention; moments of textual estrangement, on the other,
counteract the readerly tendency to substitute themselves for testifiers and thereby co-opt
testifiers’ suffering, an impulse made all the more alluring by the experience of
phenomenological enmeshment that an affective-embodied reading practice makes available.
The second practice that these narratives solicit, as a way for readers to transform into tangible
action the illiberal secondary witnessing dispositions that the alternative spatial imaginary
cultivates, is that of the demonstration—a demonstration whose means are its immediate ends.
To be more specific, I showcase how readers are instructed to put into practice the illiberal
secondary witnessing perspectives that they become cognizant of—via their affective-embodied
reading of testimonial narratives—through demonstrations that protest both the spectacularized
and routinized forms of oppression that these texts make visible. I close this chapter by calling
attention to how reader-secondary witnesses are discouraged from addressing these protests to
the state—a move that would only serve to reify the state as protector, instead of naming it as
violator, at worst, and indifferent non-witness, at best; rather, I spotlight how the ends of these
protests are contained within their very form—it is their very expressivity that ultimately
accounts for their effectivity.
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THE

LIBERAL

SECONDARY

WITNESSING

INFRASTRUCTURES

OF

HUMANITARIANISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE CAMERA AND THE SPATIAL
IMAGINARIES MADE COMMONSENSE THROUGH THEM
As I noted above, the secondary witnessing made commonsense through the liberal
infrastructures of humanitarianism, human rights, and the camera tends to either be premised on
the distancing of the secondary witness from the testifier or then persuades secondary witnesses
to imaginatively project themselves to the scene of violation, to the very site from which
testifiers speak.
The first such liberal discourse that I explore in this section, that regulates the
commonsense around secondary witnessing to align with the aforementioned spatial imaginaries,
is that of humanitarianism. As French anthropologist and sociologist Didier Fassin warns,
“although [humanitarianism] is generally taken for granted as a mere expansion of a supposed
natural humaneness that would be innately associated with our being human, [it] is a relatively
recent invention” (Humanitarian Reason ix; emphasis added). ‘Humanitarianism,’ as a secondary
witnessing discourse, has been infused with meaning through an amalgam of various, and
historically shifting, epistemologies and praxes: Evangelical Christian thought10; moral
philosophy tracts such as Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments11, that attached the
capacity to exhibit sympathy to the notion of the ‘human’; humanitarian communications
performed through the channel of online petitions,12 for instance; humanitarian documentaries

10

See Barnett, Chapter 2 for a sustained inquiry into how Evangelical Christian thought influenced the development
of humanitarianism in the period that Barnett identifies as ‘imperial humanitarianism’ (a period Barnett theorizes as
stretching from the early nineteenth century through World War II).
11
See Boltanski, Chapter 3 for an exploration of how Smith exported Newton’s explanation of gravitation to the
“relationship between an unfortunate and a spectator” (35–36).
12
See Chouliaraki for a study of how internet appeals, celebrity performances, concerts, and news media—shaped
concurrently by institutional, political, and technological forces as they are—have transformed humanitarianism
from an other-oriented to a self-oriented, neoliberal endeavor.
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filmed by those in the midst of such crises13, and even politics, that often treats humanitarianism
as synonymous with military incursions into sovereign nation-states14. I name these various
influences here to further bolster Fassin’s15 warning—to trouble an understanding of
humanitarianism as a natural altruistic tendency shared by humankind and to instead call
attention to it being a constructed way of relating to others instead. This awareness of
humanitarianism being a constructed and curated form of sociality is a crucial epistemological
precursor necessary to teasing apart its discursive implications.
While it would be rather facile to assume that humanitarianism, as a secondary
witnessing discourse, is exhaustively scripted by liberal epistemologies, its commonsense
conception has indeed been overdetermined by the liberal significations it has accrued over time.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, when humanitarianism started to become an organized
practice16, breaking from private, scattered acts of (often religiously-inspired) philanthropic
charity, it was heavily influenced by Enlightenment ideals. As Michael Barnett explains:
Enlightenment processes helped to translate sympathy into collective action. The
Scientific Revolution and a growing science of government that concerned the protection
of individual liberties and intervention for the public good stimulated a newfound
confidence in the human capacity to make a difference and encouraged a ‘collective
belief in the possibility—and desirability—of disinterested service in the cause of human

13

See Rangan’s study of the participatory humanitarian documentary genre.
See McClennen and Slaughter 2–3 for a survey of such instances of muscular humanitarianism, including the
U.S.’s invasion of Afghanistan post-9/11 and NATO’s bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in defense of
Kosovo.
15
See Humanitarian Reason.
16
Michael Barnett, in his study of the historically shifting manifestations of humanitarianism, inaugurates its history
at the point when individuals and collectives started to use this term to characterize their actions. He notes that if
humanitarianism were to be treated as synonymous with compassion, “humanitarianism is as old as history” (Barnett
19). Barnett posits humanitarianism’s origin point based on the term’s socialization and adoption in everyday
parlance, and as per these criteria, institutionalized humanitarianism can be said to have originated toward the end of
the eighteenth century.
14
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moral improvement’. These evolving beliefs contributed to a change in the organization
of society for relief and charity. (51)
As he therefore notes: “Humanitarianism is imprinted by modernity, the Enlightenment, and the
belief that it is possible to engineer progress” (Barnett 21). At first glance, it may seem
paradoxical that the Enlightenment—which revered a Cartesian dualist ideal of the human,
where mechanical reason could operate independently of and supersede emotion—
institutionalized a practice that prioritized the sentimental. However, nineteenth-century
philosophers figured the capacity for compassion as a moral value that could yield reasoned
judgment. In thus suturing emotion to reason, humanitarianism came to be understood as a form
of moral reasoning, an idea captured effectively by Didier Fassin’s articulation of ‘humanitarian
reason’.
Before World War I, individuals and communities in the West17 were primed to feel
humanitarian compassion for and take action oriented toward both those embedded in their own
immediate domestic18 realms—be that in the form of “charity for the poor, child labor, public
education, [or] most famously, the abolition of slavery” (Barnett 40)—as well as for distant
others, especially through evangelical Christian missionary work. It was only after 1918, when
the earliest international humanitarian organizations, such as the High Commission for Refugees
and the International Relief Union19, were founded, that the former connotation got ejected in
favor of the latter.
It was thus the founding of international and nongovernmental humanitarian
organizations—a phenomenon that exploded post-World War II to assist those in rapidly
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I use the term ‘West’ here as a geo-specific hemispheric marker.
Here, I use ‘domestic’ to refer to those living in the same neighborhood, city, or country.
19
By the 1930s, both of these organizations had been largely disbanded. See Barnett’s study of the evolution of
humanitarian organizations.
18
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decolonizing countries, and again in and after the 1990s, once so-called “complex humanitarian
emergencies” (Barnett 2) such as genocides, natural disasters, and civil wars occurring around
the world became available for consumption through the news and other media—that
humanitarianism truly transformed into a shorthand for helping suffering others across borders.
This distance—inscribed between Western spectators20 and suffering others they’re solicited to
assist—has become such a marked feature of humanitarianism that scholars are unable to define
humanitarianism without referencing it: Lilie Chouliaraki defines humanitarianism as “the
relationship between ‘how I feel’ and ‘what I can do’ about distant others” (1; emphasis added),
while Michael Barnett describes it as a “global architecture of care for distant strangers” (9;
emphasis added). Barnett further notes that one of the key reasons that humanitarianism has
become

so

deeply

intertwined

with

the

idea

of

distance

between

suffering

individuals/communities and spectators is due to “the presumption that humanitarianism implies
going beyond the call of duty” (19). He explains:
People, organizations, and governments provide local assistance on a daily basis, and
most of the time we describe them as fulfilling their duties and do not call them or their
actions ‘humanitarian’. Parents feed, clothe, and shelter their children, and it would sound
odd to describe such actions as humanitarian. … It is only when such assistance crosses a
boundary that we tend to call it humanitarian. (Barnett 19–20)
20

Here, the term ‘Western’ again holds together the dual connotation I described it as having in the Introduction to
this dissertation. On one hand, the ‘West’ references a specific geopolitical region, the explicit naming of which is
useful for identifying the publics that humanitarian discourses have historically hailed and continue to explicitly
address. On the other hand, I also draw on the ‘West’ as a placeholder for those publics, that despite not being
located in the geographical West, are nevertheless audience to these humanitarian appeals, which are often staged on
globalized media platforms—publics that are thus also prompted to internalize the logics and interpretive
frameworks made commonsense through this liberal discourse. For these latter publics—that are not situated in the
geographical West—the distance between themselves and the suffering others may often be more symbolic than
physical. Moreover, mediated representations of humanitarian crises often foster a sense of distance in spectators
through aesthetic framing techniques, irrespective of the geographical proximity they may or may not share with
sufferers. See my discussion of the camera, as a specific apparatus that proliferates a liberal secondary witnessing
commonsense, for a more detailed exploration of this idea.
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While humanitarianism made distance a key feature of the relationship established
between Western secondary witnesses and suffering others (typically inhabiting the Global
South), I contend that this distance was also implicitly baked into the older, now discarded
understanding of ‘humanitarianism’—one that was practiced between those embedded in a
proximal geographical space. This distance, however, was more symbolic than material. White
abolitionists, for example, were also positioned as being at a symbolic remove from the black
enslaved individuals they were committed to helping. This distance was made palpable in acts
such as “the carting out of black bodies onto the stage to bear witness to their authentic
experiences of slavery” (McBride 4). Dwight McBride notes that these compelled testimonial
acts positioned the formerly and contemporarily enslaved black bodies as being able to render
‘authentic’ testimony, whereas White abolitionists—even when they were eyewitnesses to
atrocity—were accorded reduced credibility. This is because, despite being thoroughly entwined
with and knowledgeable of the institution of slavery, these White abolitionists were imagined as
being at a remove from its experience—a chasm was thus imagined as separating the suffering
black slaves from the humanitarian White abolitionists, despite them being in physical proximity.
While the discourse of humanitarianism itself primes secondary witnesses to imagine
themselves as distant from the sufferers they seek to assist, this symbolic separation is further
bolstered through the effects of humanitarian communication. Pooja Rangan, writing about
participatory humanitarian documentaries that seek to humanize dehumanized others21 by
allowing them to represent themselves, notes that such humanitarian communication ironically
further dehumanizes its subjects. She claims that by representing the disenfranchised (and
therefore ‘dehumanized’) as performing certain codes of ‘humanity’, in order to secure viewing
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See Chapter 2 of this dissertation for a discussion of metaphors of dehumanization and the pernicious
consequences of seeking to return the ‘dehumanized’ to humanity.
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audiences’ recognition, damaging norms of the human are reinforced. For example, in
superimposing first-person voiceovers over autistic people’s representations of themselves, such
humanitarian communication reinscribes normative language as a key criterion for being
recognized as human, thus effectively dehumanizing its autistic subjects—that lack these
normative linguistic capabilities—once again.

In this way, humanitarian communication—

despite its ostensible mission of bringing dehumanized others close to ‘human’ audiences, to
secure the latter’s recognition of the former’s humanity—implicitly highlights the symbolic
distance between the two.
The explosion of media technology and news coverage of natural and human-inflicted
disasters in the post-Cold War period brought suffering into the very living rooms of audiencespectators22. While on one hand, these news spectacles made the distance between the
humanitarian secondary witness and the sufferer increasingly palpable—through their staging of
these scenes of suffering as exceptional and “unexpected incursion[s] into [the secondary
witness’s] images of the world” (Agier 197), as anthropologist Michel Agier observes—on the
other, it bridged this distance by coaxing the spectator to imaginatively transpose himself/herself
to the scene of atrocity. Pooja Rangan explains that this effect of proximity is engendered
through an aesthetic technique she calls ‘liveness’—the embedding of audiovisual tropes in the
news that perform “the technical capacity to capture and broadcast distant events as they unfold
in real time” (Rangan 72), effectively erasing any trace of mediation and instead encouraging
viewers to feel as though they are at the very site of suffering, experiencing the “unfolding
22

At first glance, it may seem as though these media spectacles do in fact bring these atrocities to audiences, and as
such, embed them in the audience’s own world; however, even as these spectacles are made to come alive in the
very homes of audiences, they nevertheless coax audience-spectators to interact with the scenes of wounding and
death that they represent through the spatial imaginaries of distance and/or proximity brought about by the audiencespectators’ imaginative transportation to the scene of atrocity. These media spectacles rarely, if ever, meaningfully
transplant sufferers into the audience-spectators’ quotidian worlds in ways that compel the latter to focalize their
own immediate contexts.
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present” (Rangan 73).
This

sense

of

proximity

is

further

reinforced

when

humanitarian

agencies/nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) intervene at these sites of suffering to offer aid
in the wake of spectacularized suffering. While audiences themselves may be separated from
these sufferers, the transportation of aid workers—as representatives of the sympathetic and
indignant spectators—to these sites of harm further elicits a sense of proximity from audiences—
a proximity felt on account of being metaphorically present at the disaster-struck locale. This
sense of proximity—‘as if we are there’, at the site of atrocity—is most directly solicited when
humanitarian agencies appeal to spectators to facilitate the agencies’ intervention in sufferer
zones by signing petitions or making donations on their websites23. This ‘clicktivism’ coaxes
spectators to conceive of the humanitarian agents working at these sites as their body doubles,
literally sent there by them, on their behalf, thus intensifying audiences’ imaginative insertion
into the scene of need and injury.
These spatial imaginaries—of distance and/or proximity created by the spectator’s
imaginative projection to the site of harm—made commonsense through the liberal discourse of
humanitarianism, demand attending to because they inform the consequences of the secondary
witnessing practices elicited from audiences. More specifically, they reinforce hierarchies of
power rather than reparatively reorienting these dynamics.
When audiences imagine themselves as distant from the individuals whose suffering they
bear secondary witness to, this distance also risks percolating into and shaping how they imagine
both themselves and the sufferers. In other words, the imagined distance between the two parties
risks coagulating into a rigid hierarchy that inflates the inequality between them, rather than
23

See Chouliaraki, Chapter 3 for a deep-dive into how NGOs and humanitarian agencies mobilize appeals—that
urge audiences to undertake the simple act of clicking their mouse to produce social change—as a form of
humanitarian communication.
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minimizing it—a critique that scholars have levied against humanitarianism time and time again.
Lilie Chouliaraki warns that humanitarianism encourages Western24 spectators to think of
themselves as ‘saviors’ of those living in the savage non-West, who in turn are imagined as “prepolitical subjects striving for survival” (Chouliaraki 40); Lauren Berlant, in their introduction to
an edited compendium of essays that speak to the theme of compassion, the very emotional
bedrock of humanitarian practice, observes: “compassion is a term denoting privilege. the
sufferer is over there. You, the compassionate one, have a resource that would alleviate someone
else’s suffering” (“Introduction: Compassion (and Withholding)” 4); Berlant’s perspective is also
echoed by Wendy Hesford who laments how suffering individuals and populations risk being
only ever apprehended as “objects of feeling and sight” (26) by humanitarian audiences, who in
turn are granted the “power and means to look and to confer recognition” (30). Humanitarian
secondary witnessing, that primes audiences to imagine themselves as distant from those that
testify to their suffering, therefore risks having the deplorable effect of ossifying this distance
between the two in hierarchical terms.
The effect of humanitarianism encouraging audiences to think of themselves as
proximate to sufferers by imaginatively projecting themselves to the site of injury-production is
that this act of secondary witnessing often becomes about secondary witnesses themselves,
instead of the testifiers, whose calls of distress they’re responding to. On one hand, such
exercises center secondary witnesses and their capacity for imaginative projection, making the
sufferers’ bodies “a vessel for [their] uses, thoughts, and feelings” (Hartman 19), as Saidiya
Hartman comments, with regards to the empathy claimed to be generated by slave narratives;
such imaginative experiments “provide [secondary witnesses] with the opportunity for selfreflection” (Hartman 4), and in the process, eclipse the sufferers themselves. On the other hand,
24

Here, I again invoke ‘Western’ as a geographically-specific descriptor.
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there exists the ever-present peril that when such imaginative projection is thwarted25,
humanitarian action will also be aborted. Moreover, theorists such as Lauren Berlant26 and
Saidiya Hartman go so far as to assert that a training in humanitarian sympathy—based on
imaginative projection as it is—is also simultaneously a training in aversion. Berlant writes:
“When we are taught … to measure the scale of pain and attachment, to feel appropriately
compassionate, we are being trained in stinginess, in not caring … What if it turns out that
compassion and coldness are not opposite at all but are two sides of a bargain that the subjects of
modernity have struck with structural inequality?” (“Introduction: Compassion (and
Withholding)” 10). This perspective is also reaffirmed by Hartman when she notes: “sentiment
sanctions black subordination because affinity … ultimately eclipse[s] equality” (10). When
sentiment is not elicited—when secondary witnesses’ attempts at imaginative projection to the
site of atrocity are complicated, or when they fail—sufferers risk being met with aversion, at
worst, or indifference, at best. Furthermore, feeling compassion for these suffering individuals
and communities—being able to successfully import oneself into the site of injury through one’s
imagination—risks comprising the entirety of the secondary witness’s humanitarian engagement,
a peril Kathleen Woodward names when she asks: “When does the feeling of compassion
become an end in itself and thwart action?” (70).
Finally—and frighteningly enough—the imaginative transportation to the site of harm
that liberal humanitarianism coaxes from secondary witnesses closely mimics muscular
humanitarianism: the invasion of sovereign territories by nation-states with imperialist
ambitions, on the pretext of ‘saving’ oppressed or distressed communities in these regions—a
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See Moynagh for an exploration of how child-soldier narratives act as limit cases for a politics of sentiment; in
offering up morally compromised ‘victims’, they complicate secondary witnesses’ imaginative insertion into the
scene of harm, and as a result, they struggle to inspire solidarity from reader-secondary witnesses.
26
See “Introduction: Compassion (and Withholding)”.
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relatively recent example of which is the militarized invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the
U.S. In fact, Sunaina Maira, in an effort to make apparent the entanglement between
humanitarian secondary witnessing and such neocolonial state endeavors, attributes to the former
the label of “imperial feelings”27 (320). Even when not sanctioning imperialistic ventures, this
imaginative projection to locales of suffering, presented as a secondary witnessing posture by
liberal humanitarianism, manufactures consent to sending aid and relief missions to these
regions, which also tend to discharge a biopolitical function—meshing the police function of
controlling marginalized populations with the imperative to care28. As I thus showcase here, both
the spatial imaginaries endorsed by liberal humanitarianism—of distance and proximity brought
about through secondary witnesses’ imaginative projection to the site of suffering—entail
consequences that warrant pause.
A specific liberal technology I now seek to engage distinctly here, in terms of how it has
shaped the spatial configuration of secondary witnessing, is that of the camera. Even though the
camera has been appropriated as a sousveillance29 device by marginalized populations—to
capture and testify to their oppression at the hands of state apparatuses such as the police, for
example, in the case of black populations documenting police brutality—I invoke it here as a
liberal technology because it has played a key role in facilitating the proliferation of the
intertwining30 liberal discourses of humanitarianism and human rights31. Wendy Hesford’s
27

Sunaina Maira defines ‘imperial feelings’ as “the everyday ‘structures of feeling’ that undergird what William
Appleman Williams called ‘empire as a way of life’. Imperial feelings are the complex of psychological and
political belonging to empire that are often unspoken, sometimes subconscious, but always present, the ‘habits of
heart and mind’ that infuse and accompany structures of … domination” (319).
28
See Agier for an anthropological inquiry into how the refugee camps set up by humanitarian organizations
undertake the police functions of control and separation alongside that of caring for those rendered stateless.
29
Sousveillance is a term coined by Steve Mann as an antonym of surveillance. Developed from the French word,
sous (which means ‘below’), sousveillance “describe[s] the use of surveillance technologies and tactics by the lower
classes for the purposes of increasing equality through making public the hidden workings of powerful institutions
and groups” (Monahan 150).
30
Scholarship tends to invoke humanitarianism and human rights as distinct discourses; while humanitarianism is
mired in a politics of moral sentiment and aid, human rights is articulated as a legalistic regime—growing out of
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monograph takes the ‘human rights spectacle’ as its very object of concern—she notes that the
cultural and legal recognition that undergirds the liberal human rights regime is constitutively
premised on ocular grounds, on “imaging technologies and discourses of vision” (Hesford 7), on
“individual images, iconic or otherwise, but [also] social and rhetorical processes … mediated by
visual representation” (Hesford 7). As suggested earlier, humanitarian sentiment too, in being
elicited by images of suffering—be those photographs, news coverage, or documentaries—is
also thoroughly entangled with the mediating technology of the camera.
Art theorist Jane Blocker, writing about the process of witnessing, notes that while
witnessing is about seeing and responding to a scene one is confronted with, it is also about
“imagin[ing] [one’s] own witnessing of it” (51). She further notes that “imagining is not a free
and boundless form of creative work but rather is disciplined by the rules and habits of
photographs, their discursive formation” (Blocker 51). Building on Blocker’s claims, I propose
that in being confronted with images of suffering and injured others, secondary witnessing
audiences are primed to imagine their looking in twofold terms: both through the camera32 and
as the camera. The spectacularization of scenes of suffering elicits a secondary witnessing
experience of being estranged from the real—it subtly alerts secondary witnesses to the fact that
they are in fact looking at the scene through a mediating device such as a camera. Lilie
Chouliaraki explains, “The staging of human misfortune … does not bridge the … distance
between those who watch and those who suffer, but ultimately intensifies such distance … [it]
treaties and covenants such as the Geneva Conventions, for example. I refer to them as intertwined here to highlight
how they are both caught up in an economy of images of suffering—how these images provoke humanitarian
(governmental and nongovernmental) relief interventions as well as claims to restore human rights to those rendered
rightless.
31
Human rights functions as a liberal discourse in several ways: it grows out of Enlightenment-based notions of the
human (see Anker, Fictions of Dignity); it is also a weapon in the late liberal neo-imperialist state’s arsenal—as
Makau Mutua observes, Western states often seek to impose both political democracy and free markets on nonWestern nation-states through the vehicle of the human rights regime.
32
When I speak about looking ‘through’ the camera here, I specifically reference mediated looking-from-a-distance
rather than simply looking through the camera’s viewfinder, which would imply being co-present with the camera.
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removes suffering from the realm of the real into the realm of fiction … mediation produces
instead an inauthentic sense of reality” (36–37). And yet, even as these spectacles of suffering
bear traces of their mediation, they simultaneously try to efface it, to make secondary witnesses
feel as though they are the camera, the eyewitness at the scene of harm, watching it unfold
firsthand. John Taylor, in his book theorizing photojournalism, points out: “The faithfulness of
the photograph as trace, index or evidence … puts onlookers in the privileged position of
standing in the place of the actual, earlier eyewitness.” (17). It is then secondary witnessing
subjects’ simultaneous imagining of themselves as looking at scenes of injury both through and
as the camera that generates what Chouliaraki terms ‘the paradox of authenticity’: an experience
of feeling both adjacent to and alienated from the reality of suffering. It is therefore this
simultaneous imagining on secondary witnesses’ part, elicited by the technology of the camera as
it is, that generates a twofold spatial imaginary—of distance (when secondary witnesses imagine
their witnessing through their camera) and also proximity, generated through their projection to
the very site of suffering (when secondary witnesses imagine themselves as the camera itself,
watching and recording the scene of harm firsthand).
This dual positioning of spectators—along with the spatial imaginaries it generates, of
distance and proximity arising from projection into the scene of suffering—again has fraught
implications for secondary witnessing practices. Jane Blocker warns that when secondary
witnesses imagine themselves as the camera, it influences the manner in which they respond to
the injury-production they witness. She cites the example of the Rwandan genocide, explaining
that while bearing secondary witness to this tragedy, the West33 imagined itself as the camera,
and this imaginative positioning shaped its response to the genocide: “The West [saw] …
impartially and from a distance, the way a camera sees. And yet, the one thing a camera cannot
33

Invoked here as a specific hemispheric marker.
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see is itself. In the blindness of that technology of witness, a world of cruelty … lies” (Blocker
53). In not acknowledging oneself as witness, as an active participant in the scene of harm,
Blocker warns that secondary witnesses risk adopting a posture of “dispassionate neutrality”
(60); in thus looking on a scene of suffering the way a camera does—present at the locale of
harm but only as a passive object unable to intervene in the action—secondary witnesses veer
into the realm of voyeurism, witnessing violation while remaining unencumbered by
responsibility.
Additionally, when secondary witnesses imagine themselves as looking through the
camera, at scenes and victims of harm that exist at a remove from them, other perils rear their
heads. Wendy Hesford names one such danger when she writes that when spectacles of
suffering—captured and preserved through the medium of the camera as they are—are placed
before Western34 audiences, they risk bifurcating the world into spectator and sufferer zones. She
cautions that this ocular secondary witnessing relationship performatively induces a “global
morality market” (Hesford 9) into being “that privileges Westerners as world citizens” (Hesford
9). By this, Hesford means that this ocular regime implicitly grants secondary witnesses based in
the West the authority to look at injury-production, and consequently assign blame and villainy,
whereas the non-West only ever figures as a zone where violation occurs and suffering
proliferates35, and must therefore be ‘disciplined’ or ‘civilized’ into restraint. Additionally, since
Western spectators are only ever assigned the task of looking, with their viewfinders pointed
elsewhere—in particular at the non-West—they simultaneously become blind to the abuses
perpetrated in the West, in their own sociopolitical milieux.
34

Discussed here in a geographically-specific capacity.
Mutua advances a similar proposition through his concept of the “Savage-Victim-Savior” (SVS) metaphor—one
that that he identifies as being a dominant frame of reference within the human rights regime. As per the SVS
metaphor, the ‘savage’ is always already the third-world, non-European state that must be disciplined by
Western/Euro-American states (the ‘saviors’). The ‘victim’, in this model, is often presented as a raced person from
the Third World, who is inevitably scripted as both helpless and innocent.
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The paradigm of human rights functions as a third liberal apparatus that structures
processes of secondary witnessing as well as the spatial imaginaries that inhere in them. Makau
Mutua, in his work, explains that human rights function as a liberal discourse for several reasons.
First, despite their pretensions at being transhistorical and universal, they are in fact thoroughly
Eurocentric36; they also emerge from a legacy of and continue to perpetuate colonialism and
racism37 in renovated forms. Second, they function as a weapon in Western nation-states’ neoimperialist arsenals—they serve as a vehicle for exporting free markets and the liberal
democratic state form to non-Western nation-states.
The spatial imaginary that the discourse of human rights rests on is also one of distance
between secondary witnesses and those testifying to their violation, although this gap is once
again symbolic and therefore more implicit than apparent. Elizabeth Anker, in her book, Fictions
of Dignity, explains how human rights, in relying on a concept of human dignity vitalized by
Enlightenment ideals, institutes a chasm between the rightful (secondary witnesses) and those
rendered rightless (the testifiers). She writes:
As liberalism scripts the human, the dignified individual in possession of rights is
imagined to inhabit an always already fully integrated and inviolable body: a body that is
whole, autonomous, and self-enclosed. This premise turns corporeal integrity into
something of a baseline condition that precedes the ascription of dignity and rights to an
36

Mutua posits that despite the clamor for a recognition of human dignity, and thus human rights, originating in
societies subjected to “European tyranny and imperialism” (205) (including the anti-slavery campaigns in the US),
the voices of non-western activists were ultimately disregarded in the construction of the hegemonic and legally
codified version of human rights that exists today. This global iteration of human rights therefore derives its
contours from Eurocentric, Enlightenment-based thought.
37
Mutua notes that human rights function as a civilizing instrument: Western societies masquerade as ‘saviors,’
rescuing non-Western victims from their ‘savage’ and oppressive non-Western states and cultures. This argument is
reinforced by Samera Esmeir, who observes that when Western states recognize the human rights of Third World
subjects (typically being violated by their own governments), this inaugurates the logic of failed and developed
states, which in turn legitimizes material imperialist action: “The constructed civil and political failure of Third
World states renders the people of the south the humans-to-be of international law. On the other hand, the same
geopolitical order casts Western societies as having successfully generated civil governments and institutions that
safeguard the humanity of their citizens (1546).
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individual. At the same time, it posits a dangerously purified subject, one purged of the
body’s assumedly anarchic appetencies: its needs and desires, its vulnerability and decay.
… Yet paradoxically, the dual conceits of human dignity and bodily integrity
simultaneously require for their legibility the threat of bodies being violated, broken, and
defiled; entailing that human rights discourses and norms are ironically vindicated by
inverse images of corporeal unmaking and abuse. (Anker, Fictions of Dignity 4)
As Anker’s incisive critique reveals, rights-possessing secondary witnesses are symbolically
distanced from the rightless, injured testifiers, on account of the former being the dignified,
corporeally integrated subjects that human rights enshrine as normative, compared to the
testifiers’ broken and violated bodies.
This distance, predicated on the Cartesian dualist figure of the human as it is, once more
risks having damaging ramifications—particularly that of sedimenting into an ontological binary,
where testifiers may be perceived as being only ever tethered to their (broken) bodies, while
rights-possessing secondary witnesses are able to visualize themselves as transcending these
corporeal shackles. Despite human rights masquerading as an instrument of emancipation, this
symbolic distance that it inaugurates between secondary witnesses and testifiers risks further
perpetuating hierarchies and the “mistreatment of peoples either imaginatively associated with or
perceived to be captive to [their bodies]” (Anker, Fictions of Dignity 55). Moreover, this
Cartesian dualism that underwrites the liberal discourse of human rights also encourages a
particular understanding of pain—one that Elaine Scarry writes about in her foundational text,
The Body in Pain, and that Elizabeth Dauphinee critiques, in order to coax other forms of
relationality into being instead. Scarry writes that pain is resistant to expression in language and
hence cannot be communicated intersubjectively; as such, it remains shrouded in doubt: “To
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have pain is to have certainty; to hear about pain is to have doubt (Scarry, The Body in Pain 13).
Elizabeth Dauphinee, however, challenges Scarry’s formulation of pain, noting that it only
makes sense within a Cartesian dualist conception of the human, where some individuals are
perceived as inhabiting their bodies too closely and are hence deeply enmeshed with their pain,
whereas others are able to transcend these corporeal sensations more effectively, making pain a
more foreign experience that cannot be easily grasped/remembered; this Cartesian imaginary
also presumes that individuals are autonomous, bounded interiorities distinct from others,
rendering them unable to easily sense and corroborate another’s pain. Dauphinee argues that
these Cartesian framings then stimulate interactions between secondary witnesses and testifiers
that materialize this assumed rupture—they lead secondary witnesses to require a verifiable
proof of pain (such as images that attest to it) before they feel responsible for it or respond to it.
This perpetuates a cycle of “self-referentiality, rather than other-[regard]” (Dauphinee 148) and
promotes an abnegation of responsibility, on the secondary witness’s part, toward the injured
testifier.
As evinced here, both the spatial imaginaries made intuitive by liberal infrastructures—of
distance and/or proximity achieved by the secondary witness’s imaginative projection to the site
of wounding—portend fraught consequences for the secondary witnessing practices that
germinate from them.
A THIRD SPATIAL METAPHORIC IN CASTELLANOS MOYA’S SENSELESSNESS
AND ITS PEDAGOGICAL IMPORT FOR ILLIBERAL SECONDARY WITNESSING
When the narrator of Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness first encounters the testimonies
offered by the Cakchiquel community in the report he is tasked with editing by the Church, he is
immediately affectively assaulted by them. He confesses:
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I am not complete in the mind, said the sentence I highlighted … the sentence that
astonished me more than any other sentence I read that first day on the job, the sentence
that most dumbfounded me during my first incursion into those one thousand one hundred
almost single-spaced printed pages … I am not complete in the mind, I repeated to
myself, stunned by the extent of the mental perturbation experienced by this Cakchiquel
man who had witnessed his family’s murder. (Castellanos Moya 1; emphasis added)
Instead of leaning into this experience of affective contagion, however, the narrator proceeds to
bear secondary witness to these testimonies via the spatial imaginaries that liberal infrastructures,
such as the ones I presented in the preceding section, have made commonsense. He
imaginatively projects himself to the scene of atrocity he is confronted with in the report, and
proceeds to “morbidly [mull] it over, trying to imagine what waking up must have been like for
this man, whom they had left for dead among chunks of the flesh of his wife and children”
(Castellanos Moya 2). Soon thereafter, he distances himself from the testifier and the scene of
massacre by reflecting on the testifier’s statement in a detached manner, by intellectualizing the
trauma it seeks to convey. He thinks to himself:
The sentence I am not complete in the mind … summed up in the most concise manner
possible the mental state tens of thousands of people who have suffered experiences
similar to the ones recounted by this Cakchiquel man found themselves in, and also
summed up the mental state of thousands of soldiers and paramilitary men who had with
relish cut to pieces their so-called compatriots … [I] reach[ed] the overwhelming
conclusion that it was the entire population of this country that was not complete in the
mind. (Castellanos Moya 2–3; italics in original)
In drawing these loose equivalences between the state of mind of traumatized victims, that of the
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military aggressors, and that of the country’s entire population (irrespective of whether they
belonged to the persecuted Indigenous community or not), the narrator renders legible the deep
chasm that separates him from the testifiers. This idle and carelessly equalizing musing, on the
narrator’s part, suggests that he engages with the massacre through a detached perspective—he
reflects upon it as an unfortunate incident that does not immediately concern him, and that he can
therefore pass rather reductive, half-baked judgments on.
The consequence of the narrator’s attempt at imaginatively embedding himself in the
scene of violation and subsequently detaching himself from it becomes evident soon enough in
the text. Using these reflections as a launchpad, the narrator turns his attention to pondering his
own circumstances—not the politics saturating his world, but rather his regret about his decision
to take up this tedious, low-paying job and to relocate to this new country:
Only somebody completely out of his mind would be willing to move to a foreign
country whose population was not complete in the mind to perform a task that consisted
precisely of copyediting a report of one thousand one hundred pages … I am also not
complete in the mind, I then told myself on that, my first day of work, sitting at what
would be my desk for the duration, my eyes wandering aimlessly over the tall almost bare
white walls of that office I would be using for the next three months—its only furnishings
were the desk, the computer, the chair I was digressing in, and a crucifix behind my back,
thanks to which the walls were not completely bare. (Castellanos Moya 3)
Instead of feeling responsible to the testifiers, whose experiences of pain and suffering he
encounters in the report—the experiences that the sentence ‘I am not complete in the mind’
brings him face-to-face with—the narrator draws on this very sentence as a way of lapsing into
musings about his decision to migrate to that country. Rather than staying with the violated
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testifier, the narrator drifts into passively reflecting on his own circumstances. The egregiousness
of the narrator’s turn-to-the-self—and its particularly depoliticized quality—becomes further
emphasized when he begins to contemplate his office’s sparse furnishings. The testifiers are
forgotten and their pain set aside as the narrator returns to his own life—a life held distinct from
the genocide he has just been confronted, in rather grisly terms, with.
Another way that the narrator of Castellanos Moya’s novel attempts to distance himself
from the testimonies he encounters in the report is by focusing on their aesthetics, instead of their
politics—the responsibility they seek to saddle their secondary witnesses with. Rather than
suggesting that aesthetics and politics are always ever mutually exclusive, through this assertion,
I seek to highlight how the narrator focuses on the testimonies’ aesthetic qualities here to
intentionally depoliticize them; his aesthetic attention, in this particular context, functions as a
way of blunting the testimonies’ affective edge, of detaching himself from the testifiers’
suffering and the actions that produced it. When the narrator encounters particularly poignant
sentences in the testimonies he reads, and is affectively impacted by them, he blunts their
potency by copying them out in his notebook and reading them to his friends. At first, it may
seem like the narrator is allowing the testifiers to infiltrate his own world through this act, but in
fact it simply functions as a distancing move on the narrator’s part—a way of dissociating the
testifiers from his own context, of treating their response-beseeching words as poetic
articulations wrought for leisurely readerly contemplation, of therefore repudiating the
responsibility of being a secondary witness. This rejection is evinced when the narrator admits,
after reading a few sentences from his notebook to his friend, Toto:
As if I had read him those sentences out of my notebook to convince him of the
righteousness of a just cause I was committing myself to, when what I really wanted …
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was to show him the richness of the language of his so-called aboriginal compatriots,
nothing more, assuming that he as a poet might have been interested in their intense
figurative language and their curious syntactic constructions that reminded me of poets
like Peruvian César Vallejo. (Castellanos Moya 20)
Instead of acknowledging that the pathos of the Cakchiquel people’s testimonies emanates from
the pain and suffering they attest to—pain and suffering he, as a secondary witness, is obligated
to respond to—the narrator attributes it to the testifiers’ literary prowess, effectively sidestepping the moral imperative they levy on him. This evasion of responsibility is further
emphasized when the narrator again treats the testimonies as pure literary objects to be passively
savored, detached from the context of injury and violation that produced them: “I proceeded to
take my notebook out of the inner pocket of my jacket intent on calmly relishing those sentences
that seemed so astonishing from a literary point of view … sentences I could, with luck, later use
in some kind of literary collage, but which surprised me above all for their use of repetition and
of adverbs” (Castellanos Moya 31–32).
As indicated by the narrator of Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness, bearing secondary
witness to testimonial accounts through the spatial imaginaries that liberal discourses and
technologies have made commonsense—of either imaginatively projecting oneself to the site of
harm or distancing oneself from the testifiers—has adverse consequences. These fraught
outcomes are further foregrounded through the narrator’s behavior in the time he spends away
from his desk, away from his job of editing the testimonial report. In these moments, rather than
attempting to fulfill his duty as a secondary witness and working to answer the call issued by the
testifiers, the narrator participates in and perpetuates the discursive violence that often sets the
groundwork for genocide. When he is told he will be paid late for his editing work, the narrator

77

places himself above the Indigenous population in a mental hierarchy he creates, when he thinks
to himself: “Didn’t [the office manager] realize I wasn’t just another miserable Indian like he
was used to dealing with?” (Castellanos Moya 27); when he is out having breakfast in the city,
he reflects on the attractiveness of the Spanish girls there, while simultaneously racializing the
Indian women present and deeming them to be unattractive: “I realized that not one of those
women with slanted eyes and toasted brown skin awoke my sexual appetite or my prurient
interests” (Castellanos Moya 68). Finally, to ensure his safety in the city, the narrator chooses to
associate with his friend, Toto, because “he looked like a landowner: the wide-brimmed hat, the
military boots, and the loose-fitting jacket … commanding a certain respect … and he was
probably carrying a loaded pistol on his belt” (Castellanos Moya 14–15), soon after clarifying
that what Toto’s appearance commands under the guise of respect is actually fear: “he would
look just like a landowner, a feared species in this country due to its aggressiveness and the little
consideration it showed for other peoples’ lives, as might be gathered from reading the one
thousand one hundred pages that lay on the desk in the archbishop’s palace” (Castellanos Moya
15). As such, despite knowing that besides the military, the country’s ruling socioeconomic
class—the landowners—perpetrated the callous slaughter of the Indigenous population, the
narrator seeks to ensure his own protection—from the Indigenous communities (that he
implicitly constructs as threat here), because it this very group that would have the
aforementioned response to Toto’s appearance—by socializing with those that resemble the
landowners. As evident here, the narrator would rather seek refuge by walking with the
aggressor, than undertake the risk that comes with aligning himself with the victims instead.
Castellanos Moya’s novel therefore indicates that in bearing secondary witness to atrocity
through liberal spatial imaginaries, one risks shirking their responsibility toward testifiers in
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more ways than one.
Despite the narrator’s attempts at alternately imagining himself into the scene of violation
and cultivating distance from the testifiers, the testimonies he encounters spill out of the report
and into his world, as I suggested earlier in this chapter. Notwithstanding the narrator’s most
fervent attempts at detachment, he is affectively impacted by the accounts he reads—as he quite
evocatively describes: “I flung open the door, terrified, as if there were no air in the closed room
and I was about to pass out in a frenzied fit of paranoia” (Castellanos Moya 6–7). The fear
experienced by the testifiers in the report takes hold of the narrator too. This paranoia is not only
affectively experienced; it also assumes material shape in his everyday life. Everywhere he goes,
the narrator imagines plainclothes military men milling among the crowds, spying on him, ready
to pounce on him, detain him, and torture him at a moment’s notice: “I had the reflex to look
nervously at the customers sitting at the tables around us, some of whom could well have been
military informers” (Castellanos Moya 21), he anxiously notes, and later, “I was walking as fast
as my legs could carry me … crossing impetuously in the middle of the block, not so much to
prevent somebody from following me, how deluded could I be on such a crowded street, but
rather to avoid the ambush I always feared, the one in which two pseudo-muggers—really army
intelligence operatives—would corner me and stab me … so the priests [working on publishing
the Indigenous people’s testimonies] would finally get the message” (Castellanos Moya 28–29).
Through the narrator’s paranoia, spurred by the testimonies he encounters as a secondary
witness, a new spatial configuration emerges here: one of proximity, brought about by the
testifiers entering the secondary witness’s own milieu.
In the moments where the narrator of Castellanos Moya’s novel affirms the presence of
the testifiers in his world—through the paranoia he experiences—his conduct shifts. Instead of
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uncritically participating in the racialization and pejorative characterization of the local
Indigenous population, he begins to self-reflexively reenact the injuries the military inflicted on
the Indigenous people38. In a particularly telling instance, while he is reading an Indigenous
testimony and copying an evocative sentence into his notebook, he reflects: “There in Izote the
brains they were thrown about, smashed with logs they spilled them, which I repeated with
increasing fury until I could see those magnificent logs making pieces of gray hair tufts anointed
with brains fly through the air” (Castellanos Moya 51; italics in original). The narrator’s
repetition of the description of this act of wounding with ‘fury’—an emotional state that the
military perpetrators could be expected to be in—as well as his use of the adulatory adjective
‘magnificent’ for the logs, weaponized as they were to perform this horrendous act of violence,
aligns him with the perpetrators of the genocide. This alignment is rendered increasingly tangible
later in the text, when the narrator is mulling over a particularly graphic testimonial account he
has read. Caught in the throes of this disturbing account, he begins to mimic the actions of the
perpetrator:
I stood up and began to pace around the small space of my room … as if I were that
lieutenant who had brutally burst into the hut of that indigenous family, grabbed in my
iron hand by the heel that baby only a few months old, raised it over my head and begun
to swing it around through the air … until the baby’s head suddenly crashed against a
beam inside the hut, exploding, the brains spraying out everywhere, I swung it in the air
by the heels until I came back to my senses and I noticed that I had been about to bash
38

At first, it may seem as though in these moments, the narrator is imaginatively transporting himself to the scene of
atrocity. However, I would like to draw attention to the fact that it is the narrator’s perpetually paranoid mental
state—as per which, atrocity-perpetuation has become lodged within his own world—that culminates in this scene;
as such, rather than transporting himself to the scene of violation, the narrator in fact imports these scenes from the
Indigenous people’s testimonies into his own world. The fact that the narrator mimics the military perpetrators’
actions in the here-and-now of his own context, rather than passively imagining this scene of violation, further
substantiates this interpretation.
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my arm, which I had been swinging violently over my head, against the headrest of my
bunk because I wasn’t in a hut but rather in my small room at the spiritual retreat center,
nor was I that lieutenant who had busted the heads of newborn babies against beams in
the middle of a massacre, but rather a copyeditor distressed by the perusal of this
testimony several times repeated in the report. (Castellanos Moya 125–126)
In thus mirroring the emotional states and actions of the military agents that executed these
brutal acts of maiming and murder that the Indigenous testifiers bear witness to, the narrator
showcases recognition of his proximity to them. This recognition, on the narrator’s part, reads
almost like a performative display of what Michael Rothberg calls ‘implication’. Rothberg
defines ‘implication’ as a term “proximate but not identical … [to] complicity … [It] draws
attention to how we are ‘folded into’ … events that at first seem beyond our agency as individual
subjects” (1). Implicated subjects, therefore, as described by Rothberg, are those that “occupy
positions aligned with power and privilege without being themselves direct agents of harm; they
contribute to, inhabit, inherit, or benefit from regimes of domination but do not originate or
control such regimes. An implicated subject is neither a victim nor a perpetrator, but rather a
participant in histories and social formations that generate the positions of victim and
perpetrator” (Rothberg 1). In the narrator’s breaking of his paranoia-fueled reverie—in realizing
that he is not in fact the death-dealing lieutenant—he almost self-reflexively and simultaneously
registers both his proximity to and difference from the perpetrators. He may not be the
perpetrator of the genocide, but he is nevertheless implicated in the massacre that the testifiers
attest to, he seems to realize. As such, it is this realization of his implication—brought about by
the bleeding of the testimonial scene into his milieu—that reframes the narrator’s relationship to
the testimonies he bears secondary witness to, and that enables him to reevaluate himself as an
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actor in, rather than a passive spectator of, the scene of harm—a realization that, in turn, bears
the potential to stimulate a sense of responsibility in him, as secondary witness to the Indigenous
people’s testimonies.
Another generative effect of the testifiers entering the narrator’s world is that he
becomes alert to the power dynamics marking the context he himself is embedded in; he
becomes increasingly attuned to how power isn’t simply operating in an elsewhere, removed
from his everyday life, that he then has to imaginatively project himself to, but is also operative
in his own immediate milieu. While the testifiers’ metaphoric entry into his world makes the
narrator vigilant to the unbridled necropolitical power possessed by the country’s military, he
also becomes increasingly alert to the complex positionalities of the different agents he works
alongside. Instead of appraising them as morally unsullied ‘saviors’ devoted to a righteous cause,
as people who have no blood on their own hands, the narrator’s paranoid disposition—fueled by
the testimonies he reads—enables him to assess these characters and institutions in more
nuanced ways. As the text proceeds, the narrator names the Church as a “colonial structure”
(Castellanos Moya 9), alluding to its participation in global-historical suffering. Further, the
narrator also notes how the psychiatrist helming the writing of the report, Joseba—who
pontificates extensively on “the effects that the specific and generalized drawing and quartering
had had on the physical, mental, and emotional health of the surviving population” (Castellanos
Moya 10)—was ironically enough an ETA39 sympathizer (the ETA being a Basque separatist
organization that, as the narrator later notes, was notorious for “executing its victims with one
bullet to the back of the neck” (Castellanos Moya 77)). When he meets the NGO director too,
who his friend Toto had nicknamed “Chucky, the Killer Doll” (Castellanos Moya 53), the
39

ETA, an acronym for Euskadi de Askatasuna (“Basque Homeland and Liberty”), is a separatist group operating in
northern Spain and south-west France. It’s notorious for using robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations as a means
of lobbying for an independent Basque state. See “ETA” for more information on this group.
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narrator immediately recalls being told how the director, in his youth, had “play[ed] a leading
role in all kinds of dangerous adventures in which he had risked his own life and taken the lives
of others” (Castellanos Moya 53). Finally, he also mentally takes note of the wealth of the
forensic anthropologist whose party he attends toward the end of the novel, subtly questioning
the anthropologist’s motives for doing this work when he wryly notes: “it was much more
profitable to dig up Indians’ bones” (Castellanos Moya 109). This heightened attention that the
narrator pays to these characters and institutions in the novel—an alertness provoked by the
paranoia that the Indigenous testimonies elicit in him about his own world—helps him come to
terms with the complex tapestry of power relations he is entangled in. As Castellanos Moya’s
novel effectively showcases: the imprint of power imbalances that risk erupting in violent deathdealing ways isn’t simply stamped on a faraway locale, a foreign scene of spectacular massacre;
rather, it saturates the secondary witness’s own world as well. Moreover, embroiled in this web
of power are not only those entities that are explicitly necropolitical, but also those that claim to
be restorative—the very characters and institutions that act as flag-bearers of rehabilitative
justice. In this way, the narrator becomes sensitive to the various ways in which power—
necropolitical, that is explicitly committed to killing, as well as biopolitical, that is invested in
the thriving of certain groups at the expense of others—suffuses his own world.
Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness therefore suggests that this renovated spatial
metaphor—‘as if the testifier is in the secondary witness’s world’—offered by testimonial
narratives, can rejuvenate secondary witnessing practices by alerting reader-secondary witnesses
to their own status as implicated subjects as well as to their embeddedness in a complex terrain
of unstable and shifting power relations, thereby provoking a heightened sense of responsibility
in them.
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THE SPOTLIGHTING OF THE QUOTIDIAN HARM PERVADING READERSECONDARY

WITNESSES’

OWN

IMMEDIATE

MILIEUX

IN

SLAHI’S

GUANTÁNAMO DIARY
Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s testimonial life narrative, Guantánamo Diary, holds multiple
spatial imaginaries together within its pages. On one hand, it’s cognizant of the vast physical and
figurative distance existing between the detainees whose ordeal it testifies to and the readers it
seeks to communicate with and activate into secondary witnesses. Besides, by delving into the
sordid conditions of the detention camp, by recounting the physical, psychological, and sexual
torture techniques practiced on the detainees there, it also invites reader-secondary witnesses to
imaginatively transplant themselves into the space of the camp—in order to bear witness to the
ghastliness of the interrogation techniques practiced there, to be appalled at the sheer injustice of
this entire American government-led operation. However, on the other hand, Slahi’s testimonial
life narrative also hosts a third spatial metaphoric—one that gets overshadowed by the
aforementioned hegemonic spatial imaginaries, both because they have been made intuitive by
liberal secondary witnessing infrastructures and are hence more easily discernible, but also
because these liberal spatial imaginaries elicit secondary witnessing practices that can offer a
prompter reprieve from torture to the detainees and are hence amplified within Slahi’s text. This
third spatial metaphoric that I seek to spotlight here, that is hosted (albeit in a muted tone) by
Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary, is once again that of proximity, achieved by the testifier, Slahi’s
projection out of the camp and into the secondary witnesses’ milieux—‘as if I (the testifier) am
here (in the secondary witnesses’ world)’. As I will now showcase, Slahi’s text vitalizes this
spatial metaphoric in three distinct ways.
First, even as Slahi, in his testimonial narrative, sheds light on the horrifying and
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spectacular injuries inflicted on the detainees by the American interrogators, he also attends to
the micro-aggressive dynamics invoked and played out in the prison—micro-aggressions that
leach into the detention camp on account of their unexceptional nature outside its perimeter. I
prefix these oppressive dynamics with the term ‘micro’ not to downplay their significance or the
suffering that they catalyze; on the contrary, the structural violences that inform them and that
they in turn perpetuate, make them quite antonymic to this diminutive tag. I simply use this
prefix here as a shorthand to distinguish these forms of oppression from the brutal performances
of injury- and death-production that are otherwise commonplace in detention camps such as
Guantánamo. The micro-violences that Slahi attests to in Guantánamo Diary, then, channel the
denigratory representations of marginalized identities—such as women, black people and those
identifying as homosexual—that have been made commonsense by racist-colonialistheteropatriarchal norms. In his narrative, Slahi describes how women tend to frequently be
invoked as sex objects in the camp; while American women are deployed as weapons used to
sexually assault the detainees, the detainees’ female loved ones are also sexualized as a way of
torturing the detainees—as Slahi recounts, one of his interrogators “dedicated the time to
speaking ill about [Slahi’s] family, and describing [his] wife with the worst adjective you can
imagine” (225). The guards also constantly mobilize racist slurs and disparaging stereotypes of
black men, despite swaddling their words in denials of racist intent—“Fuck your N*****40 chess
… N***** is not black, N***** means stupid” (Slahi 328), a guard tells Slahi. Further, as Slahi
notes, the American regime recruits black men in its detention and torture operations, but the
roles these black men are made to play draw on stereotyped notions of them as mindless brutes.
Slahi observes, at multiple points in the text, that the black guards were merely brought in to

40

While this racist slur is expressed in full in Slahi’s narrative, I omit it here to avoid unnecessarily reproducing this
denigrating language.
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intimidate and exert brute force on the detainees, as evinced in an interrogator’s threat—“You
know we have some black motherfuckers who have no mercy on terrorists like you” (Slahi 117).
The black guards in Guantánamo are thus simply positioned as bodies capable of inflicting
vicious injury, while being deprived of any real authority—as Slahi states, “[m]y observations
resulted in knowing that only white Americans were appointed to deal with me, both guards and
interrogators. There was only one black guard, but he had no say. His associate was … younger,
white … but the latter was always in charge” (287) Finally, Slahi represents the Gitmo guards
and interrogators as repeatedly drawing on language that works to denigrate both women and gay
men—they often use “pussy” (296, 332) and “gay” (296, 332) as a shorthand for cowardly
behavior.
While these instances may at first seem to fit within the liberal spatial paradigm—of
Slahi once again imploring readers to imaginatively project themselves into Guantánamo, to
witness the interactions taking place within its walls—I urge a reappraisal of this impulsive
reading. I posit that by holding up these moments, in which marginalized identities are treated in
demeaning ways, despite being aligned with the regime, Slahi transposes himself into the world
outside Guantánamo—the one inhabited by the secondary witnesses that his text hails—to offer a
commentary on it. By narrating these microaggressions directed toward other marginalized
identities, that are also aligned with the U.S. government, Slahi calls secondary witnesses’
attention to a complex, differentiated terrain of power. In other words, Slahi portrays a more
nuanced picture of power in these moments than the rest of his narrative may suggest: in that,
power is no longer amenable to being understood as a binary—with the all-powerful American
government juxtaposed with the absolutely powerless detainees; rather, power emerges as a
highly differentiated field, with individuals situated at varying distances from it based on their
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racial, gender, and sexual presentations. Through this commentary on the world that the
secondary witnesses inhabit, Slahi indicates that standing at the apex of the power hierarchy is
the hegemonic white, cis-het man, whereas those inhabiting identities that diverge from this ideal
are situated lower in the hierarchy. Additionally, as Slahi makes evident through the varying
treatment different individuals are subjected to, this hierarchy, apart from being one of power, is
also one of sanctioned harm—where individuals fall on it determine what kinds of treatment can
be meted out to them without consequence: while the detainees, occupying the lowest rung of the
hierarchy, can be subjected to cruel torture, women—subordinate to white men, but ranking
higher than the Muslim detainees—can be treated as sex objects; white men themselves, at the
very top of the hierarchy, are subjected to no corporeal harm—rather, they possess the ability to
inflict it.
Several scholars have written about how testimonial narratives rely on what Susan
Sniader Lanser calls the ‘communal mode’ of narration—where a single narrator, in attesting to
his own experiences, also represents those of a broader collectivity. While Slahi’s memoir also
undertakes this communal mode of narration, the communal voice it hosts reaches beyond the
most apparent collectivity—rather than simply speaking on behalf of the other Guantánamo
detainees, it also represents oppressed communities in the world outside Guantánamo, that
although not quite as vulnerable and violable as the detainees are, remain susceptible to harm. In
thus metaphorically transporting himself beyond the barbed wire of Guantánamo, to critique the
structural hierarchies marking the world occupied by his testimonial text’s secondary witnesses,
Slahi showcases how difference—from the White, male, heterosexual hegemonic norm—comes
to be naturalized as worthy of mistreatment—a logic that taken to its extreme, culminates in
performances of extreme violence such as those taking place within the Guantánamo detention
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camp. It is this very continuity between the two that Paul Gilroy indexes through the term “camp
thinking” (qtd. in Paik 8)—a phrase he develops to foreground how the logics that produce the
camp are present, albeit in rarefied form, in the sociocultural milieu that lies outside of it, in the
form of discriminatory -isms such as racism, for example. As A. Naomi Paik reiterates: “The
camp, ultimately, constitutes a dense node of state power … It therefore provides a focusing lens
that elucidates how power operates more broadly … This focused understanding can also shed
light on how power permeates … the parts of the world that are far more familiar than the
camp.” (8)
In thus inserting himself into the secondary witness’s milieu through this critique of the
discursive and material harm that subtends difference, Slahi subtly invites a reconsideration of
the ends of secondary witnessing practices. While I do not intend to suggest that Slahi’s
testimonial text does not campaign for a restoration of rights and liberation for himself and his
fellow detainees—when subjected to such abominable forms of torture as Slahi describes, one
cannot but make that plea—I do posit that this third spatial metaphoric, weaved into Slahi’s
narrative, encourages readers’ secondary witnessing practices to reach beyond immediate victimbased solutions to build in more durable, structural remedies. Foucault, in his study of the
workings of power in Discipline and Punish, asserts that power operates through a “network of
relations” (26); in that, it operates less as a linear relation and more in a multiform, rhizomatic
pattern, distributed among various agents and erupting at multiple points of contact between
institutions and individuals. The effect of power working in this ‘network’ form is that even if a
couple of nodes of power are defused, the general network remains undamaged—as Foucault
warns, power “does not, then, obey the law of all or nothing; it is not acquired once and for all by
a new control of the apparatuses nor by a new functioning or destruction of the institutions”
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(Discipline and Punish 27). Taking heed of Foucault’s counsel, then, simply restoring the rights
of those detained at Guantánamo alone—disrupting the operation of power at one, albeit its most
dense node—will not dismantle the violence of the system itself. Deactivating one node of power
still leaves intact an entire network—systems and logics of differentiation and sanctioned
harm—that can, and will, resurrect in new locales and new forms. This third spatial metaphoric
that Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary hosts—through Slahi’s commentary on and therefore, his
insertion into the readers’ own milieux—therefore asks reader-secondary witnesses to also attend
to and address the accepted harms that exist in their own worlds, harms that go unnoticed due to
their routinization, as a way of bearing secondary witness to Slahi’s testimonial narrative.
A second way Slahi projects himself out of the camp—beyond his and the other
detainees’ own immediate circumstances—and into the readers’ world, is by reflecting on the
circumstances that might have prompted the guards at Guantánamo as well as at the other ‘black
sites’ to keep working in these carceral spaces, despite the horrific torture they were being made
to perpetrate on the detainees. Slahi names crippling poverty as a key factor compelling the
guards to continue working at these sites; he writes about the guards in Mauritania, his country
of citizenship where he was first detained at the behest of the U.S.: “I didn’t feel any hatred
toward them, just bad for them … All my guards had something in common: they all lived way
below the poverty line, and without a supplementary job none of them could make it to the end
of the month” (Slahi 130), and then later about a guard in the U.S., “How could a man as smart
as he was possibly accept such a degrading job, which surely is going to haunt him the rest of his
life? … Maybe he had few choices, because many people in the Army come from poor families,
and that’s why the Army sometimes gives them the dirtiest job” (Slahi 234). As Slahi explains,
then, the guards are compelled to take up these jobs in these carceral sites—no matter how
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unsavory they may be—as a way of scrounging together a living in a neoliberal sociopolitical
setup that offers no safety net and exploits the poor’s helplessness as a pipeline for these ‘dirty
jobs’.
The guards here, framed through Slahi’s wide-angle lens that captures the systems of
oppression they themselves are mired in, take shape as what Aaron Michael Kerner calls
“pro(an)tagonists” (5)—blameworthy perpetrators, but also victims of structural inequities
themselves. By thus commenting on the broader structural injustices that compel people to
participate in such vicious programs—that deprive them of the privilege of refusal—Slahi holds
up a mirror for readers, reflecting to them the unexceptional systemic harms marking their own
world that sustain ‘exceptional’ spaces of captivity and violation such as Guantánamo. In
compelling readers to confront these structural harms that produce agents of violation, Slahi
saddles them with the responsibility of addressing these systemic issues as a way of bearing
secondary witness to the atrocities he recounts in his testimonial narrative.
Finally, Slahi also inserts himself into the readers’ milieux by narrating his life—
particularly his naïve belief in the American justice system—before he was detained by the U.S.
In doing so, he attempts to convey how his pre-detention optimistic perspective paralleled that of
the readerly subjects his text elicits—how he too once shared their ideological worldview, one
where the U.S. perpetrating heinous torture on those detained on the grounds of flimsy
suspicions was unimaginable. Recounting an early interrogation he was subjected to, in a cell
adjacent to one where another detainee was being tortured, Slahi writes: “Chairs were still flying
around and hitting the walls and the floor. I knew it was only a show of force, and the
establishment of fear and anxiety … I didn’t believe that Americans torture” (9). Further, despite
being tortured in the various ‘black sites’ he was detained in prior to his arrival at Guantánamo,
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when Slahi finally realized that he had reached an American military camp, he recalls naïvely
thinking: “I wrongly believed that the worst was over … I trusted the American justice system
too much … We all had an idea about how the democratic system works” (41). Slahi remembers
having similar beliefs even when he was initially detained and interrogated in Mauritania: “I
entered the interrogation room … The room was large and well-furnished: leather couch, two
love-seats … and, as always, the picture of the president conveying the weakness of the law and
the strength of the government. I wished they had turned me over to the U.S.: at least there are
things I could refer to there, such as the law” (92).
By presenting readers with these over-trusting beliefs that he once nurtured about the
American justice system, Slahi attempts to persuade them of the similarities he shares with them;
he seeks to communicate that he too once possessed the same ingenuousness that readers, having
never been subjected to such an arbitrary suspension of their rights, might currently have. This
establishment of a likeness between Slahi’s old trusting self and the readerly subjects that his text
hails, functions, in turn, as a way of dismantling the stark divide separating the rightful from the
rightless; instead, it connects them and places them on the same ever-shifting continuum. A.
Naomi Paik, in her monograph tackling the condition of rightlessness, explains the work that
Slahi’s text accomplishes through this rhetorical move quite succinctly when she writes: “Camp
imprisonment exposes a basic human vulnerability, which links the fates of the rightful and the
rightless: all but the most powerful can be ensnared by the state power that produces
rightlessness. And it is the people who do not matter, who are not worth listening to, [such as
Slahi] who in fact foretell the ominous direction that [the readers’] own futures could take” (9).
As such, by narrating how he too once shared the trusting conceptions that readers might have
about America, Slahi seeks to caution them about how they—notwithstanding the disbelief they
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may experience at being confronted with this depraved underbelly of the U.S. that he exposes in
his memoir—should care about and attempt to destabilize this systemic architecture of injury and
violation, because one day, they could be caught in it too. At one point in his memoir, Slahi
explicitly warns: “I am sure that Americans are not much luckier. I’ve heard of many of them
getting persecuted and wrongly arrested … Americans, non-Americans: it is as the German
proverb puts it, Heute die! Morgen du! Today Them, Tomorrow You!” (Slahi 269).
Slahi’s narrative act of implanting himself in the readers’ world, through this move, holds
the potential to influence secondary witnessing practices in a generative way. In Paik’s words:
If [reader-secondary witnesses] see the dire predicament of rightless people as heralding
[their] collective future, then the struggle against rightlessness and the forms of power
that produce it [will be] motivated not by charity for these others, but by solidarity
organized around a shared vision of a future that [they] fight for together. And because
[reader-secondary witnesses] are relatively rightful, at least for the moment, [they will]
have a greater capacity to act against rightlessness, to work toward dismantling it. (229)
By embedding himself within the readers’ world in this way, Slahi thus calls for a secondary
witnessing practice grounded in readers’ recognition of their constitutive vulnerability—a
recognition of the fact that they too, despite having never experienced the capriciousness and
ruthlessness of sovereign power, are not guaranteed immunity from it.
As I show here, Slahi, in his testimonial memoir Guantánamo Diary, filters secondary
witnessing practices through a new spatial metaphoric: as if he, the testifier, were embedded in
the readers’ world. This spatial metaphoric solicits a fresh, illiberal secondary witnessing
practice: one where reader-secondary witnesses focalize their own milieux as a potential space of
intervention and transformation.

92

Secondary witnesses’ turn to oneself and one’s own milieu that testimonial texts such as
Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary and Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness provoke, risks appearing akin
to what Lilie Chouliaraki bemoans as the stance of the ‘ironic spectator’. Chouliaraki defines the
ironic spectator as a secondary witnessing positionality generated by three co-articulated liberal
forces—the instrumentalization of the aid and development field41, the replacement of narratives
of universalist solidarity with a highly individualist morality42, and the expansion of digital
technologies that promote self-expression43. Based on Chouliaraki’s theorization of the ironic
spectator, he/she emerges as a self-oriented, neoliberal subject through and through. The defining
quality of ironic spectators is their preoccupation with themselves and their own context—they
respond to spectacles of suffering by focusing on and intervening in their own immediate
milieux. The secondary witnessing action they engage in typically takes shape as a consumerist,
feel-good endeavor that is both fleeting and low-intensity, such as purchasing products or
donating online as a way of responding to a humanitarian crisis—it is thus self- rather than otheroriented. Hence, if read through Chouliaraki’s emphasis on the ironic spectator’s self-orientation,
the centering of secondary witnesses’ own selves and their own sociopolitical context may seem
troublingly reminiscent of this ironic spectatorship—rendering it vulnerable to the charge of
lapsing into a liberal secondary witnessing practice after all.

41

Chouliaraki explains this as the professionalization of the humanitarian sector, owing to both the proliferation of
NGOs and international humanitarian organizations as well as the production of administrative knowledge in the
field of Development Studies. This professionalization has led to the entrenchment of microeconomic, individual,
and neoliberal humanitarian solutions over structural rehauls; it has also domesticated other-oriented practices into
“the self-oriented imperative of profitable performance in the humanitarian sector” (Chouliaraki 6).
42
Chouliaraki laments that the ‘grand narratives’ of: 1) solidarity as salvation (that arose in response to the atrocities
of war and aspired to save lives) and, 2) solidarity as revolution (predicated on the Marxist critique of the social
conditions that produce suffering and that aspired to change them) have been replaced with an individualist
morality—"solidarity as a vision of suffering-free society [has been] replaced by a humbler vision of simply
managing the present, in a non-heroic pursuit of pleasures for the self” (Chouliaraki 14).
43
Here, Chouliaraki refers to the explosion of new media that allow individuals to express themselves, based on the
emotionality they may experience in response to spectacles of suffering. These new technologies that promote selfexpression fill the void of compassion fatigue that modern humanitarian audiences tend to experience when
confronted with these spectacles.
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However, here, it becomes crucial to note that Chouliaraki describes these spectatoraudiences with the adjective ‘ironic’ because they are constitutively ambivalent figures: they
“[stand], at once, as skeptical towards any moral appeal to solidary action44 and, yet, [are] open
to doing something about those who suffer” (2). Instead of surrendering this self-oriented
secondary witnessing practice to liberalism, I hold this paradox—of reader-secondary witnesses’
self-centering combined with a desire to bear secondary witness to suffering—as being suffused
with illiberal potential. I posit that it is not the turn toward oneself and one’s own milieu itself
that turns this secondary witnessing practice over to liberal ‘ironic spectatorship,’ as Chouliaraki
defines it, but rather the actions that it culminates in. When self-awareness about how one is
called to bear secondary witness to testimonial scenes of suffering evolves into structurallyoriented action rather than consumerist solutions, it is able to remain grounded in the realm of
the illiberal. Moreover, secondary witnesses’ self-reflexivity—elicited as it is by testimonial
texts’ attention to the systemic harms that prop up spaces and circumstances of violation—may
further act as a bulwark against their backslide into adopting neoliberal solutions, into
reinforcing the very structures of oppression that testifiers condemn.
AFFECTIVE-EMBODIED READING AND READERLY ESTRANGEMENT
What are the secondary witnessing practices that testimonial texts such as Slahi’s
Guantánamo Diary and Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness then elicit from audiences? What are
the practices that they coax readers to engage in, as a way for readers to further sensitize
themselves to the illiberal secondary witnessing ethos that the alternative spatial imaginary
embedded in these texts makes discernible?

44

Chouliaraki notes that it is this skepticism, on secondary witnesses’ part—about the authenticity of the spectacles
of suffering placed before them, about whether their secondary witnessing can truly mitigate suffering, and so on—
that produces a sort of compassion fatigue in them, which in turn culminates in a neoliberal, consumerist, self- rather
than other-oriented practice of secondary witnessing.
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Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness represents the preliminary step of such an illiberal
secondary witnessing practice as being the act of reading itself. This becomes apparent in the
ways in which the narrator and his friend, Toto, are portrayed as grappling with the genocide of
the Guatemalan Indigenous people. While the narrator and Toto—who is local to the same Latin
American country in which the narrator is based—are both aware of the genocide that the
country’s military had perpetrated, the qualitative contours of their engagement with this
genocide are vastly dissimilar. Toto and the narrator’s divergent appraisals of the massacre
become legible in a conversation they have about a deaf-mute who was interrogated by a
sergeant and beaten to death when he couldn’t respond to the sergeant’s questions:
‘What a stupid deaf-mute, why didn’t he make signs with his hands?’ my buddy Toto
commented as he picked some potatoes and onions off the plate … as if he had no idea
that the first thing the soldiers do is tie a victim’s wrists to immobilize him and as if I
hadn’t explained that with the first swing of the machete the god-damn hands of the deafmute went flying, tied and all. (Castellanos Moya 18)
Toto, who knows about these killings, but has not himself encountered the Cakchiquel people’s
testimonies, treats the slaughter flippantly, focusing more intently on his meal than on the grave
subject at hand; he fails to feel implicated or in any way summoned by this bloody history. The
narrator, on the other hand, having read the Indigenous testifiers’ accounts of the brutal
slaughter, is affectively assaulted by them; the testimonies weigh on him and he finds himself
unable to extricate himself from their grasp despite his best attempts—so much so that he feels
personally slighted by Toto’s nonchalance. Considering that both Toto and the narrator are
acquainted with the ruthlessness of this pogrom, what informs their qualitatively distinct
engagements with it is the means through which they each encounter it. To be more specific, the
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narrator’s potent sense of enmeshment with the genocide can be attributed to the means through
which he became familiar with it: by reading the testimonies of the Cakchiquel people and being
affectively assaulted by them. Castellanos Moya’s narrative therefore posits the act of reading,
and the affective contagion it enacts, as being the alchemical process that transfigures the
narrator into a starkly different secondary witness from Toto—into an illiberal secondary
witness.
Holding the affective contagion that the narrator is represented as experiencing when
reading the Cakchiquel people’s testimonies—that eventually reshapes the kind of secondary
witnessing he engages in—as paradigmatic, I posit that Senselessness offers up ‘affectiveembodied reading’ as a preliminary step that readers can engage in, as part of an illiberal
secondary witnessing practice. This hyphenated term—affective-embodied reading—is one that I
develop to capture the key strands of the reading practice that Castellanos Moya represents in
and advocates for through his testimonial novel. I refer to this reading practice as ‘affectiveembodied reading’ because it draws on what Elizabeth Anker explains as an ‘embodied politics
of reading,’45 while simultaneously amplifying the role that affect plays in facilitating this
phenomenologically rich and responsible encounter between testifiers and reader-secondary
witnesses.
Anker refracts her theorization of an ‘embodied politics of reading’ through philosopher
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological framework, one that he explains as an exercise in
“disclosure or unconcealment” (Anker, Fictions of Dignity 53). Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology
takes as its springboard the fact of an embodied individual’s state of always already being
embedded in a material lifeworld—what he refers to as the “flesh of the world” (Anker, Fictions
of Dignity 59), his choice of diction working to play up the liveness of these surroundings that
45

See Fictions of Dignity.
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include and extend beyond the human. Merleau-Ponty posits that one’s perceptual experience
emerges from this very embeddedness; more specifically, one’s corporeal-cognitive46 experience
necessarily yields from “a reverberating matrix of vital intensities” (Anker, Fictions of Dignity
48) that are exchanged between the perceiving individual and the fleshy lifescape he/she is
immersed in. These intensities, generated and hosted by the lifeworld as they are, are in turn
perceived by the individual through an “intersensory gestalt” (Anker, Fictions of Dignity 52).
While this gloss on Merleau-Ponty’s work might at first suggest that the perception he theorizes
can only occur through material co-presence, Anker emphasizes that this is not the case. On the
contrary, Merleau-Ponty identifies aesthetic interactions as being particularly conducive to
phenomenological experience; in Anker’s words, “art possesses a deep affinity with ontology—
being variously disposed to expose the lifeworld’s texture, to stimulate phenomenological insight
… aesthetic experience can map the unfolding of an embodied consciousness, in the process
suspending ordinary thought and discourse to excavate submerged registers of understanding”
(Anker, Fictions of Dignity 74). An embodied reading of testimonial narratives is therefore such
an aesthetic encounter that can stimulate a phenomenological experience for reader-secondary
witnesses—an encounter that enables reader-secondary witnesses to perceive, in a particularly
corporeal manner, both the testifiers themselves and the experiences they attest to.
More specifically, I posit that reading, as an aesthetic encounter between testifiers and
reader-secondary witnesses, catalyzes a phenomenological experience for the latter through the
medium of affect—an insight Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness heavily emphasizes, as I
suggested through my reading of his novel earlier in this chapter. Affect has been theorized by
scholars in several distinct ways—a multidimensionality I attempt to braid together into a
46

Through this compound term, I seek to emphasize that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological framework does not
adhere to a mind-body dualism; he understands embodiment—fleshy perception—to inform and in turn be shaped
by cognition.
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generative unity here. Michael Richardson observes that affect is an entity that is “both bodily
and between bodies” (161)—it is simultaneously a materiality that is of the body47 and also
transmits between bodies. Affect—in its verb-operation, as an entity that galvanizes activity in
the world—can further be understood through two discrete schools of thought. The Spinozist
school holds that affect refers to the “capacity for both acting and being acted upon” (Richardson
35); in that, bodies function as “sites of potential” (Richardson 35) and in interacting with each
other and the world, they generate affect which, in turn, by penetrating them, “change[s] them …
caus[ing] them to grow, enlighten, transform, strengthen … or mutate, freeze, rupture, break,
traumatize” (Richardson 35).

A second school of thought, helmed by developmental

psychologist Silvan Tomkins, conceives of affect as “biological and specific … [as] discretely
identifiable: shame, anguish, fear, joy, excitement, disgust, love, interest, and anger” (Richardson
36); yet, affect is not quite these emotions themselves but rather the “pre-cognitive and visceral
experiences that shape and change bodies” (Richardson 36) that correspond to these emotions.
Affects, through Tomkins’ conceptualization as well, are “felt on the surface of the skin … [but]
do not occur in isolation—they are always relational; they are involuntary bodily responses born
of particular encounters” (Richardson 36). As such, when reader-secondary witnesses read
testimonial narratives in an ‘embodied’ manner, they expose themselves to a phenomenological
experience that occurs through the transmission of affect between themselves and the testifiers.
Moreover, this transmission of affect and the phenomenological experience it catalyzes sets the
ground for readers to become alert to and eventually internalize an illiberal secondary witnessing
ethos.
47

Richardson writes: “Bodies are determined ‘not by an outer skin-envelope or other surface boundary but by their
potential to reciprocate or co-participate in the passage of affect” (35). However, Jane Bennett puts a finer point on
Richardson’s description when she warns that “[a]ffects create a field of forces that do not tend to congeal into
subjectivity” (xii)—affect is therefore never possessed by a singular body, even as it may penetrate it. Affect is thus
corporeal, but also exceeds the body—it is what Richardson calls “pre-subjective” (35).
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Another important characteristic of affect that Michael Richardson calls attention to is its
resemblance to the gesture. In referring to affect as gestural, Richardson stresses that it is a
suggestive and polyvalent, rather than a firmly indicative, force. While the transmission of affect
between subjects is itself a precognitive, unwilled phenomenon, it is nevertheless possible to
make sense of affect in ways that stymie its responsibility-generating potential, as represented by
the narrator of Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness. Despite being hyper-perceptive to the affect
relayed by the Cakchiquel testimonies he reads and edits, the narrator attempts to re-ascribe this
affective force to alternate stimuli and thus defuse its potency, as established in his attempts to
aestheticize the testimonial utterances he confronts as well as in his promiscuity with the Spanish
women he meets after work48. The narrator’s attempt to dissipate the affective charge he
experiences by intentionally (mis)interpreting it as being evoked by stimuli other than the
Indigenous testimonies he reads, however, forecloses the salutary implications it holds for
secondary witnessing; instead, it results in the narrator completely disregarding the context that
produced the statements he admires, thus shirking his responsibility as secondary witness.
Embodied reading, in a way that facilitates productive affective-phenomenological encounters
between reader-secondary witnesses and testifiers—encounters that can, in turn, fuel a deeply
illiberal secondary witnessing practice—thus also involves a hermeneutic component, an
interpretive hospitality that can facilitate the transformative effects of affect, rather than
obstructing or re-routing them.
The questions that inevitably follow from this unpacking of what an affective-embodied
reading practice looks like are: What are the affordances of this method of testimonial
encounter? How might reader-secondary witnesses’ affective-embodied reading of testimonial
48

Castellanos Moya’s novel represents the narrator as channeling the affective surplus that lingers with him—owing
to his engagement with the Indigenous people’s testimonies—into wanton sexual encounters with the Spanish
women that he socializes with after work.
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narratives facilitate the internalization of an illiberal secondary witnessing ethos? How may it, as
Elizabeth Anker claims, “elucidat[e] the character of just coexistence” (Fictions of Dignity 48)?
The first, and most crucial, consequence of the phenomenological experience stimulated by an
affective-embodied reading practice is that it attunes reader-secondary witnesses to their
condition of always already being intertwined with others—and in this particular case, with the
testifiers they encounter in the pages of these testimonial texts. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, writing
about phenomenological perception, claims that “embodied perception fuses the self to other
beings … the body, operating simultaneously as seer and visible object [among other reversible
sensory exchanges], undergoes a palpable ‘reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in
another’ that engenders ‘intercorporeity’” (Anker, Fictions of Dignity 59). In other words, when
partaking of affective-embodied reading, reader-secondary witnesses submit themselves to a
phenomenological experience—owing to the transmission of affect—that alerts them to their
fundamental enmeshment with others—their ability to be acted upon, and thus by extension, to
also act upon these others. This awareness of ‘intercorporeity’—of one’s fundamental
enmeshment with others—is an important precursor to nurturing a sense of implication and
attendant responsibility49, both key components of an illiberal secondary witnessing ethos, as
Castellanos Moya’s testimonial novel suggests.
The sense of responsibility and implication that reader-secondary witnesses may
experience when undertaking affective-embodied reading is further augmented by another
49

I don’t intend to suggest that an awareness of intercorporeity—of one’s enmeshment with others and one’s ability
to impact others—will always, without exception, compel readers to meditate on their implication in these acute
forms of global-historical suffering or that it will necessarily stimulate a sense of responsibility in them. In fact, it
can further augment the will to injure (as it does in those who torture) or the desire to consume spectacles of injuryproduction as a source of perverse pleasure. However, here, I seek to emphasize how this phenomenological
experience is amenable to nurturing a readerly awareness of enmeshment that is suffused with illiberal potential. It
may not definitively stimulate a readerly sense of implication or responsibility, but it nevertheless provides the
fertile ground for these insights to take root. Liberal secondary witnessing practices often thwart this readerly
cognizance of enmeshment itself—thus making it increasingly unlikely that readers will arrive at the insights that
build on this primary acknowledgment of the relationality that they share with testifiers.
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element of the phenomenological experience that Merleau-Ponty spotlights. He notes that in
perceiving an other, in becoming conscious to the condition of ‘intercorporeity’ that marks all
our embodied existences, one is also compelled to meditate on how “corporeal existence …
ensnares life within relations that are inherently conflictual … the ontological condition of
embodiment poses a constant reminder of the body’s mortality and woundedness” (Anker,
Fictions of Dignity 57). In realizing the myriad ways in which one is perpetually exposed to
another, one can become mindful of one’s own—and therefore the other’s—constitutive
precariousness, a realization that holds the potential to enhance the sense of responsibility one
feels in relation to an other. Noticing that one can injure, just like one can also oneself be injured,
levies the imperative to live both care-fully and responsibly with others—in Anker’s words: “an
awareness of one’s own precarity50 simultaneously dispels monadic self-interest and orients the
self toward the collective” (Fictions of Dignity 57).
Additionally, affective-embodied reading facilitates an affective phenomenological
encounter that is experienced by reader-secondary witnesses in their own bodies. This attention
to the self, to one’s own body as the affective host of the testifiers and the experiences they
recount, holds the potential to reaffirm the renovated spatial metaphoric nestled in the pages of
testimonial narratives such as Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary and Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness.
Attending to oneself can further prompt reader-secondary witnesses to focalize the ‘here and
now’ that they co-inhabit with the testifiers rather than imaginatively projecting themselves to a
‘there and then’—to a distanced scene of suffering and harm. As Anker clarifies: “corporeal
being inexorably intertwines the [perceiving] subject within their proximate milieu” (Fictions of
50

Although Anker uses the term ‘precarity’ here to refer to our constitutive vulnerability, Butler would substitute
this term with ‘precariousness’. Butler distinguishes ‘precariousness’—the constitutive vulnerability shared by all
human beings by virtue of our embodiment, from ‘precarity,’ a term they reserve to explain the particular and
unequally distributed vulnerabilities that the disenfranchised are burdened with, to avoid conflating the two. See
Frames of War for a more sustained exploration of the two.
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Dignity 48).
Even as an affective-embodied reading practice orients reader-secondary witnesses
toward focalizing themselves—their own constitutive precariousness51 and their own milieux,
both stances that are crucial elements of an illiberal secondary witnessing ethos, these postures
are not without risk. Centering oneself in these ways runs the risk of lapsing into a liberal
iteration of secondary witnessing that I called attention to at the beginning of this chapter—a
form of secondary witnessing that culminates in substituting oneself for the other, in co-opting
the testifiers’ pain and suffering and manipulating it into an opportunity for self-reflection,
thereby eclipsing the sufferers themselves from view. To prevent readers from engaging in this
appropriation when practicing affective-embodied reading, the testimonial narratives I explore in
this chapter either embed or represent moments of readerly estrangement in their pages.
In Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary, these moments of readerly estrangement are produced by
Larry Siems’ editorial interventions in the text. The dedication that opens the text reads:
“Mohamedou would like to dedicate his writing to the memory of his late mother, Maryem Mint
El Wadia, and he would also like to express that if it weren’t for Nancy Hollander and her
colleagues Theresa Duncan and Linda Moreno, he couldn’t be making that dedication” (Slahi v).
By referring to Slahi via a third-person address here, Siems makes apparent that this dedication
has been authored by him, as the editor, in conversation with Slahi, rather than by Slahi himself.
Siems thus patently stamps his presence over this testimonial narrative, intervening in the textual
relationship between Slahi and the reader to prevent the latter from inhabiting Slahi’s interiority
too closely, thereby again bringing Slahi into view as a testifier who stands distinct from the
51

Overemphasizing the notion of constitutive mutual vulnerability runs the risk of enacting a facile equalization
between testifiers and reader-secondary witnesses. It is this very risk that Kelly Oliver indexes when she warns that
naming the ontological condition of vulnerability, that emanates from moving through the world as embodied
beings, risks obfuscating the “differential vulnerability that is the result of political or social oppression” (475). It is
to avoid this conflation that Butler distinguishes ‘precariousness’ from ‘precarity,’ as I mentioned in the previous
footnote.
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reader-secondary witness. Further, Siems also peppers the text with footnotes, thus annotating
Slahi’s narration with educated conjecture about the identities of his torturers as well as with
extra-textual corroborations of the events that Slahi recounts. These footnotes again interrupt the
flow of the first-person narrative, jolting readers out of Slahi’s interiority, reminding them that
even though they may speculatively inhabit his perspective, they cannot and should not attempt
to wholly appropriate the experience that Slahi attests to.
Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness represents these moments of estrangement—between
the reader and the testifiers he/she encounters—through the perspective of the novel’s narrator.
The alienation that the narrator experiences when reading the Cakchiquel people’s testimonies
becomes palpable in the moments where he copies particularly poignant statements from the
testimonies he reads into his notebook. In the very first sentence of the novel, the narrator states:
“I am not complete in the mind, said the sentence I highlighted with the yellow marker and even
copied into my personal notebook … the sentence … astonished me more than any other
sentence I read that first day on the job, the sentence … dumbfounded me … I am not complete
in the mind, I repeated to myself, stunned by the extent of mental perturbation experienced by
this Cakchiquel man” (Castellanos Moya 1; emphasis in original). Even though the narrator later
aestheticizes (and thus attempts to domesticate and depoliticize) this testimonial utterance, in the
initial moments of his raw encounter with these words, he is perplexed by them, he is estranged
by their force. Reading the Cakchiquel man’s words, the narrator is unable to accommodate them
within any familiar frames of reference, and it is this very experience of alienation, of noncomprehension52, elicited by testimonial utterances, that Castellanos Moya’s text represents as
imperative for reader-secondary witnesses to linger with.

52

See the Conclusion of this dissertation for my exploration of a readerly affirmation of non-comprehension as an
illiberal secondary witnessing practice.
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Kali Tal, writing about how secondary witnesses unpack testimonial articulations,
explains that secondary witnesses reach into their own repertoire of past traumatic experiences to
make sense of what they are encountering on the page—their own trauma becomes a way of
making sense of the testifier’s trauma. However, as Tal warns, it is pivotal for the readersecondary witness to remember that “the re-experience of trauma in the reader will always be
derived from the reader’s own traumatic experience, and not from the read experience of the
survivor-author … [T]he non-traumatized reader has at his or her disposal the entire cultural
‘library’ of symbol, myth, and metaphor, but he or she does not have access to the meanings of
the sign that invoke traumatic memory [in survivors]” (16; emphasis in original). The testimonial
texts that I read in this chapter therefore elicit and represent moments of readerly estrangement
as a way of introducing friction in the reader-secondary witness’s affective-embodied reading
practice—friction that can ward against a readerly appropriation of testifiers’ experiences of pain
and suffering.
At first, it may appear as though these textual moments of estrangement are once again
encouraging readers to refract their relationship with testifiers through the liberal spatial
imaginary of distance; however, I trouble this understanding on the grounds that testimonial
texts’ estrangement of readers functions more as a distance-in-proximity, rather than the absolute
separation (material or figurative) that liberal secondary witnessing infrastructures have made
commonsense. In soliciting readers to attend to moments of textual estrangement, even as they
coax them to partake of an affective-embodied reading experience, testimonial texts instruct
readers in an illiberal secondary witnessing practice that alerts them to their difference from
testifiers, that forecloses appropriative identification on reader-secondary witnesses’ part. Such
an illiberal secondary witnessing encounter, elicited by testimonial narratives as it is, therefore
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functions as a practice of what Kaja Silverman christens ‘heteropathic identification’53—a form
of readerly identification with testifiers that “resist[s] incorporative (idiopathic) identifications
that result in the affirmation of self-sameness” (Hesford 200).
THE

DEMONSTRATION

AS

AN

ILLIBERAL

SECONDARY

WITNESSING

PRACTICE
Slahi closes out his testimonial narrative, Guantánamo Diary, by posing a number of
direct questions to his readers, including: “So has the American democracy passed the test it was
subjected to with the 2001 terrorist attacks? I leave this judgment to the reader” (371) and “What
do the American people think? I am eager to know” (372). By asking these questions, Slahi
conveys to reader-secondary witnesses that he anticipates a response from them—he hopes for
them to engage with the events he has testified to in his text long after their encounter with his
memoir itself wraps up. Slahi’s embedding of this desire in his testimonial text suggests that an
illiberal secondary witnessing practice cannot conclude with affective-embodied reading itself.
While affective-embodied reading indeed functions as a crucial first step of such an illiberal
secondary witnessing practice—provoking insights in reader-secondary witnesses that provide
fecund ground for an illiberal ethos to take root—a more sustained engagement, that extends
beyond the reading moment, is sought of reader-secondary witnesses.
Castellanos Moya’s testimonial novel, Senselessness, also makes a similar appeal to
readers. The narrator of the text—who represents reader-secondary witnesses—indicates that
simply engaging with the testimonies of the Cakchiquel people does not comprise the entirety of
his secondary witnessing endeavor. When the narrator, after several attempts at evasion,

53

Another theoretical term used to capture this concept of identification-at-a-distance is Dominick LaCapra’s
“empathetic unsettlement”. Wendy Hesford provides a succinct gloss on this term when she explains; “LaCapra
argues that unlike a stance of full identification, wherein the self and the other are construed as fused, empathetic
unsettlement recognizes and respects the alterity of the other” (198).
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eventually affirms an affective-embodied engagement with the testimonies he is assigned to edit
and becomes sensitive to the testifiers’ metaphoric presence in his own milieu, he has several
epiphanies that prime him to adopt an illiberal secondary witnessing posture—such as his
awareness of his status as an implicated subject as well as of the power dynamics that saturate
his own milieu. However, these epiphanies are not sufficient to count as a comprehensive
illiberal secondary witnessing practice in and of themselves; rather, they function as an illiberal
ethos that precipitates the action that the narrator eventually undertakes at the end of the novel.
Toward the end of Castellanos Moya’s text, the narrator is depicted as sitting at a bar,
reflecting on the Indigenous testimonies he has read and how this work has transformed him, so
much so that he is nearly unrecognizable to himself—“my face … suddenly looked different to
me, as if he who was there wasn’t me, as if that face for an instant were somebody else’s, a
stranger’s” (Castellanos Moya 134). The narrator has transformed into a new secondary witness
here—an illiberal secondary witness; however, this illiberality only becomes fully discernible in
the actions he undertakes next. Soon after this probing moment of self-reflection, the narrator
spots a man leaning against the bar who he believes to be General Octavio Pérez Mena, the
military official who had castrated a prisoner and raped a teenage Indigenous girl whose
testimony the narrator had read. In this moment, instead of succumbing to his paranoia and
fleeing the scene, as he is represented as having done at multiple points in the novel, the narratorsecondary witness turns to the man he presumes to be the General and shouts, “We all know who
are the assassins!” (Castellanos Moya 140)—a sentence he had encountered in a testimony he
had edited. Refusing to give up after one attempt, the narrator screams another sentence,
excerpted from another testimony, at the man: “Thereafter we live the time of distress”
(Castellanos Moya 140). When the man at the bar fails to respond to him, the narrator takes to
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the streets and shouts at passersby, who are celebrating a Carnival: “We all know who are the
assassins!” (Castellanos Moya 141). These scenes suggest that the narrator of Castellanos
Moya’s novel, goaded on by the illiberal ethos that his affective-embodied reading of the
testimonies inculcated in him, practices illiberal secondary witnessing by amplifying the
testifier’s words, through his own voice, in a public setting, seeking to call a new social justiceoriented collectivity into being—he undertakes action that is reminiscent of a demonstration, a
protest.
In other words, these testimonial narratives elicit an illiberal secondary witnessing
practice from readers that comprises of two steps. The first step involves partaking of an
affective-embodied reading experience that holds the potential to sensitize readers to the
proximal spatial imaginary of the testifiers inhabiting their own milieux, while also helping them
internalize the lessons that this new spatial metaphoric yields—of their implication, of their
constitutive vulnerability, and the fact that routinized structural harms saturate their own world,
harms that accrue and eventually explode into the spectacular injuries that the testifiers attest to,
such as genocidal violence or torture in the prison-camp. The next step involves affirming this
implication and constitutive vulnerability by intervening in one’s own milieu—by demonstrating
against both the acute forms of suffering that the testifiers make visible, as well as the structural,
quotidian oppression that goes unnoticed on account of its routinization.
How might a demonstration function as a form of illiberal secondary witnessing? Luc
Boltanski defines it as a public speech-act54 that establishes the secondary witness’s commitment
to action; he notes: “commitment, and political commitment in particular, is always mediated by
54

Luc Boltanski posits that public speech, the kind involved in a demonstration, can be understood to be a form of
action because it fulfills the following criteria: it goes “a) from intentionality to; (b) … incorporation in bodily
gestures and movements set out in the world of things, which consequently presupposes; (c) the sacrifice of other
possible actions and which; (d) by manifesting itself in the presence of someone else; (e) testifies to and seals a
commitment” (185).
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speech” (Boltanski xvi). Further explicating the value of such a public speech-act in the face of
spectacles of suffering, Boltanski points out that it is this very speech-act that “distinguish[es]
between a way of looking which can be characterized as disinterested or altruistic, one which is
orientated outwards and which is motivated by the intention to see the suffering ended, from a
selfish way of looking which is wholly taken up with the internal states aroused by the spectacle
of suffering: fascination, horror, interest, excitement, pleasure, etc.” (21). As such, staging this
public speech act in their own milieux functions as a way for readers to performatively identify
themselves as committed secondary witnesses.
Moreover, demonstrations function as a way for reader-secondary witnesses to
materialize their recognition of their implicated status as well as their constitutive vulnerability—
insights furnished by an affective-embodied engagement with testimonial narratives. On one
hand, such a public speech-act functions as a public acknowledgment, on reader-secondary
witnesses’ part, of their implication in both spectacular and quotidian forms of harm-production,
and thus an affirmation of the responsibility they shoulder. On the other, the public speech
involved in the protest puts on display their constitutive vulnerability. Zeynep Gambetti, writing
about how the protest functions as an embodiment of agonistic politics, observes that its defining
feature is a potentially disintegrating exposure—by speaking out in this manner, people submit
themselves not only to repressive state violence, but also to the potential destabilization of their
identities as they transform and ‘become other’; by engaging in protests, reader-secondary
witnesses thus performatively affirm their vulnerability to being impacted, even to being
wounded. Pooja Rangan further identifies this risk that marks the protest—of an exposure, that
is at odds with self-preservation—as being a capacious practice of “being-for-the-other” (12) that
displaces the “ontological investment in being-for-[one]self” (12).
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Who might the audience for such a demonstration be? As the narrator-secondary witness
in Castellanos Moya’s Senselessness indicates, while it may be tempting for readers to stage this
public speech-act before the ultimate dispenser of bio/necropolitical violence, the state—an
institution personified, in this particular textual instance, by the man that resembles General
Octavio Pérez Mena—to urge it to terminate its necropolitical actions, spectacular and
quotidian55, or to attenuate suffering through the issuing of biopolitical safeguards such as rights,
it is unlikely that the state will respond in a truly ameliorative fashion56, a non-response mirrored
in the “confounded smile” (Castellanos Moya 140) the man flashes the narrator as well as his
muttering unintelligibly in German. In fact, holding the state and its solutions as the ultimate
ends of the demonstration has the potential to further exacerbate suffering: as Chandan Reddy
cautions, hankering after state solutions to oppression, spectacular and quotidian, merely
validates the “liberal egalitarian national state” (8)—it upholds the state as the “final outcome of
struggles for equality” (Reddy 8), as “the ultimate embodiment of the values that enable and
guarantee equality” (Reddy 8), obscuring the many ways in which the state itself participates in,
and even helms the perpetuation of, these very systems of oppression57.
55

The state’s necropolitics do not exclusively take spectacular form—such as genocide or torture. In fact, the state
regularly holds certain marginalized populations in conditions of institutionalized precarity—what Jasbir Puar refers
to as ‘debility,’ a form of slow, prolonged putting-to-death. Puar identifies such debilitation as being a biopolitical
act, due to its insistence on ‘making live’ rather than on brutally killing. However, I differ from her to refer to
debilitation as being ‘necropolitical’ as well, in order to emphasize it as a genre of politics oriented by active deathproduction—prolonged and routinized as this death-production may be.
56
Chandan Reddy’s formulation of ‘freedom in violence’ suggests that in the current conjuncture, even when the
state undertakes certain rehabilitative actions, these freedoms often work to cover over the perpetuation of other,
renovated forms of injustice and oppression. As an example, Reddy cites the passing of the Shepard and Byrd Hate
Crimes Prevention Act, an amendment to a federal hate-crimes law passed in 1969, at the end of the civil rights
movement. The state’s passing of this act—that would ostensibly protect LGBTQ populations—worked as a
smokescreen that obfuscated the simultaneous passing of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that
appropriated funds to and inflated the U.S. military budget.
57
Apart from the overtly necropolitical acts that these narratives testify against, the state is often responsible for
perpetuating the routinized, systemic forms of oppression that testifiers such as Slahi highlight as well. Some of the
ways in which the U.S. conserves and promulgates the particular quotidian, systemic forms of harm that Slahi writes
about—such as racism and debilitating conditions of poverty that disallow the privilege of refusal—are through the
form of the racial state as well as through reduced government spending on welfare initiatives, for example. See
Goldberg for an in-depth theorization of the racial state.
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Refraining from demonstrating before the state, for state-sponsored rehabilitative
measures, may, at first, seem like a means without an end—a secondary witnessing practice
directed to no particular audience, oriented toward the achievement of no identifiable objective.
However, the ends of such an illiberal secondary witnessing endeavor are embedded within the
means itself. In other words, several ends are achieved in the practice of the means—in staging
the demonstration, in discharging this public speech-act—itself. First, the demonstration
functions as a gesture of refusal—a withdrawal of one’s consent to the perpetration of both acute
and routinized abuse in one’s name. It is this very consent that Slahi spotlights, through his
invocation of ‘democracy,’ when he asks: “So has the American democracy passed the test it was
subjected to with the 2001 terrorist attacks?” (371). By naming the participatory democratic
system, Slahi urges reader-secondary witnesses to consider how their consent—that often takes
shape as their lack of dissent—props up systems of oppression and allows them to flourish
unchecked.
Furthermore, the kind of demonstration I write about here functions akin to the acts that
Chris Ingraham corrals together under the label of ‘gestures of concern’—actions that people
take that exhibit care, even if their immediate, measurable impact remains negligible. Ingraham
asserts that the significance of such actions lies in their expressivity, rather than their
effectiveness. He further explains:
The impact of concerned gestures is rather to spread an affectability, begetting new
capacities for what can be or be done, and what can be known or felt in the thereafter of
proximity to their encounter … Concerned gestures find people beckoning toward some
potential that they seldom see actualized except through the realization of reaching for it
… [W]hatever the aim, because its deferral does not extinguish its potential, the gesture
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of reaching for it typically fails to achieve a new state of being, while affirming a new
manner of being instead. (2; emphasis in original)
Ingraham observes that gestures of concern, despite lacking conspicuous and immediately
identifiable effects, feed into a commonwealth—a reservoir of affect that promotes “a shared
attunement and response-ability to one another” (Ingraham 133). Moreover, since the expression
of concern creates an affective repository of “impalpable compulsion that calls one to action …
from without, as a distributed energy within the social field, impossible to ignore” (Ingraham
11), its repeated performance also holds the potential to convene publics that are devoted to
collective flourishing. Gestures of concern—through their nurturing of a commonwealth and of
publics oriented to collective wellbeing—can thus eventually help actualize what Ingraham calls
a ‘creative democracy’: “a daily practice of communicative participation with others, grounded
in a reflective faith in the validity and worth of all humans, regardless of their differences”
(Ingraham 11).
Piggybacking off of Ingraham’s theorization of gestures of concern, then, I urge a
consideration of how public speech-acts—protests—of the kind that these testimonial narratives
elicit, despite lacking conspicuous, immediate effects, seed an affective commonwealth that in
turn, can help “stave off the uncommonwealth that can result from relying on the presumption of
equally distributed democratic welfare instead of building it … oneself” (Ingraham 135). These
demonstrations—as an illiberal secondary witnessing practice—through their very enactment,
thus generate the potential of inducing more livable worlds into being, where both spectacular
and systemic oppression are attenuated, despite these effects being neither expeditious nor
tangible.

111

Bearing illiberal secondary witness to testimonial narratives by taking to heart the
alternative spatial metaphor, ‘as if the testifiers are here, in the reader-secondary witness’s
world,’ thus involves modes of reception and response that take place in the here and now of
reader-secondary witnesses’ own milieux. As the testimonial narratives that I read in this chapter
propose, contrary to what liberal discourses and technologies would have us believe, the space of
intervention for reader-secondary witnesses isn’t only a distant elsewhere—in fact, attending to
and acting in one’s own quotidian world is itself a rather capacious form of response.

112

CHAPTER 2
“What sort of being am I? Am I a person? An animal? A thing?”: Metaphors of
dehumanization and (de)humanist secondary witnessing in Mustafa Khalifa’s The Shell
and Rigoberta Menchú’s I, Rigoberta Menchú
“[A]s long as the discourse of speciesism goes unchallenged … ‘the humanist
discourse of species will always be available for use by some humans against
other humans as well, to countenance violence against the social other of
whatever species—or gender, or class, or sexual difference.’ Speciesism
essentially breeds other forms of -isms.”
—Bénédicte Boisseron, Afro Dog
“The philosophical project of naming where [human] subjectivity begins and ends is too
often bound up with fantasies of a human uniqueness in the eyes of God, of escape from
materiality, or of mastery of nature; and even where it is not, it remains an aporetic or
quixotic endeavor.”
—Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter
Syrian author Mustafa Khalifa’s novel, The Shell, is a semi-autobiographical testimonial
text. It recounts the experiences of a Syrian Christian man named Musa, who is detained and
tortured in an unnamed ‘desert prison’—a thinly veiled reference to the Tadmur military prison1,
located in the Syrian city of Palmyra—on account of his suspected involvement with the Muslim
Brotherhood, an Islamist religiopolitical organization. Tadmur—described as “the kingdom of
death and madness” by Syrian poet Faraj Bayraqdar and the “absolute prison” by Syrian writer
Yassin al-Haj Saleh2—was used heavily by the Syrian dictator, Hafez al-Assad, in the 1980s and
90s to deter and repress political dissenters, particularly those accused of being affiliated with the
dissident collective, the Muslim Brotherhood (Human Rights Watch), although members of other
banned secular, leftist, and Marxist organizations were also detained there (Taleghani, Readings
1

The Tadmur military prison is commonly invoked as the ‘desert prison’ in Syrian literature. See Taleghani,
Readings in Syrian Prison Literature, Chapter 5 for a detailed exploration of Tadmur’s representation in Syrian
prison literature.
2
See Taleghani, “Book Review: A Memoir Novel of Tadmur Military Prison.”
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in Syrian Prison Literature 126). Khalifa braided his own experiences of being imprisoned and
tortured in Tadmur and other Syrian security prisons—first from 1979–1980 and then again from
1982 to 19943, for being affiliated with a left-wing dissident movement—with those of his
Christian friend and the prisoners he interacted with, to produce this testimonial narrative
(Karkas).
While Khalifa originally wrote The Shell in Arabic, most Arab publishers initially refused
to publish the book for fear of retribution by the al-Assad regime, considering the harsh critique
that this text mounted of the administration and the cruel repressive measures it relied on4.
Khalifa’s memoir-novel was therefore first published in French, in 2007, by Franco-Syrian
editor, Farouk Mardam-Bey, as La Coquille (The Shell). It was only in the following year, 2008,
that the Beirut-based publisher, Dar al Adab, agreed to publish the book—titled Al-Qawqa‘a
(also translating to The Shell)—in Arabic. Thereafter, Khalifa’s The Shell was re-published in
French in 2012 and in English in 2017.
A significant aspect of the detention experience, in the state-run military prison, that
Khalifa’s The Shell elaborates on is the chasm created and maintained between the prisoners and
those affiliated with or working on behalf of the al-Assad regime, such as the military police and
the guards. The differences between these two groups are manufactured and made visible by the
regime in multiple ways. While the prisoners are forced to go into the chilly prison yard
“barefoot and naked … even ordered … to take off [their] underpants” (Khalifa, The Shell 116),
the “policemen, sergeants, and the adjutant [wear] military coats and … [wrap] their heads in
woolen scarves” (Khalifa, The Shell 116). Additionally, while the prisoners are repeatedly
compelled to adopt a posture of deference, with “heads bent down and eyes closed” (Khalifa,

3
4

See Khalifa, “After 13 Years in Syrian Prisons, I Knew Assad Would Win.”
See Snaije.
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The Shell 58)—enforced so frequently that this description almost becomes a refrain over the
course of the memoir-novel—the men working for the regime take up postures of power, “legs
slightly apart, chest pulled back, left hands resting on their hips, right hands holding either a
thick cane, or a piece of twisted cable made of electric wires, or a black rubber contraption like a
belt” (Khalifa, The Shell 22).
In contradistinction to this binaristic portrayal of the prisoners and state actors in
Khalifa’s narrative stands another recurring incident—the outbreak of communicable diseases in
the prison: first meningitis, then tuberculosis, and finally scabies. Even as the regime tries to
cultivate a naturalized understanding of these two groups—the prisoners and police—as
fundamentally distinct and hierarchically organized, the spread of infectious disease in the prison
disrupts this artificially organized commonsense. While the regime initially refuses to treat the
diseased prisoners—holding tightly onto its presumption of complete separation and
consequently, the police’s immunity from the prisoners’ suffering—the state officials in Tadmur
are compelled to take heed of these outbreaks when the prison dormitory head, overhearing the
imprisoned doctors, spells out the consequences of this stubborn refusal: “Sir, this disease is
extremely infectious. The police may catch the infection from the prisoners and die. It’s possible,
God forbid, that you could die yourself!” (Khalifa, The Shell 72). In attending to the dormitory
head’s warning and allowing the prisoners to be treated, the regime is compelled to eventually
affirm the performatively denied horizontality and relationality between the two groups.
I juxtapose these scenes offered by Khalifa in The Shell to tease out the pedagogical
import they hold for readers of this testimonial narrative. Read together, these scenes suggest that
despite hegemonic attempts to taxonomize groups as fundamentally distinct—and naturalize this
taxonomy as manifest truth through repeated, highly visible performances of difference—the
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reality is that of a horizontal relationality, of connectedness and interdependence, where the
wellbeing of those portrayed as detached from each other is in fact sutured together.
Another scene from Khalifa’s testimonial novel that I highlight as a frame for this chapter
is one that occurs during one of the ‘breaks’—a euphemism used by the Syrian regime to
describe periods where prisoners are let into the yard to be beaten and tortured. During one of
these ‘breaks’, a sergeant sees a mouse darting across the prison yard and squashes it under his
boot. He then proceeds to pick up the mouse by its tail and goes up “to the rows of prisoners
turning around the yard … grabb[ing] one of the prisoners at random and forc[ing] him to
swallow the mouse” (Khalifa, The Shell 133). I lift this scene up here to draw attention to the
sequential injury experienced first by the mouse and then the prisoner. The proximity Khalifa’s
narrative forces between these two incidents of harm enables readers to consider their—the nonhuman animal’s and human’s—suffering together. Just as the wellbeing of the prisoners and
guards was intertwined, despite both these groups being portrayed as distinct and dissociated, the
aforementioned scene compels a reconsideration of the interdependencies between the welfare of
humans and non-humans—concepts rarely yoked together. Using this insight, legible in
Khalifa’s text, as a springboard, in this chapter, I focus on the coupling of non-human (animal
and object) and human harm—typically thought in distinct and disconnected registers—in
testimonial narratives that recount experiences of state-inflicted torture.
Political theorists such as Achille Mbembe5 and Giorgio Agamben6 have written about
how the detention camp, as a paradigmatic biopolitical space, functions as a locus of the human’s
reduction to less-than-human life. Testimonial narratives such as Khalifa’s give shape to this
5

See Mbembe 122–123 for his discussion of the camp as a site of de-civilization or radical dehumanization, a
“space where humans [a]re made to experience their becoming-animal” (123).
6
See Agamben for an exploration of how the camp functions as a space where bios (politicized human life) is
transformed into bare life (mere life exposed to death)—a form of life that resembles vulnerable non-human animal
life—through the sovereign ban.
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theoretical insight by narrating experiences of dehumanization in camps or prisons—often by
deploying metaphors of animalization/objectification, where detainees are treated as if they were
non-human animals or objects. In this chapter, I linger with these metaphors of dehumanization
to ask: What might the rhetorical work performed by these metaphors, which are deployed in
narratives testifying to state-sponsored injury, be? What kinds of secondary witnessing practices
might they encourage or dislodge?
In this chapter, I first perform a twofold reading of Khalifa’s The Shell to explore the
multiple secondary witnessing possibilities elicited by this testimonial narrative—the
commonsense human rights response, where readers may bear secondary witness to the suffering
implied in the prisoners’ narrated dehumanization by working to restore the humanity they’ve
been dispossessed of, as well as the less intuitive practice of tarrying with the unmooring of the
human from humanity, which in turn may alert readers to a new repertoire of illiberal secondary
witnessing practices. Here, I would like to pause and preface my discussion of Khalifa’s
narrative with an important note: this latter proposition—of secondary witnesses lingering with
the untethering of the human from humanity—is not overtly advocated by Khalifa’s testimonial
text, even as the commonsense human rights response is. I attribute this difference to the fact that
the commonsense human rights response is likely to be more immediately productive of a
cessation of torture for the detainees. Given this imbalance, to access both the normative and
unconventional secondary witnessing prospects embedded in The Shell, I oscillate between
different reading practices: reading along the grain of Khalifa’s narrative helps me parse the
commonsense interpretation of dehumanization that the text obviously emphasizes, whereas it is
only by reading against the grain, by scouring the depths of Khalifa’s text, that I am able to
excavate a nascent, non-normative conceptualization—one that empowers readers to question the
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hegemonic commonsense that Khalifa’s text overtly taps into. Moving on, then: between diving
deep to inquire into the infrasonic possibility of lingering with the detainees’ dehumanization
and coming up to the surface to name the commonsense secondary witnessing stance that
Khalifa’s narrative overtly urges, this chapter works through the liberal technologies and
epistemological orientations that make the secondary witnessing impulse to restore humanity to
the dehumanized—to premise justice for the human on the accepted inferiority and sanctioned
oppression of non-human entities—both seductive and intuitive.
While Khalifa’s testimonial memoir-novel tacitly opens up a reflective space for readers
to sink into, one that holds the potential to orient them away from commonsense liberal
secondary witnessing practices, I draw on an Indigenous Guatemalan peasant woman’s
eponymous testimonio, I, Rigoberta Menchú, as a beacon that illuminates what alternative
illiberal secondary witnessing approaches, growing out of the self-reflexive pause elicited by
Khalifa’s text, may look like in practice. Rigoberta Menchú narrated her testimonio to
Venezuelan anthropologist, Elisabeth Burgos-Debray, in Spanish—a language she associated
with her ladino7 oppressors and learned only a few years prior, as a way of fighting against their
tyranny8. While the testimonio was originally published in Spanish in 1983, it went on to be
translated into five languages, including English; the English translation of Menchú’s testimonio
was published a year later, in 1984. Through her testimonio, Menchú testifies to the routinized
structural oppression9 and corporeal violence that both the ladinos and the Guatemalan military
visited on her Mayan peasant community—during and beyond the Guatemalan Civil War—
7

Ann Wright, the English translator of Menchú’s testimonio, explains this term as follows: “Although ladino
ostensibly means a person of mixed race or a Spanish-speaking Indian, in this context it also implies someone who
represents a system which oppresses the Indian—first under Spanish rule and then under the succession of brutal
governments of the landed oligarchy” (Menchú viii).
8
Ann Wright confirms that Menchú “learned the language of the culture which oppresse[d] her in order to fight it—
to fight for her people” (Menchú viii).
9
Including, for instance, the poor working conditions and meager wages paid to the Mayan laborers working on the
ladinos’ plantations, that often resulted in their malnutrition and death.
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alongside the awakening of her political consciousness and the grassroots activism she engaged
in to protect her community from this systematic persecution and genocide, including her
participation in the Committee of the Peasant Union (CUC)10. Menchú’s testimonial narrative is
frequently invoked in debates about the facticity of testimonial narratives and the cultures of
suspicion in which they circulate, owing to anthropologist David Stoll’s allegation that Menchú
‘fabricated’ certain parts of her testimonio, and it was thus “[not] the eyewitness account it
purport[ed] to be” (qtd. in Rohter). However, in this chapter, I am not interested in the task of
arbitrating the truth-value of the persecution that Menchú’s testimonio attests to; rather, taking
Menchú’s testimonio to be veracious in ways that exceed the paltry metric of empirical
verifiability11, I read it to surface the Mayan cosmovision and dehumanist care practices that
Menchú carefully describes in it.
In doing this work, I interact with Menchú’s narrative differently from the way I engage
Khalifa’s. In that, instead of alternating between reading with and against the grain of her
testimonio— as I do with Khalifa’s—I largely read Menchú’s text along the grain; I isolate a
specific narrative thread from the intricate fabric of her testimony, without fraying its fibers, and
re-entwine it into a different braid—that of the provocations made legible by Khalifa’s The
Shell—to explore what its texture might contribute to this new weave. In engaging with
Menchú’s narrative in this way, I don’t intend to idolize the Mayan worldview she describes in
it. Instead, I seek to offer up this Indigenous perspective—with a keen awareness of its partiality
and curated nature—as a tangible rail that readers can hold onto and learn from as they work
10

The CUC, created in 1978, was “Guatemala’s first Indian-led national labor organization and the first to bring
highland Indians and poor ladino farmworkers together” (Drouin 85), to protest the oppressive conditions created by
the Guatemalan military and the wealthy ladino landowners. See Drouin for a detailed exploration of the oppression
faced by Indigenous Guatemalan communities and the political campaigns that the CUC mounted to protest this
persecution.
11
See Smith and Watson for their discussion of how an ethic of verification shackles testimonial utterances and why
readers need to cultivate a “more sophisticated understanding of the ethical work of testimony, one that does not rely
on an over-investment in ‘authenticity’” (592).
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toward fashioning an illiberal secondary witnessing praxis of their own.
As I mention here, Menchú’s testimonio spends a great amount of time attending to
Mayan beliefs and Indigenous ways of moving through the world; in narrating Indian cosmoepistemologies that emphasize living alongside and caring for the natural world, it therefore
presents a dehumanist illiberal secondary witnessing practice that readers of testimonial
narratives can adopt. I borrow the term ‘dehumanist’ here from Julietta Singh, complete with the
dual meaning she imputes to it—a practice of solidarity that emerges from the condition of the
dehumanized and that seeks to dislodge ways of being human that have been made hegemonic
by liberal discourses and apparatuses (something I explore in more detail later in this chapter), in
favor of practices that skew toward living care-fully and in horizontal relation with non-human
animals and the earth. By narrating practices of care and respect that her Indigenous community
embraces to live in harmony with the natural world, that also recognize animals’ and matter’s
subject possibilities, Menchú offers her readers a secondary witnessing practice that breaks with
what Joseph Pugliese labels “dominant Euro-anthropocentric conceptualizations of justice” (32).
Menchú’s illiberal dehumanist practice is particularly capacious for readers called to bear
secondary witness to human harm because it involves what Arturo Escobar describes as
“free[ing] ourselves with the Earth” (58). In pursuing renovated forms of justice—that do not
rescue the human by consigning non-human others to sanctioned injury—we may begin to
produce more liberatory futures for all living beings.
In this chapter, I therefore linger with the dehumanization on display in the metaphors of
animalization and objectification used by the detainees to describe their experiences in Tadmur,
in order to tease out the pedagogical implications of these metaphors. What happens when we,

120

Western12 readers and literary critics, suspend the impulse to bear secondary witness to
testimonial narratives by restoring a brutally snatched humanity—an impulse made hegemonic
and commonsense by liberal discourses and apparatuses—thus also resisting the urge to premise
justice for humans on a fundamental act of injustice toward non-humans? What are the contours
of the illiberal secondary witnessing practices that emerge when we follow Menchú’s lead and
cultivate a dehumanist orientation instead?
METAPHORS OF DEHUMANIZATION AND READERLY RE-HUMANIZATION IN
KHALIFA’S THE SHELL
Mustafa Khalifa’s The Shell recounts, in excruciating detail, the torture and humiliation
inflicted on the detainees held in the Tadmur military prison, by the al-Assad regime. The
prisoners, including the protagonist, Musa, when communicating with each other or introspecting
on their circumstances, often lean on metaphors that equate them to animals or objects, to relay
the denigration and injury being visited upon them. Some of these metaphors take the form of
direct, unadorned comparisons to non-human animals and objects, such as when Musa thinks to
himself: “We walked, we turned, and sometimes I wondered: ‘What sort of being am I? Am I a
person? An animal? A thing?’” (Khalifa, The Shell 65) or “I was just like stone, a piece of wood
bereft of sentiment and feelings, with no thoughts, no reactions” (Khalifa, The Shell 47); others
are implied, such as when Musa is brought to Tadmur and he realizes that all he hears is the
“sound of screaming” (Khalifa, The Shell 5)—the infliction of extreme pain has deprived the
prisoners of the trait often cited to distinguish humans from non-humans—the capacity for

12

As I explain in the Introduction to this dissertation, in using the term ‘Western’, I invoke readerly subjects that
have been exposed to and that have internalized liberal secondary witnessing commonsenses, wherever they may be
located—in the geographical West as well as in regions that fall beyond the pale of this hemispheric marker. It is,
however, important for me to name the ‘West’ here as a way of identifying the geo-specific locus from which these
commonsenses have radiated globally, through the mechanisms that I explore more fully in this chapter.
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language13—effectively unmooring them from the category of the human itself.
The prisoners’ reliance on animal and object metaphors to depict their circumstances is
reinforced by the military police’s use of the same when speaking to or about the prisoners, as a
way of further humiliating them by reaffirming their less-than-human14 status. The regime men
frequently default to the epithet ‘dog’ when referring to the prisoners: “Why are you raising your
head, you dog?” (Khalifa, The Shell 58), one sergeant shouts, while another adjutant castigates a
prisoner at a later point in the novel with the words “Go outside as well, you dog, son of a bitch!”
(Khalifa, The Shell 109). Apart from ‘dog’, the military police refer to the prisoners as asses
(Khalifa, The Shell 9, 198, 209), goats (Khalifa, The Shell 9), and sheep (Khalifa, The Shell 63).
The military police not only dehumanize the prisoners by comparing them to animals; they also
depict them as inanimate beings by analogically referring to them as objects, such as when a
jailor talks about more prisoners being brought to the prison the following day by saying:
“There’s some big consignments coming in from the provinces” (Khalifa, The Shell 16).
Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito, writing about how Jews were often referred to as
parasites by the Nazis, notes that in the concentration camps, metaphors did not remain mere
abstractions; they became corporealized—“[A] loaded metaphor actually took on a physical
shape … Jews d[id] not resemble parasites, they d[id] not behave like bacteria—they [were] such
things … [T]hey [were] treated as such” (85; emphasis in original). Human beings were treated
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Political theorist Giorgio Agamben, in Homo Sacer, notes that zoë (natural animal life, that has not yet been
incorporated into a polis) can be distinguished from bios (politicized life) by the fact that the former only possesses a
voice (that can express pain/pleasure solely through sounds), while the latter possesses language—speech that is
recognized and responded to. While Agamben’s theorization is itself rather anthropocentric, Khalifa’s memoir-novel
overtly elicits this very anthropocentric understanding, as evinced in Musa’s comment (cited later in this chapter) on
how the detainees’ screams made them resemble non-human animals: “More than thirty screams of pain … of defeat
… coming from the mouths of more than thirty cultured, educated men … The howl of thirty wolves, the roar of
more than thirty lions, would not be louder … could not be wilder or more animal-like” (Khalifa, The Shell 32).
14
I use the term ‘less-than-human’ here to highlight the regime’s goal of making the prisoners register the
deprivation of their human status (as nebulous as that concept is) as an experience of dispossession, rather than to
insinuate a hierarchy between humans and non-human animals/objects.
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in ways that gave material substance to the less-than-human—the non-human animal and
object—metaphors used to describe them. While Esposito’s statement was made specifically in
the context of the Holocaust, his observation resonates with Khalifa’s representation of the
Syrian military prison too. In The Shell, the prisoners are not only invoked as animals and
objects; they are treated and made to behave in ways that corroborate and fortify these metaphors
of dehumanization. The detainees are transported in trucks that resemble those “used to distribute
slaughtered animals from the abbatoirs to the kitchens” (Khalifa, The Shell 21) and are “lined up
in them like the animals in the real ‘meat trucks’” (Khalifa, The Shell 21); when sleeping in the
communal cells, they are made to lie down crammed next to each other, “[a]s if they were
cigarettes lined up in a packet” (Khalifa, The Shell 12). Additionally, certain torture techniques
inflicted on the detainees involve making them literally reproduce animal behaviors and
sounds—prisoners are made to run around the prison yard “bray[ing] like a donkey” (Khalifa,
The Shell 59) or are made to fetch the food put out for them by “crawl[ing] out on all fours like a
dog, barking all the time” (Khalifa, The Shell 184).
These metaphors of dehumanization lend themselves to being read as indicators of the
scale of degradation experienced by the detainees because they derive their rhetorical impact
from the portrayal of the transformation of the human into animal/object as poignant. They’re
able to powerfully communicate the egregiousness of the torture practiced in the prison because
they piggyback on the notion that the transmutation of the human into non-human animal/object
is wretched and pathos-evoking. The intuitive secondary witnessing practice that these
metaphors of dehumanization then elicit—due to the underlying commonsense they rely on—is
that of rescue and undoing, where readers are motivated to reverse the human’s reduction to
animal/object and to restore his/her humanity. Here, animality and objecthood take on a
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pejorative cast—they function as ontological states that connote inferiority and expose one to
justifiable maltreatment, and it is precisely this negative connotation that coaxes readersecondary witnesses (public and scholarly) into rescuing detainees from these states, as a way of
bearing secondary witness to their narratives of torture and humiliation.
On the surface, Khalifa’s novel seems to encourage this reading—where the
transfiguration of the human into non-human animal/object appears deplorable, stemming from
an interpretation of animality/objecthood as an undesirable ontology that humans must be
protected from devolving into. This encouragement is evinced in the fact that the prisoners also
mobilize the same metaphors of dehumanization for the state actors that the latter used for the
former—that of ‘dog,’ for example: “These dogs don’t kill their spies” (Khalifa, The Shell 46),
one detainee says in the novel, while another recounts, “There was a dog opposite me on the
street who fired a hail of bullets at me” (Khalifa, The Shell 139). In relying on dehumanizing
metaphors to not only describe the prisoners in the military prison, but to also characterize their
oppressors, Khalifa’s text seems to reinforce the negative associations imputed to
animals/objects. These non-human entities thus read as free-floating signifiers of
undesirability—whomsoever they attach to acquires a pejorative cast that should ideally be
expunged, so that their humanity can be restored.
Khalifa’s text also seems to uphold the imputation of negative meaning to
animality/objecthood by representing the prisoners as putting humanity on a pedestal, such as
when they invoke it as a compliment—“You’re a man of great humanity” (Khalifa, The Shell
131) and “everyone was praising [the doctor’s] humanity” (Khalifa, The Shell 94)—or when they
identify it as a coveted status, such as when Musa reflects: “I had the feeling again that I was a
human being with an existence that at least some people could respect—respect his person, his
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intelligence, and his views” (Khalifa, The Shell 160). Humanity here figures as a respectable
ontology, in direct contrast to the derogatory connotations attached to non-human
animality/objecthood.
As such, at first glance, the metaphors of dehumanization deployed in Khalifa’s
testimonial narrative offer up humanity as a cherished state of being (while also portraying
animality and objecthood as abject ontologies that one runs the risk of being ‘reduced’ to). In
doing so, they elicit a specific secondary witnessing response from readers—that of campaigning
to restore detainees’ deprived humanity. It makes sense for Khalifa’s testimonial novel to vitalize
this reading and secondary witnessing practice, because returning the dehumanized to humanity
implies a restoration of the dignity attached to the human—an association made commonsense
by the human rights paradigm, a fundamental premise of which is that humans possess an
inherent, irreducible dignity15—which in this case, would mean the cessation of torture and
humiliation for the detainees.
LIBERAL PEDAGOGIES OF THE (NON)HUMAN
As discussed above, metaphors of dehumanization embedded in testimonial narratives
such as Khalifa’s elicit secondary witnessing responses that are premised on undoing, that seek
to reverse the detainees’ descent into animality/objecthood and restore their imperiled humanity.
It is, however, important to take a step back here and question the premises that lay the
groundwork for and make commonsense such a secondary witnessing practice: How has this
notion of the human—as separate from and superior to the non-human animal and object, as a
dignified and revered ontology—come to be discursively scripted and disseminated? As Megan
Glick notes, what it means to be human—often framed in biologically essentialist terms (as
15

Anne Phillips writes: “The ‘dignity of man’ has figured as one of the bases for claiming rights for centuries, but it
was mainly with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 that the ‘inviolable’ dignity of the human
became such a central reference point for human rights documents and legislation.” (81)

125

belonging to the human species)—is thought to be intuitively grasped by all, but in reality,
“processes of human speciation are contingent on prevailing cultural and scientific discourses”
(5). What it means to be human, and conversely, what it means to be ‘animal’ or ‘object’—each
a singular, reductive term that corrals together a heterogenous multiplicity of entities within
itself, as Jacques Derrida has observed16—is something that needs to be rigorously interrogated.
In this section, then, I undertake a Foucauldian critique, reading the human as well as the nonhuman animal and object as objects of knowledge—products of specific epistemological
practices that need to be historicized and made visible—rather than as taken-for-granted entities.
This estrangement is crucial to unpacking how these commonsense ontologies of the human, the
animal, and the object, as well as the interrelationships between the three, have come to be made
commonsense for Western readerly subjects.
In this section, I invite consideration of how the premise undergirding the interpretation
of the human’s descent into animality/objecthood as vile and tragic—of the human17 therefore as
separate from and superior to non-human animals and objects—has been made intuitive through
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Jacques Derrida, in The Animal that Therefore I Am, makes this observation specifically with reference to ‘the
animal’. However, this observation can be exported to objects as well. Derrida writes: “Whenever ‘one’ says ‘The
Animal,’ each time a philosopher, or anyone else, says ‘The Animal’ in the singular and without further ado,
claiming thus to designate every living thing that is held not to be human … well, each time the subject of that
statement, this ‘one,’ this ‘I,’ does that he utters an asinanity. … [T]he singular, of a notion as general as ‘The
Animal,’ as if all nonhuman living things could be grouped within the common sense of this ‘commonplace,’ the
Animal, whatever the abyssal differences and structural limits that separate, in the very essence of their being, all
‘animals’. … Confined within this catch-all concept, within this vast encampment of the animal, in this general
singular … are all the living things that man does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers. And
that is so in spite of the infinite space that separates the lizard from the dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the
shark from the lamb, the parrot from the chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel from the tiger, the
elephant from the cat, the ant from the silkworm, or the hedgehog from the echidna” (33–34).
17
Even as the entities that liberal infrastructures have tried to definitively disarticulate have been referred to via the
shorthand of humans, animals, and objects, the ‘human’ has always been imagined as what Sylvia Wynter renames
‘Man’—white, heterosexual, able-bodied, cis-gendered, male. Bodies that fall outside these parameters have
implicitly been assumed to occupy the unnamed interstices between human, animal, and thing. See Wynter and
McKittrick for a thorough articulation of Wynter’s concept of Man.
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the onto-epistemologies put into circulation by liberal discourses and technologies18. In fact,
Agamben, in his work, identifies the ‘decisive event’ inaugurating liberal modernity itself to be
the manufacturing of the distinction between animal life (what he christens zoë) and politicized
human life (what he terms bios). ‘Liberalism’, as I invoke it here, has a three-pronged definition,
as outlined in the Introduction: first, it refers to the onto-epistemologies that were inaugurated
and normalized by the Enlightenment, that also authorized the violent processes of colonialism,
imperialism, and racial capitalism; second, it encompasses the chronotrope that Elizabeth
Povinelli designates as ‘late liberalism’—a mode of governance that emerged in the wake of, and
responded to the legitimacy crisis posed by, anticolonial and other social justice movements, by
accounting for, accommodating, and defusing the radical potential of difference; finally, it also
pulls neoliberalism into its folds, as a form of biopower that differentially distributes
vulnerability and protection to populations based on their alignment, or lack thereof, with market
thinking.
One of the primary knowledge systems that organized the notion of the human as distinct
from and superior to non-human animals and objects—all presumed to be stable, self-evident,
knowable entities—was orthodox Christian doctrine, a theological discourse that was also
historically deployed to authorize the domination of black and brown bodies that failed to align
with the Christian/European image of the human. The Bible functioned as a central reference for
positioning the human as superior to animals based on the possession of a soul. The following
passage from Genesis 1:26 lays out the human’s supremacy over non-human animals and the
earth in no uncertain terms: “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness:
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the
18

While liberal discourses and apparatuses have not necessarily inaugurated the notion of the ‘human’ as being
separate from and superior to non-human animals and objects, they have nevertheless reified it, elaborated on it
further, and played an influential role in globalizing this commonsense.
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cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth” (qtd. In
Kim 32–33). At another point in Genesis19, God, having created man (as separate from and
preceding woman) and the animals, allows him to name them, thereby enabling man to extend
his authority over the animals. As Derrida notes, God is depicted to “[have] created man in his
likeness so that man will subject, tame, dominate, train, or domesticate the animals born before
him and assert his authority over them. God destines the animals to an experience of the power
of man” (16; emphasis in original). Man’s superiority over animals and the earth, in Christian
theology, did not only derive from his being created in God’s image or his possessing a soul, but
also from the “theo-onto-epistemological view that only humans possess the cognitive faculties
for moral reasoning and that animals (and all other-than-human entities) are congenitally devoid
of such a capacity and are thus lesser beings on the biopolitical hierarchy” (Pugliese 10).
The Great Chain of Being, which emerged in the Middle Ages, was another influential
paradigm for codifying the superior position of humans vis-à-vis animals and objects. While Mel
Chen defines the Great Chain as “an ordered hierarchy from inanimate object to plant to
nonhuman animal to human, by which subject properties are differentially distributed (with
humans possessing maximal and optimal subjectivity at the top)” (40), Claire Jean Kim expands
this graduated hierarchy to include both God and angels, with the human situated below God and
the angels, but above animals and objects on this scale. The Great Chain of Being ascended to
popularity by the eighteenth century in Europe, an epoch Erica Fudge identifies as being marked
by “anxious anthropocentrism” (143)—an unease around whether humanity could truly be
posited to be distinct from animality, a tension that was resolved through amplified and vicious
performances of animal domination, such as branding, baiting, and hunting.

19

This incident is related in what is called the second narrative/beginning in Bereshit. See Derrida 15–18 for a
deeper exploration of this textual episode.
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Western20 philosophy functioned as an epistemological apparatus that secularized these
theologically-rooted concepts and elaborated on them. Descartes’ writings from the seventeenth
century established the popular dualist formulation that worked to further distinguish humans
from animals: humans were portrayed as possessing the capacity of higher-order thinking,
“defined by soul, mind, thought, and language: Cogito, ergo sum (I think therefore I am)” (Kim
34; italics in original), in contradiction to whom, animals were designated mere “machines, pure
matter, bodies unencumbered by souls or minds” (Kim 34). Other thinkers, such as Plato and
Aristotle, put forward similar arguments—Plato postulated that the human soul is a tripartite
entity, with ‘rational and soldierly parts’ tasked with reining in the appetitive, or animal part;
Aristotle, too, deprived animals of the capacity to reason in Politics21, thus understanding them
to be inferior to the human.
Twentieth-century

Western22

thinkers

further

perpetuated

this

distinction.

In

Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger differentiated the human (represented via the
concept of dasein) from non-human animals and objects using the following rationale,
synthesized succinctly by Karl Steel:
Objects are in the world but do not apprehend it in any way. Animals, being weltarm or
‘poor in world,’ apprehend the world they inhabit without being able to ‘unconceal’ it,
that is, to reflect on, or even to apprehend, their distinctiveness within the world. Unlike
dasein, animals are entirely ‘captivated’ and thus can more accurately be said to be had
by their world than to have it … Only dasein can reflect upon itself in its world. Through
this reflection emerges a host of other capabilities unique to dasein, chiefly dasein’s
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Invoked here as a geographically-specific marker.
See Steiner, Chapters 2 and 3 for a detailed exploration of these philosophers’ conceptualization of the humananimal divide.
22
Again referenced in a geographically-specific capacity.
21
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awareness of the world’s persistence after its death. Dasein confronts death by knowing
that the world will go on without it. By contrast, animals, unaware of their own worldly
captivation, and thus unaware of the world’s existence apart from themselves, do not die
but merely cease. (Steel 6–7)
Lacan maintained the human’s distinction from the animal by elevating the former’s linguistic
capacities. He declared that animals can merely react—they are “capable only of a coded
message or of a meaning that is narrowly indicative … strictly constrained; one that is fixed in its
programming” (Derrida 119–120) whereas humans are able to respond in dynamic, complex, and
reflective ways, making them superior to animals. Lévinas was another influential thinker whose
work buttressed the hierarchization of the human and non-human animal. Theorizing encounters
capable of having ethical consequence, he postulated that the ethical self is constituted through
an encounter with the ‘face’ of an other that by definition, cannot be fully known, that is capable
of eliciting responsible interaction precisely because of its unknowable plenitude. This ‘other,’
however, remained firmly human; as per Derrida’s synopsis of Lévinas’ theorization: “this
subject of ethics, this face, remains first of all a fraternal and human face” (106). Lévinas’ work,
therefore, also perpetuated the idea that only humans are morally considerable—they alone
possess the unfathomable depth that commands responsibility and respect.
This discursive positioning of the human as wholly separate from and superior to animals
and objects was not without its moments of tension; in fact, it was shot through with
contradictions that constantly threatened to subvert it. Closely reading the framework of the
Great Chain of Being, Arthur Lovejoy calls out two premises that jeopardize the notion of
absolute human supremacy. The first point of tension lies in the “principle of continuity” (59)
that undergirded the Great Chain, whereby each entity, occupying a particular rung of this
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hierarchical ladder, was assumed to “[differ] from that immediately above and that immediately
below it by the ‘least possible’ degree of difference” (59). The ordering of beings in the Great
Chain then seems to be premised on gradation, a fuzzier form of distinction than the absolute
differences it was interpreted as demonstrating when it leached into the popular imaginary.
Additionally, the early conceptual architects of the Great Chain posited that God had created
different species to make the Chain as complete as possible. This rationale tells a different story
about the relationship between the human and other non-human beings; if these entities were
birthed to complete the Chain, the event of genesis “testified to God’s power and splendor; none
was created for the utility of another species” (Kim 33).
Political philosopher John Locke too interrupted the philosophical trend of asserting
human supremacy based on rational thinking by locating this cognitive capacity in an
independent entity he called consciousness—something that was possessed by humans but could
also possess things. Colin Dayan, in her summation of Locke’s treatise, writes: “Locke argued …
that God can superadd the thinking faculty to matter, giving ‘created senseless matter … some
degree of sense, perception, and thought. The force of consciousness can adhere to things; and
once that happens, distinctions between [humans and non-humans] are moot” (122). What’s
more, just because humans possessed consciousness did not mean they were exercising their
capacity to reason: there is, Locke wrote, “something in us that has a Power to think” (qtd. in
Dayan 120) but one can never determine with certainty whether that “Substance perpetually
thinks or no” (qtd. in Dayan 120). Utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham also posed
resistance to the unquestioned inferiority—and lack of moral worth—Western23 philosophers
ascribed to non-human animals, by arguing in favor of animal sentience, and consequently their
moral considerability, as evinced when he wrote: “The question is not, Can they reason? Nor,
23

Invoked here as a geographically-specific label.

131

can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” (310–11).
How did the notion of human dominance over non-human animals and objects persevere
despite these countercurrents of thought? Foucault’s breakdown of the workings of power and
the resistance mounted to it provides a persuasive path out of this quandary. Foucault, in his
lectures delivered at the Collège de France in 197824, engages power in its religious
manifestation as ‘conduct’—the pastorate’s ability to regulate the conduct of men. He explains
how resistance to specific forms of conduct emerged—such as mysticism, as a form of direct
communication between an individual and God, to counter the Christian emphasis on the priest
as an intermediary between the two—ultimately challenging the assumption that counter-conduct
exists outside of and opposed to conduct. Instead, Foucault posits that counter-conduct (or
resistance, although Foucault’s renaming seeks to intentionally step away from this expression
and its purely oppositional connotations) is co-extensive with conduct (or power). They both
share and re-utilize the same elements, albeit deployed in different ways. In the above example,
the shared element was that of communication between an individual and God—conduct and
counter-conduct both drew on it, appearing opposed simply because of the differences in how
they discursively deployed it. Further, Foucault explains that counter-conduct is not necessarily
destructive and negating, as often assumed—always already working to erode the hold of the
conduct it challenges. Instead, it’s generative: it spawns new forms that re-deploy the same
shared elements in newer configurations, perhaps even further entrenching the forms of power
that counter-conduct originally sought to dismantle. Exporting Foucault’s theorization to the
context at hand illuminates how, despite countercurrents that appeared to challenge discourses of
human supremacy, these discourses continued to persist, perhaps in even more potent forms than
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See Foucault’s lecture delivered on 1 March, 1978 in Security, Territory, Population for an in-depth examination
of the relationship counter-conduct shares with conduct.
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before, especially once more and different liberal apparatuses began to reiterate the tenet of
human distinction.
From the late nineteenth century onwards, this discursively posited supremacy of humans
over non-human animals and objects was further socialized and disseminated via the knowledge
apparatuses that became increasingly hegemonic during and following the Enlightenment, such
as that of science, a discipline touted as relying on empirical, rationalist study. Megan Glick
confirms: “Through the development of more refined animal and human research protocols,
classificatory lines began to be redrawn with greater precision on and between bodies of
difference. From the late 1800s onward, categorizations of life according to spiritual and
religious meanings increasingly gave way to ideas about species survival” (5). First, biological
theories and the taxonomizing process of speciation joined hands to define what the human is, in
contradistinction to non-human animals. Working together, they created the fiction of the human
as its own clearly delineated species, firmly differentiated from non-human animals based on a
range of arbitrarily selected morphological and symbolic features25: “[A]n ambiguous application
of scientific theory … first and foremost consolidate[d] the human as a species, and secondarily
mark[ed] it as a unit definable by measurable attributes. In … scientific frameworks, the species
divide trumps all other forms of differentiation” (Glick 9). This process of definitively
consolidating life-forms into cleanly differentiated species has shown itself to be a porous
fiction26—and yet it figured and continues to figure in the public imagination as a commonsense
maxim.
A particular strand of scientific thought, building on this taxonomy of life-forms, that
25

See Glick for a study of how discourses of speciation paved the way for human biopolitical inequality by
furnishing the grounds for “broader hierarchies of speciation” (4)—for practices that forge hierarchical differences
between humans based on race, sex, etc.
26
Animal rights activists have often “used the purportedly inalienable attributes of humanity (intelligence,
rationality, and so on) to argue for the liberation of certain nonhuman species” (Glick 9).

133

went on to capture the Western imagination was that of evolutionary theory—what Megan Glick
identifies as a form of “infrahumanist discourse,” due to its establishment of hierarchized
taxonomies that simultaneously defined both racialized humans and non-human animals as lessthan-human. Despite Darwinian evolutionary theory establishing continuity between the human
and the non-human animal—going so far as to hold the ape as the human’s ancestor—it
ultimately worked to establish a linear teleological pathway forward from animals to humans,
with humans representing the most elaborated and ‘fittest’ of life forms27. Science thus made
speciesist thinking commonsense—with the human, as a distinct species, standing at the apex of
this hierarchy.
Other scientific disciplines have cultivated a commonsense around objects occupying the
lowest rung of the hierarchy by representing them as inanimate, acquiring value only through
humans’ Midas touch. Joseph Pugliese holds up forensics as one such discipline, observing that
it yields no space for animist thinking, incontrovertibly identifying objects as insensate and
lifeless: "In the disciplinary space of Western forensics the latent metaphysics that inflect this
animist scene are occulted by a set of scientific procedures that conjure up a type of rebus, where
the objects in the crime scene constitute an ensemble of cryptic indexes … that can be brought to
intelligible speech and resolved only through the disciplinary interventions of the forensic
scientist” (19). Geology is another such discipline. Kathryn Yusoff, staging a piercing critique of
what she calls ‘White Geology,’ identifies it as a discipline concerned with manufacturing
mythologies of inertness (assigned both to matter and racialized black flesh), which in turn
allows them to be treated as “atemporal materiality dislocated from place and time” (4) and
27

See Haraway, When Species Meet 28 for an exploration of how relations between humans and non-human animals
can be conceived of differently from the hegemonic one of linear descent (popularized by evolutionary theory). One
such method she invites us to consider is Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic becoming, which prioritizes alliance—
or more specifically, “nonhierarchal becomings and contagions” (Haraway, When Species Meet 28)—between
humans and non-humans.
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facilitates their extraction—a process that subsequently imbues them with value.
This geological process of fixing matter as only ever inert to facilitate its extraction also
attests to the working of neoliberal capitalism as a liberal technology participating in the
construction of a commonsense around human supremacy. While these extracted commodities
were imbued with value, this ‘value’ was one derived from capital circuits, always inferior to the
inherent metaphysical value of the extractor himself. In fact, what transformed these extracted
‘raw materials’ into valued objects was the process of extraction by the White man and the
establishment of a property relation between himself and the object, effectively making him the
“owner of value” (Yusoff 70). Claire Jean Kim corroborates this hierarchization between humans
and non-humans performed by neoliberal capitalism through the establishment of use relations
when she writes: “Neoliberal capital … [works by] transform[ing] … nonhuman animals and the
earth into ‘resources’ in the game of perpetual capital accumulation” (287).
The construct of citizenship in Western political democracies further naturalizes the
hierarchical separation between humans and their non-human counterparts. As Agamben notes in
Homo Sacer: “In Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose
exclusion founds the city of men” (10). Bare life, in Agambenian theory, refers to a life-form that
is banned by the sovereign and thus excluded from the political community; it stands as almost
synonymous, for all intents and purposes, to the pre-political animal life that Agamben invokes
through the Greek appellation of zoë. It is through the explicit act of holding animal life to be
inferior, and thus excluding it, that humans, as elevated citizens of the polis, come to be.
Hobbesian theory, as one strand of influential Western28 political thought, props up Agamben’s
statement. In Leviathan, Hobbes explains the Commonwealth as a covenant formed by humans
to protect themselves from their own and other humans’ violent tendencies—which in turn are
28
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born from humans’ animal instincts. Here, even as humans are posited to possess a constituent
animal nature, their eventual separation from these non-human life-forms is achieved through an
active superseding of their animal tendencies through rational political action, such as that of
founding a Commonwealth where they proactively impose external checks on their violent
impulses. Roberto Esposito reiterates this fundamental hierarchization upon which political
belonging depends when he bemoans the fact that ‘immunization’—separation and dissociation,
both generally and specifically that of the human from the animal—functions as the very
grammar of the political logic made hegemonic by the liberal apparatus of citizenship.
This hierarchized separation of the human from the animal and object has become even
more firmly entrenched in the popular imaginary through its reanimation and encoding in
Western legal doctrine generally, and human rights law, in particular. Colin Dayan, in her
influential monograph on the sociopolitical workings of law, The Law is a White Dog, explains
that legal codification enfleshes discursive specters and grants them longevity: “The law enter[s]
the picture to define and codify an already existing tradition, ensuring that it … continue[s],”
(133) she remarks. This entrenchment of human exceptionalism and supremacy in EuroAmerican legality is most apparent in the figure of the ‘person’ that appears frequently as a
protected, property- and rights-holding subject in legal doctrine. Connal Parsley parses
personhood as follows:
The dispositif of the person … is characterized by the intrinsic duality of the human,
which is split into two elements. It is ‘a totality composed of soul and body’. Crucially,
these elements are organized into hierarchy in which the former dominates—and must
dominate—over the latter. ‘Man is a person if and only if he masters the more properly
animal part of his nature,’ … ‘[T]he degree of humanity present in all will derive from
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the greater or lesser intensity of de-animalization’ resulting from this mastery. (12)
As evident here, the dualism articulated by philosophers such as Descartes, has been resurrected
and imbued with legal import. While the legal discourse of personhood seems to again allow the
possibility of the animal being part of the human, rather than wholly distinct, this
superimposition is gradually elided through a hyper-emphasis on the human’s mastery (and
consequent excision) of this animal component.
When it comes to human rights law, the idea of human supremacy simmers to the fore in
the most fundamental premise that undergirds it—that of the irreducible dignity possessed by the
human. Anne Phillips explicates what it means for human rights to be premised on dignity when
she writes: “Dignity relies on a normatively loaded, sometimes quasi-religious, almost inevitably
substantive understanding of what it is to be human. It also makes our entitlement to equal
respect dependent on hierarchical claims about us being better, or more valuable, than other
species … [It promotes] a moral hierarchy of us as superior beings” (89). A German
Constitutional Court, in a judgment it issued, further highlighted how dignity functions as an
index of the human’s superiority when it declared: “human dignity means not only the individual
dignity of the person but the dignity of man as a species” (qtd. in Phillips 87).
As I have suggested here, multiple liberal discourses and apparatuses have contributed to
the dissemination and concretization of the mythology of the human as separate from and
superior to non-human animals and objects—enabling this notion to sediment as shared
commonsense. However, the tenacious grip that this commonsense has on the public imagination
is attributable to one more factor that has haunted the discourses presented above and now bears
explicit mentioning—the equation liberal institutions compel us to draw between an entity’s
position in the human–non-human hierarchy and its exposure to or protection from injury; this
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implicit coupling coaxes publics into developing an affective attachment to the idea of the
human, due to the immunity that this construct confers. Neel Ahuja provides a compelling
analysis of how this investment is cultivated through an exploration of the U.S. empire’s focus
on disease control and health security. While the human body is an ecological assemblage
crosscut by a meshwork of species—Ahuja urges us to consider “the life-sustaining work of gut
bacteria or the ingested flesh of animals or plants” (viii) to drive home this point—imperial states
extract the human from these complex biosocial relations29, through discursive and technological
means, to position him/her as an independent, albeit vulnerable, entity, as a way of
“transform[ing] the body’s actual biological processes into a site of management and
optimization” (Ahuja 5). Once this wresting is accomplished, imperial states proceed to present
other species as threats to human well-being30 while also offering the siloed human an illusion of
protection “from the unpredictable and inhuman risks of life” (Ahuja x). Through this
manufacturing of bio-(in)security, human–non-human intimacies get coded as risky, and the
human is guaranteed a veneer of protection at the expense of the non-human’s elimination by the
state—moves that collectively work to catalyze stronger investments in the idea of the human as
wholly distinct from and superior to non-human entities31.
While thus far I have sought to explain how liberal discourses and apparatuses have
cultivated a commonsense around the distinction and superiority of humans over non-human
29

Ahuja describes this process as one of ‘anthropomorphization’—it is through this very extraction that the ‘human’
emerges.
30
The non-human other that Ahuja invokes here has a double valence: on one hand, this term refers to
microorganisms and such; on the other, it gestures toward the racialized populations that the imperial state portrays
as threat. In fact, the imperial state often codes certain racialized bodies as being vectors of viruses and bacteria that
endanger ‘human’ life, thus tethering these two connotations to one another.
31
Ahuja argues that this “government of species” (xv) is undertaken by imperial states in a way such that certain
populations, that align with hegemonic identity categories, get classified as ‘human’ whereas racialized bodies from
the nation-states subject to the former’s imperialist whims are read as non-human threats to be warded off or
eliminated. While these processes inevitably stimulate attachments to the ‘human’ form in dominant populations
located in these imperial states (likely in the geographical West), minoritized populations also internalize this desire
for ‘humanity,’ considering that being slotted with the non-human other exposes one to sanctioned injury and harm.
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animals and objects in the popular imaginary, this bias has also been cemented in critical thought
being produced within the liberal institution of the university. The university has been a prime
locus for late liberalism’s operations, as explained by Roderick Ferguson in his critical
examination of the rise of interdisciplinary programs, such as race, gender, and ethnic studies, in
the U.S. Ferguson contends that while the student movements of the 1960s and 70s—that
precipitated these interdisciplinary fields of study—were oppositional and ruptural, the
university, by ossifying their radical demands into disciplined programs of study, tamed their
revolutionary potential. Critical thought germinating in the university, despite scholars’ best
intentions, has not been immune to this late liberal disciplinary impulse. Denise Ferreira da Silva
explains this further by observing: “Precisely because they too are specimens of modern thought
… available critical tools cannot support an ethico-political intervention capable of undermining
cultural difference’s capacity to produce an unbridgeable ethical divide” (57). She adds that
extant critical tools tend to rehearse the idea of ontological separation—they remain attached to
the notion of “The World as an ordered whole composed of separate parts” (Ferreira da Silva
57)—and thus frequently imagine sociality only as it may occur between entities occupying the
same realm (humans with fellow humans, for example)32.
Biopolitical theory stands testament to this. While this body of thought takes as its central
provocation the differential distribution of vulnerability and protection to different populations, it
conceives of these populations in strictly human terms. As Mel Chen puts it: biopolitics is
marred by a “species-centric bias that privileges discussions about human citizens” (6–7).
Agamben’s Homo Sacer, as a prominent text in the field, tellingly positions animal life (zoë) as
inferior to politicized human life (bios). Animals (as an undifferentiated homogeneity) or zoë
32

Scholarship that actively imagines and invokes sociality and overlaps between humans, animals, and objects is
often compelled to explicitly flag itself as posthumanist, enabling scholarship that embodies Ferreira da Silva’s
critique to occupy normative ground.
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only appear here as meager, purposeless life-forms whose sole function is to spotlight, by means
of contrast, the entitlements afforded to humans with political affiliation. Additionally, the
citizen in Agambenian theory can only ever be reduced to animal life through the act of the
sovereign ban. Even when thus exposed to sanctioned harm, this human is still designated bare
life—he/she is afforded a new lexical formulation, invented to hold him/her in a theoretical
bracket between animal and politicized human, rather than being allowed to fully collapse into
animality. Cary Wolfe further critiques Agambenian biopolitical theory on the grounds that it
reductively captures life-forms within the binary of zoë/bios, based on their species belonging,
instead of theorizing sociopolitical life in its full plenitude. Drawing on theorists such as Roberto
Esposito and Dominick LaCapra, he instead advocates for a “more complex and differentiated
biopolitical field” (49) that is capacious enough to carefully disentangle the nuances of each
living being’s—foetus’s, farm animal’s, wildlife’s, pet’s—positionality within a recalibrated
biopolitical matrix.
Theories of subalternity also reproduce this species bias by being disinclined to name the
proximities between human, animal, and thing—instead often critiquing the operation of power,
in particularly de-humanizing ways, by playing up disempowered populations’ humanity. Mel
Chen bemoans this critical impulse in their work:
[M]any of the theoretical discussions about objectification invoke inanimate or less-thananimate matter as well as animals as generalized standards of comparison, often
rendering the distinctions between these categories as simplified and even templatic. In
fact, many contemporary discourses continue to disavow, if not simply ignore, the
possibility of significant horizontal relations between humans, other animals, and other
objects. (50)
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Critical work, then, produced under the aegis of the late liberal university as it is, reproduces the
hegemonic commonsense of human exceptionalism and supremacy, even as it is informed by it.
Why is liberal modernity so thoroughly invested in assigning and policing ontology in the
fixed, separatist, and hierarchical way that it does? Ann Laura Stoler’s Along the Archival Grain,
that reads colonial archives to understand the Dutch imperial administration of modern-day
Indonesia, offers a particularly elucidative nugget. She notes that the Dutch colonial government
was constantly embroiled in efforts to definitively categorize the Indonesian population into
clearly delineated social types, each marked by specific attributes that were supposed to capture
the group’s essence. Stoler calls particular attention to the fact that these social ontologies were
emphasized, even as they were constantly reworked, because “assigned attributes fell short of
differentiating … gradations of exclusions and exemptions” (5) as well as because “[a]ffections
and attachments [on the part of the colonial administrators and the colonized] … were often
impervious to the meddling priorities of a supposedly ‘rational’ and reasoned state” (2–3). In
other words, this colonial taxonomy sought to define and stabilize social ontologies precisely
because it was constantly confronted with the risk of this project’s failure. Stoler’s analysis
explains the attempts of liberal discourses, institutions, and apparatuses to incontrovertibly fix
human, animal, and object ontologies as well. As suggested at multiple points in this section,
even as different liberal apparatuses try to categorically fix these three ontologies as distinct and
hierarchical, they repeatedly come up against the limits of this project—both because of the
artificial nature of this demarcation, but also because of these liberal infrastructures’ own
intersecting and contradictory agendas, such as that of designating black humans as objects to
facilitate the extraction of their labor, for example. The attempts, made by liberal discourses and
technologies, to fix human, animal, and object ontologies, as well as the interrelationships
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between them, in the popular imaginary, can thus be read as a preemptive allaying of an everpresent anxiety—that these ontological categorizations will be identified as artificial, and
therefore destructible. As Karl Steel remarks: “The unilateral, legitimized domination of animals
[and objects] by humans resolves, or attempts to resolve, the various, shifting boundaries
between humans and other worldly lives into a single line” (14).
The task of developing an alternative, subversive, illiberal secondary witnessing practice
then rests on removing the blinkers that these liberal discourses and technologies impose, on
estranging the commonsense that they create and continually reinforce about the distinction of
the ‘human’ vis-à-vis non-human animals and objects, in order to recognize the dehumanist
possibilities that they seek to conceal from view.
THE RENDING OF LIBERAL FICTIONS, THUS CREATING SPACE FOR
DEHUMANIST POSSIBILITIES, IN THE SHELL
As I propose in the previous section, liberal discourses and apparatuses have worked to
make commonsense the notion of the human as separate from and superior to the non-human
animal and object—thereby also seducing Western readerly subjects into bearing secondary
witness to moments of dehumanization by working to restore this dispossessed humanity. As I
note earlier, Khalifa’s The Shell overtly elicits this understanding and secondary witnessing
response as a way of facilitating the cessation of the torture and debasement that detainees face
regularly in military prisons such as Tadmur. However, the secondary witnessing possibilities
suggested by Khalifa’s narrative aren’t exhausted here. In fact, reading the text closely renders
legible an alternative, albeit embryonic, possibility embedded in it. Even as The Shell draws on
the commonsense that liberal infrastructures have fostered, simultaneously available in this
testimonial memoir-novel is an understated yet incisive critique of this very commonsense—a
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critique that both lays bare the fictions that liberal discourses and technologies have heretofore
normalized as fact and that also stimulates new ways of thinking to supplant these fictions, thus
creating fertile ground for different, more capacious secondary witnessing postures and practices
to take hold.
Challenging the notion of humans, animals, and objects being discrete entities with stable
ontological referents
One of the first subversive potentialities submerged in Khalifa’s narrative can be
salvaged by attending to the metaphors of dehumanization themselves. These metaphors
construct analogical relationships between the detainees and non-human animals and objects
through implicit as if constructions; the detainees are treated as if they were animals or objects.
The as-if-ness of these metaphors of dehumanization coaxes readers into the realm of the
hypothetical. It provokes a suspension of the presumed knowability, the taken-for-granted
discreteness of humans, animals, and objects, in favor of toying with new and different relational
configurations between these entities.
The experiences of torture narrated in Khalifa’s text further blur the commonsense
taxonomies that liberal discourses and apparatuses have persuaded Western readerships into
internalizing. In the face of the unrelenting suffering inflicted by torture, the detainees are
represented as only being able to vocalize primal cries and screams—sounds that are eerily
animal. During an episode of brutal torture, paradigmatic of the many others in the text, Musa
observes: “The lieutenant screamed like an animal, howled like a wolf” (Khalifa, The Shell 30).
During another, he remarks: “More than thirty screams of pain … of defeat … coming from the
mouths of more than thirty cultured, educated men. More than thirty heads, every one full of
ambition, hopes, and dreams. All were screaming. The howl of thirty wolves, the roar of more
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than thirty lions, would not be louder … could not be wilder or more animal-like” (Khalifa, The
Shell 32). While on one hand this blurring of the human with the animal, in moments of acute
pain, reads as deplorable, on the other, the as-ifness of these metaphors urges readers to tarry in
the realm of the hypothetical. These moments of dehumanization, produced during torture, in
Julietta Singh’s words, offer up the human as “not something that simply ‘is’ but rather
something contingent that can be moved toward and away from” (121). In other words, these
textual moments of torture, where humans are only able to emit animal shrieks and cries,
position the human as a construct, rather than a fixed ontology. Moreover, these moments of
dehumanization also provoke readers into considering the palimpsesting—to the point of
merging—of the human and animal, constructs that tend to largely be invoked in discrete and/or
hierarchical terms in liberal discourse. Colin Dayan, in response to her own question—"What
does it mean in times of torture and dissembling to be like an animal?” (116)—remarks that it is
in precisely these moments that “categories and terminologies get muddled. The hierarchies no
longer hold” (116).
These frequent episodes of torture have two more effects on the detainees: they often
render the detainees unable to extricate their bodies from the pain being inflicted and they also
cause the detainees to experience numbness in the face of excruciating agony. Recounting one
particular incident where he was stuffed into a tire and whipped across his feet, Musa notes:
“Ayyoub managed to stuff me into that car tire in such a way that my legs were sticking up in the
air, unable to escape no matter how much I tried” (Khalifa, The Shell 7), and then later: “I …
began to lose any physical feeling … A numbness, a numbness, for some minutes, maybe long,
maybe short” (Khalifa, The Shell 8). Political theorist and philosopher Jane Bennett remarks that
a feature often ascribed to objects is their inability to be ‘actants’—entities that “ha[ve] efficacy,
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can do things, ha[ve] sufficient coherence to make a difference, produce effects, alter the course
of events” (viii), while Mel Chen states that matter is often depicted as being insensate. By
rendering detainees both numb and immobile, then, Khalifa’s text also maps objecthood onto the
detainees’ human selves, once again sabotaging liberal disjunctive taxonomies and also
complicating the presumed ontological fixity of both humans and objects.
Juxtaposing the moments in Khalifa’s narrative where detainees mobilize metaphors of
dehumanization to describe those working for the regime with the moments where they use these
metaphors to index their own condition provides another critical foothold for discerning a subtle
problematization of the liberal commonsense around the categories of animal and object. On one
hand, when the detainees describe themselves in animal/object terms in Khalifa’s text, these
animals/objects function as signifiers of a violated and humiliated state of being. On the other,
when these animal/object metaphors are deployed to describe the prison guards and policemen,
animals/objects get coded as cruel, vicious, and lacking a capability to recognize and respond
empathetically to human suffering. The imputation of these divergent meanings to animals and
objects, based on how they are analogized, reveals these non-human animals and objects to be
unstable constructs functioning merely as vehicles of pejorative comparison—they appear here
as concepts lacking stable ontological referents, onto whom any which disparaging attribute can
be projected. Moreover, the juxtaposition of these metaphors further affirms, as Karl Steel
observes in his work, that the human, as a liberal construct, shares a dependent relation to the
categories of animal (and object)—it lacks positive ontological content as well, constituting itself
only through a negative relationship to the constructs of animal and object, by projecting onto
these categories the attributes it wants to divest itself of.
Together, these textual moments trouble the notion of the human, animal, and object as
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discrete entities with fixed and knowable ontological content, instead suggesting them as being
discursive constructs. These narrative speed breakers that I lift up here, that recur frequently over
the course of Khalifa’s novel, quietly urge reader-secondary witnesses to pause and question
their commonsense understandings of human, animal, and object. When attended to, they nudge
readers to the realization that “the distinction ‘human/animal[/object]’ … is a discursive
resource, not a zoological destination” (Wolfe 10).
Allowing hegemonic systems to script the meanings attached to the human/animal/object
Khalifa’s The Shell further provides an opportunity for readers to be jarred from their
liberal commonsense by mapping femininity and homosexuality—new metaphors—onto the
detainees, who had thus far been described largely through the metaphors of animal and object,
and by allowing the consequences of these new metaphorical representations to play out over the
course of the memoir-novel. In one particularly illuminating scene, after a series of detainee
executions conducted by the regime, a policeman proceeds to brutalize these corpses. He beats a
dead prisoner with his stick, eventually proceeding to push the stick between the prisoner’s
buttocks, all the while chanting, “You dare to oppose the President … you queer” (Khalifa, The
Shell 152) and after a while, “the President will fuck your mothers … the President’s got the
biggest cock in the whole world, … he’ll fuck you and your sister one after the other!” (Khalifa,
The Shell 153). Through the slur he utilizes, the policeman depicts the prisoner as being
homosexual; moreover, by later naming him among the women the President could sodomize,
the policeman also feminizes the prisoner.
Khalifa’s text proceeds to unpack the consequences of these attributions of femininity
and homosexuality to the prisoners. The prisoners respond to these attributions by distancing
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themselves from both femininity and homosexuality33. The way they achieve this is by calling
forth images of female bodies as sex objects, as subordinated bodies—thereby positioning
themselves as both hypermasculine and firmly heterosexual. Musa describes the fantasies he
harbors about women when he’s imprisoned at Tadmur: “In every daydream there would always
be a woman—every woman I’d ever passed or who’d passed me—and the cells of my body
would be on fire. I would mingle the past with the present, recalling the most passionate
moments and reconstruct them” (Khalifa, The Shell 76). These masculinity and heterosexualityaffirming fantasies are also harbored by the other prisoners, evinced in Musa’s anecdote about a
detainee that sucked Musa’s toe while asleep, dreaming about it being his fiancé’s mouth—when
awoken by Musa, the detainee tells him that he was dreaming about “the very moment I took of
her and she took hold of me” (Khalifa, The Shell 19). Additionally, when Musa begins to
develop a close bond with another prisoner, Nasim, he at first rejects the homoerotic
undercurrents of this relationship by reminding himself: “[I]n the whole of my past I had never
had any unnatural or deviant experiences. I had never observed in myself any inclination to
indulge in sexual practices other than the ordinary ones between a man and a woman … On the
contrary, I had a psychological aversion to them” (Khalifa, The Shell 161), and later: “Could the
influences and effects of prison have changed my psychological makeup to make me travel in
this direction? But my intellect absolutely refused this explanation. And my great fear … could
that be a sign of health, if my feelings and emotions were signs of sickness” (Khalifa, The Shell
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While the broader context of heteropatriarchal Syrian Islamic culture is likely also responsible for the detainees’
desire to distance themselves from attributions of femininity and homosexuality, here I intend to focalize how the
regime’s imputation of these labels to the detainees and the derogatory treatment these labels sanction further
intensifies any misogyny and homophobia that the detainees may already harbor. In fact, the regime’s evocations of
femininity and homosexuality are of a piece with the broader sociocultural heteropatriarchal script—the belittling
connotations that the regime attaches to these identity categories are themselves derived from this script; the regime
simply imbues these connotations with a particular material consequentiality. Here, I seek to highlight how these
specific material consequences—torture and humiliation—compel the detainees to urgently divest themselves of
these labels.
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162). Musa’s characterization of homoeroticism as depravity and sickness—perhaps even a
manifestation of the psychological trauma inflicted by the brutality of torture—attests to his
homophobic leanings.
The prisoners’ attempts to vehemently reject the metaphoric femininity and
homosexuality foisted upon them by the al-Assad regime indicates a deep anxiety about
inhabiting these devalued categories. When the regime invokes these identity categories while
humiliating the detainees, it forges an association between these devalued categories and the
treatment meted out to the detainees. In other words, the regime seems to suggest: women and
homosexuals are worthless human beings who can be treated in demeaning ways without any
qualms, and because you prisoners are now like women/homosexuals, you can also be treated in
these ways without any hesitation. The prisoners’ attempts to distance themselves from
femininity and homosexuality, in this context, then reads as an attempt to condemn the
degradation they are subjected to by reminding themselves that they do not in fact inhabit these
identity categories that are vulnerable to sanctioned mistreatment. Yet, in their attempts to
distance themselves from femininity and homosexuality in the ways that they do, the prisoners
also reify the regime’s conceptualization of these identity categories—women existing as sex
objects for men’s ideological and material domination, and homosexuality as an abhorrent
pathology.
By exploring these new metaphors of femininity and homosexuality affixed to the
prisoners as well as the prisoners’ responses to them—namely those of simultaneous rejection
and reproduction of their demeaning connotations—Khalifa’s text fosters a significant insight:
the prisoners have allowed dominant power systems to script their understanding of what these
categories mean and the treatment they sanction. Khalifa’s text’s superimposition of the
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metaphors of femininity/homosexuality on those that had heretofore been represented through
the metaphors of animality/objecthood then catalyzes consideration, on the reader’s part, of how
the insights derived from the text’s exploration of the former apply to the latter. In that, readers
are invited to reflexively ponder how, by distancing those that they consider ‘human’ from
animality/objecthood through rescue and undoing, they are allowing hegemonic systems to
exhaustively determine what these constructs of animal/object mean as well as the treatment
these meanings sanction.
The ‘human’ isn’t a panacea
Considering that readers might be motivated to emancipate detainees from the degrading
statuses attributed to them by the regime, Khalifa’s superimposition of the metaphors of
femininity/homosexuality on the detainees suggests that the readerly act of rescue rejects and
expunges not only the labels of animal/object from the detainees’ identities, but also those of
woman and homosexual. The figure that readers thus end up salvaging and reinstalling here is
not just the human, but a particular iteration of the human—a heterosexual man, a figure that
bears remarkable resemblance to what Sylvia Wynter signifies as Man, a hegemonic European
humanist iteration of the human that privileges white, male, cis-heteronormative, and ablebodied identities to the exclusion of others. As such, in leaning on more widely recognized
categories of disenfranchisement, Khalifa’s text prompts readers to reflect on how, by working to
reinstall liberal humanist genres of the human, they are not remedying injustice or dismantling
the effects of power. In fact, they are doing the exact opposite—propping up hegemonic power
structures that can only ever produce more inequity. Besides, through this readerly act of rescue,
categories
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protection
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woman/homosexual/animal/object—are ironically made even further available for violation.
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Finally, the exclusionary version of the human that readerly acts of undoing might prop
up here affirms that the ‘human’ can be neither a panacea nor a desirable endpoint of secondary
witness advocacy because it does not guarantee the termination of injury and harm. As Anne
Phillips ruefully admits, someone can be “sav[ed] … as abstract man (or human) while [being]
annihilat[ed] … in his specificity or particularity” (18), based on his race, gender, sexuality, and
more. French anthropologist and sociologist Didier Fassin corroborates Phillips’ perspective in
his work on the “politics of life” (“Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life” 500), a term he
explains as “politics that give specific value and meaning to human life” (“Humanitarianism as a
Politics of Life” 500). Fassin explains that these ‘politics of life’ create a graduated hierarchy
between humans based on how much their lives are worth, which in turn informs when and if
human beings will be protected from harm. Returning the detainees to human status, then, is not
the silver bullet it is purported to be—it cannot be held as the ultimate justice-achieving goal of
the secondary witnessing catalyzed by testimonial narratives such as Khalifa’s.
Non-human oppression is interlinked with and fortifies human oppression
Next, the superimposition of metaphors of femininity/homosexuality onto those already
marked by metaphors of animalization/objectification manufactures a chain of equivalence
between these categories. Being woman or homosexual appears equivalent to being animal or
object here, and the disparaging characteristics affixed to animality/objecthood by liberal
discourses and technologies get projected onto women and homosexuals, devalorizing them in
the process as well. The overlapping of woman/homosexual/animal/object in The Shell thus
helps illuminate how non-human oppression brackets and facilitates human denigration.
Exporting this observation to the discursive relationship between the detainees and the
animals/objects they are compared to emphasizes that the persecution of both is interlinked, as
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suggested by the sequential harm experienced first by the mouse and then the detainee in the
scene I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. Simply rescuing the human from becoming
animal/object, while leaving the harm-sanctioning meanings attributed to the categories of
animal and object, cannot work as a justice-producing or oppression-ending endeavor. As long as
these categories of permitted abuse—animality and objecthood—with their liberal discursive
scaffolds remain intact, this abuse will eventually transfer to humans as well, since anyone that
can be shown to fit these rubrics will be rendered available for subjugation.
Several scholars, in their work, have already highlighted how the treatment meted out to
animals eventually transmits forward to humans. Joseph Pugliese, in Biopolitics of the MoreThan-Human, sheds light on how experimental torture techniques performed on animals—such
as that of learned helplessness, tested by psychologist Martin Seligman on dogs34—were
eventually practiced on detainees at Guantánamo to reduce them to “compliant, docile, and
confessional subject[s]” (Pugliese 150). Bénédicte Boisseron too, writing about the proximities
between black men and dogs in terms of how they are treated, remarks:
The racially tainted tough-on-crime policies uncannily resemble, in their discriminative
and punitive impact, legislative measures taken against pit bulls starting in the same
period. In her book in defense of pit bulls, author Bronwen Dickey argues that ‘like their
owners, the dogs [pit bulls] tend to be stereotyped as ‘criminals,’’ a categorization that
has necessitated a special kind of legislation prohibiting the ownership of pit bulls in
various cities and housing facilities in America … Since the 1990s, both the breedspecific legislation and tough-on-crime policies have cleaned up American cities, putting
34

“Various dogs were exposed to a series of shocks over the course of a week. One group of dogs came to
understand that they could move to a different area to escape the shocks. Another group of dogs was conditioned to
understand that there was no behavior that the dog could undertake to avoid the treatment. After days of confusing
stimuli and persistent jolts of electricity, the dogs in the second group came to accept their fate as permanent. They
would respond to pain lying down and whimpering ‘helplessly’ rather than attempt an escape” (qtd. in Pugliese
150).
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away or putting down the ‘dangerous’ breed/race. (10–11)
In fact, as Pugliese astutely calls out, “[t]he discourses of biological-racist degeneracy and the
institutional apparatuses of exclusion and segregation are all conceptually enabled by the
concept-specter of speciesism” (6). Megan Glick’s study, Infrahumanism, takes this very fact as
its launchpad, exploring how biopolitical phenomena that divide humans into hierarchies that
confer protection and harm derive their conceptual architecture from the human–non-human
divide and how these non-humans are allowed to be treated as a result of this divide. Summing
up the main thrust of her argument, Glick writes: “Infrahumanist ontologies mobilize ambiguities
surrounding the boundaries of the human itself to … maintain broader hierarchies of speciation.
In this context, the phrase ‘hierarchies of speciation’ includes practices of human differentiation
(via race, sex, and so on) … I foreground the discourse of species in the production of human
biopolitical management and inequality” (4).
Considering how the damaging meanings attributed to and harm perpetuated against nonhuman entities surrounds, props up, and eventually informs the subjugation that humans are
subjected to, it becomes crucial to develop a multi-optic perspective in one’s secondary
witnessing endeavors35. Claire Jean Kim defines a multi-optic perspective as “a way of seeing
that takes disparate justice claims seriously without privileging any one presumptively” (19); it
“encourages a reorientation toward an ethics of mutual avowal, or open and active
acknowledgment of connection with other struggles” (Kim 20). Such a multi-optic perspective
entails holding non-human harm—discursive and material—alongside human harm and
responding to both simultaneously. A multi-optic perspective stands in antonymic relation to a
35

This claim might itself appear to be a liberal, anthropocentric one. However, I don’t intend to suggest that nonhuman harm must only be attended to because of how it feeds into and facilitates human mistreatment. Rather, I
articulate this idea here to acknowledge that acts of secondary witnessing are often prompted by accounts of human
suffering, while also flagging the fundamental impossibility of sustainably alleviating human suffering as long as the
harm that non-human entities are subjected to remains unaddressed.
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single-optic perspective—“a way of seeing that foregrounds a particular form of injustice while
backgrounding others … [that hinges on] a posture of mutual disavowal—an explicit dismissal
of and denial of connection with the other form of injustice being raised” (Kim 19)—that would
seek to address human harm at the expense of that faced by non-human others, a posture
reinforced by liberal discourses and technologies when they position non-human animals and
objects as inferior to, as less considerable than, humans.
An imperative to linger with that which threatens
Despite their initial rejection of both femininity and homosexuality, the detainees in
Khalifa’s testimonial novel are represented as eventually deriving solace from these very
identities. During moments of excruciating pain and suffering, the detainees dream of and
remember women—in ways distinct from the hypersexualized female figures invoked earlier—
deriving comfort from these imaginings. When being mercilessly whipped by the guards, Musa
dreams of all the things he had found solace in immediately before he was arrested, and his
female ex-lover and the female air hostess on his flight figure prominently among them: “The
armchair in Orly Airport, Suzanne, refreshments, beer, the comfortable seat in the plane, the air
hostess who exuded beauty and kindness, the juice, the tea!” (Khalifa, The Shell 6), Musa recalls.
The other detainees also reminisce fondly about women, deriving comfort from these memories:
“Their imagination wandered to the place of family and loved ones, where women appeared as
the dominant force—the woman as wife, sister, daughter” (Khalifa, The Shell 120). Additionally,
while Musa’s early musings suggested an internal conflict about how he should proceed in his
relationship with Nasim—a relationship rife with homoerotic undertones—instead of shying
away from these feelings, he eventually leans into them. He nurtures a close friendship with
Nasim, instead of pushing him away, and even goes on to affirm its homoeroticism: “Touches

153

between us—it sometimes happened that when we were deep in conversation or playing I would
take his hand and feel a strange sense of peace and pleasure! And I would carry on holding it for
longer than the situation required” (Khalifa, The Shell 162). By representing the detainees as
lingering with that which was threatening only to discover its rehabilitative potential, Khalifa’s
text provides a model that readers can adopt—instead of rejecting the human’s transformation
into animal/object by impulsively rushing to reverse it, readers are quietly nudged to tarry with
both the detainees’ unmooring from the human as well as the harm-sanctioning meanings
attached to the non-human animal and object that become visible in Khalifa’s testimonial
memoir-novel.
In fact, The Shell gives tangible shape to this exhortation by depicting Musa as actively
occupying animality and objecthood, ontologies that he then goes on to suffuse with positive
implications. While clinging to his sense of humanity amplifies Musa’s suffering and compels
him to internalize a sense of utter helplessness, taking on the roles of animal/object help him
survive and hold the regime accountable for its atrocities. Instead of the other-than-human
always being less-than-human, as Eva Giraud puts it, in these scenes the other-than-human
becomes palpable as more-than-human. Musa occupies objecthood by behaving like a camera (or
‘tape recorder,’ as he calls it)—a perspective he inhabits with ease as a film director—to record
the goings-on in the prison as a form of testimony: “I’d gradually converted my mind into a tape
recorder on which I recorded everything I saw and some of what I heard” (Khalifa, The Shell 3),
he states at the very beginning of the memoir-novel. In conceiving of himself as a camera/tape
recorder, Musa acquires the tenacity to exceed his material circumstances—his pain and
anguish—in order to continue to bear witness to both the prison and the torture the regime
performs: “My professional and artistic sensibility was crouching in a far-off corner, watching …
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[it] remained beyond the domain of pain and anxiety, awake and neutral, observing and
recording however great my own psychological and physical pain” (Khalifa, The Shell 16), he
notes. Objecthood therefore appears here as a capacious mode of being, one that enables Musa to
exceed his suffering and instead channel his energy into testifying against the al-Assad regime’s
brutality.
Musa also takes inspiration from animality—particularly the morphology and behavior of
tortoises—as a way of surviving in the prison. When he confesses that he is Christian and an
atheist, he draws the ire of the other Muslim detainees who cease to engage with him; given this
animosity, Musa survives and maintains his sanity by behaving as a tortoise would. Remarking
that “a shell began to grow around [him], made up of two walls … [the other prisoners’] hatred
for [him] … [and his] fear of them” (Khalifa, The Shell 48), Musa goes on to note that “[l]ike a
tortoise that has sensed danger and retreated inside its shell, [he] sat in [his] own shell, secretly
watching and observing, recording and waiting for release” (Khalifa, The Shell 53). In this way,
by imagining a metaphorical, tortoise-like protective shell around him and observing all that
connotes risk—both his fellow detainees and the prison occurrences—without drawing attention
to himself, Musa finds a way to survive in Tadmur.
I acknowledge that asking readers to tarry with moments of dehumanization is a fraught
proposition, especially due to the long and continuing histories of oppression faced by raced,
gendered, classed, and disabled bodies, that have been built on and sustained by collapsing
‘humans’ into animality and objecthood. As such, even as I recognize the validity of the
discomfort that readers may feel at this suggestion, I urge the importance of pushing past it to
linger with the separation from ‘humanity’ that testimonial texts such as Khalifa’s make
perceptible, because in resisting it, as indicated earlier in this chapter, we risk valorizing the
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meanings and hierarchized positionalities that liberal discourses have assigned to the human,
non-human animal, and object. Roberto Esposito, labeling the detachment that liberal discourses
have entrenched between the human and animal/object as a kind of ‘immunity’ and the human’s
confrontation with the artificiality of this distinction ‘autoimmunity,’ explains that this
autoimmunity should be embraced, rather than repudiated. Vanessa Lemm, summarizing
Esposito’s thinking on the topic, writes:
Where immunitary devices characterize politics, modern politics becomes characterized
by autoimmunitary effects in which the immune system becomes so strong that it turns
against the very mechanism that it should defend and winds up destroying it … Thus,
autoimmunity, the radicalization of immunity, to the point that an immunity is set up
against what immunizes, should not be merely understood negatively, as the harbinger of
autoimmune diseases that literally kill individuality. Rather, immunity should be seen …
as a way for the individual to open up to what is threatening to him or her in order to
alleviate the grip that one’s own self-protection has over the individual: as a way of
protecting oneself from too much protection. (Esposito 6)
Embracing the autoimmunity that dehumanization makes available—in the form of the
destruction of the artificial boundaries between humans, non-human animals, and objects—
therefore functions as the first step that readers can take in cultivating an illiberal, dehumanist36
secondary witnessing practice that stands proudly on the debris of the damaging ontoepistemologies that liberal discourses and technologies have thus far made intuitive.

36

Julietta Singh defines dehumanist solidarities as “social bonds that are mobilized and sustained through a refusal
of the sovereign human subject and that enact agential forms of inhuman relationality” (123).

156

CULTIVATING

A

DEHUMANIST,

ILLIBERAL

SECONDARY

WITNESSING

PRACTICE BY FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF I, RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ
Lingering with dehumanization as well as the harm-sanctioning meanings attributed to
the non-human animal and object is a crucial precursor to developing new and more capacious
illiberal secondary witnessing practices. By deconstructing and jettisoning liberal modes of
thought premised on human distinction and supremacy, readers empower themselves to veer
away from the impulse to reinstall a damaging liberal iteration of humanity, in favor of new
dehumanist secondary witnessing commitments. What do these dehumanist, illiberal secondary
witnessing commitments look like? What attitudes and epistemological orientations do they
grow out of? By narrating her Indian community’s dehumanist37 values, Mayan Guatemalan
peasant woman, Rigoberta Menchú, in her testimonio, I, Rigoberta Menchú, shines light on
potential answers to these questions.
The testimonio functions as a particularly capacious medium for inculcating illiberal
modes of thought in reader-secondary witnesses. As John Beverley explains in Testimonio: On
the Politics of Truth, the testimonio is a specific iteration of testimonial writing that “comes to us
from the place of an other … [having] the force of what Freud calls the uncanny” (2). Beverley
notes that in being addressed by the subaltern, readers of the testimonio often encounter elements
that fail to align with their preexisting worldviews, that therefore jar them from their familiar
patterns of thinking and being, and that it is precisely “[t]hese moments [that] summon [them] to
… a new kind of politics” (2). Menchú’s testimonio, too, is therefore particularly effective as a
pedagogical tool—in confronting readers with a non-intuitive dehumanist worldview, it
possesses the ability to displace their liberal commonsense and supplant it with alternative,
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As used here, this term intends to focalize the horizontal relations between human, animal, and object that
dislodge commonsense liberal, hierarchical onto-epistemologies.

157

radically illiberal onto-epistemologies.
Menchú’s testimonio is largely preoccupied with attesting to and mobilizing against a
form of injustice that Menchú repeatedly describes as ‘internal colonialism’. Her editor and
interlocutor, Elisabeth Burgos-Debray reaffirms: “As a popular leader, [Menchú’s] one great
ambition is to devote her life to overthrowing the relations of domination and exclusion which
characterize internal colonialism” (Menchú xiii). On the most explicit level, this ‘internal
colonialism’ refers to the relationship shared by the Indian Guatemalan community and the
ladinos—mixed-race Guatemalans who dominated the country’s economic and political systems
and oppressed Indian communities, supported in this oppression, both materially and
ideologically, by the Guatemalan military. However, on the other, Menchú’s text also subtly
teases out another kind of internal colonialism—an oppressive relationship that exists between
those that have internalized liberal onto-epistemologies and their non-human others. This
alternative connotation of ‘internal colonialism’ emerges in the experience Menchú describes as
having herself when she worked as a maid in a ladino woman’s home: “When I saw the maid
bring out the dog’s food—bits of meat, rice, things that the family ate—and they gave me a few
beans and hard tortillas, that hurt me very much. The dog had a good meal and I didn’t deserve
as good a meal as the dog. … I felt rejected. I was lower than the animals in the house” (92).
While a significant part of Menchú’s narrative focuses on the horizontal relations between
humans and non-human animals that her Mayan community affirms, internalizing a liberal
commonsense compels Menchú to abandon that horizontality in favor of hierarchizing
comparisons that assume humans to be superior to animals in this moment. Thus, when BurgosDebray, as a prefatory statement to Menchú’s narrative, remarks: “We Latin Americans … forget
that we too are oppressors and that we too are involved in relations that can only be described as
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colonial,” (Menchú xii) this statement holds multiple implications together. It invokes, most
overtly, the colonial, discriminatory relations that exist between humans—between the ladinos
and the Indians—but it also pertains to the relations that exist between people that have imbibed
a liberal commonsense and their non-human others. In fact, Menchú’s testimonio’s holding
together of these two meanings of ‘internal colonialism’ is significant, because it once again
prompts reflection on how the former is subtended by the latter.
In this context, where human and non-human harm appear as interwoven, Menchú’s
narrative offers up the adoption of dehumanist onto-epistemologies as a way of producing justice
for humans and non-humans alike. In fact, it specifically routes the respectful treatment of
humans through the cultivation of respectful attitudes and epistemological orientations toward
non-humans, evinced when Menchú talks about how the White Man’s colonial attitudes and
behavior “killed [her community’s] most important, most revered ancestors” (69), immediately
following this with the remark, “Because of this, we must learn to have respect for the natural
world” (Menchú 69). Menchú’s articulation of these statements in a consecutive and causally
linked fashion suggests that cultivating more respectful orientations toward non-human entities
will foster ways of thinking and being that produce more just practices toward humans as well.
The political vision and secondary witnessing practice that Menchú’s narrative makes available
is therefore one that expands beyond the human; it takes the entirety of the meshwork of humans,
animals, and objects as its field of intervention. As such, Menchú’s testimonial text encourages
readers to sink into what Jane Bennett calls “political ecology” (xix)—a form of politics that
takes as its object “human-nonhuman collectives that are provoked into existence by a shared
experience of harm” (J. Bennett xix)—as an illiberal secondary witnessing practice.
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Before I tease out what this Mayan cosmovision38, laid out in Menchú’s testimonio, looks
like and how it can function pedagogically to illuminate illiberal secondary witnessing postures
and praxes that readers can adopt, I pause here to clarify my positionality vis-à-vis Menchú’s
text. Rather than occupying the role of invisible ventriloquist, through this brief interlude, I hope
to make my interpretive presence known as I articulate a couple of important caveats to my
reading of Menchú’s text.
Menchú’s testimonio offers up a Mayan cosmo-epistemology that imagines more
horizontal relationships between the entities liberal discourses and technologies have
disarticulated as human, animal, and object—a cosmovision that is therefore rich in terms of the
potential it holds for secondary witnessing. Yet, as I parse Menchú’s text to amplify the attitudes
and epistemological orientations she makes legible in it, I am wary of reproducing the
‘ecological Indian’ trope through my reading. Claire Jean Kim explains this trope as one where
the Indian is perceived as being “a natural conservationist, [who] lives simply and virtuously,
maintain[ing] a spiritual balance with nature” (106). Kim further explains why this trope can be
damaging by noting that it “function[s] as a disciplinary tool, essentializing [Indians] (in the
guise of lauding them) and erecting a behavioral ideal that [tends to be] both restrictive and
unattainable” (207). To clarify my intention here, then—even as I amplify the ecological,
dehumanist onto-epistemologies and practices that Menchú’s community adopts, I hold them up
as specificities, rather than generalities that define (and essentialize) Mayan Indians or
Indigenous communities broadly.
Further, while I focalize the Mayan ecological practices that Menchú writes about, I
38

Arturo Escobar defines the term ‘cosmovision’ as an onto-epistemology that envisions “the universe [as] one
continuous whole where everything is alive” (49). He further clarifies what he means by the term ‘alive’ by noting:
“‘the living’ (lo vivo) is … everything that exists, challenging the living-nonliving and organic-inert binaries that are
foundational to modern sciences” (Escobar 57). I will unpack this concept more robustly further along in this
chapter.
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explicitly reject the idea that it is possible to know the entirety of Mayan Indian culture and its
diverse and thick beliefs and ways of life through this brief, curated glimpse that Menchú
provides in her text. Menchú’s anxiety about the reader presuming complete transparency and
knowledge of her community’s way of life is noticeable in her repeated textual performances of
withholding information from the reader39— —“Indians have been very careful not to disclose
any details of their communities, and the community does not allow them to talk about Indian
things. I too must abide by this” (9), she warns, and then, “Spaniards dishonored our ancestors’
finest sons … And it is to honor these humble people that we must keep our secrets. And no-one
except we Indians must know” (13), for example. Hence, to honor Menchú’s desire for opacity, I
explicitly step away from making any claims of comprehensive knowledge of Mayan Indian
culture based on my reading of this testimonio40.
Turning back to the dehumanist Mayan cosmovision that Menchú’s testimonio hosts:
before exploring what its exact contours are, it’s important to first attend to the ethos that
structures and births this illiberal worldview. As Menchú explains in her text, the relationship her
Indigenous community cultivates with non-human animals and objects is undergirded by love
and care. She gives voice to this affective foundation at several points in her narrative, such as
when she remarks, “We loved our land very, very much” (Menchú 4) and later, “We often come
to love the animal which is our nahual41 even before we know what it is. Although we love all
the natural world, we are often drawn to one particular animal more than others” (Menchú 19).
39

See Sommer, “Rigoberta’s Secrets” for a robust unpacking of Menchú’s textual refusals and how they seek to
prevent readers from presuming intimacy between themselves and her culture.
40
Both these caveats that I offer here underline the ever-present risk that haunts the illiberal—that it can, at a
moment’s notice, fold into the liberal (be that through the imposition of straitjacketing stereotypes or through a
claim to full visibility and exhaustive knowledge)—something that scholarly writing about the illiberal mode is not
immune to. See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a deeper exploration of literary scholarship and the il/liberal modes
of reading and writing it might rely on.
41
Editor Elisabeth Burgos-Debray explains the nahual as “[t]he word given to the double, the alter-ego, be it an
animal or any other living thing, which, according to Indian belief, all human beings possess. There is a relationship
between the nahual and a person’s personality” (Menchú 250).
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Menchú and her community’s Indigenous cosmovision, therefore, is deeply rooted in an ethic of
care. Care theorists such as Lori Gruen and María Puig de la Bellacasa explicate the ‘ethic of
care’ as an ethos and practice that is characterized by the following: it emanates from a thorough
awareness of our entanglement and resulting interdependency with other beings, while also
preserving the distinction between oneself and the other; it involves being attentive, responsive,
and responsible to the needs of others; and it demands both cognitive and emotional labor.
This ethic of care stands in direct contrast to liberal rights-based approaches42. In fact,
even when rights-based approaches have been pursued to achieve dehumanist ends—such as that
of troubling the denigratory attributes that liberal discourses impute to animals, for example—
they have worked, counterintuitively, only to further entrench a hegemonic liberal commonsense
about these non-human entities. Victoria Ridler, writing about the animal trials that took place in
Europe during the Middle Ages—where animals were tried for perceived wrongs, and were thus
granted legal subjectivity and procedural rights, rather than simply being treated as property—
notes that these events were still subjugating; it represented “little more than a shift from
claiming dominium in the non-human animal, to claiming imperium (the right to rule) over it”
(102). Pooja Rangan makes a similar observation about attempts to grant animals moral
considerability and protection from harm based on their possession of human traits. Leaning on
Cary Wolfe’s formulation, ‘humanist posthumanism,’ she writes that ventures that are “ethically
committed to undermining the ontological divide between the human and the animal … [but
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Certain care theorists such as Lori Gruen collapse rights-based approaches into justice-oriented ones, which in
turn are directly contrasted with care-based strategies. Such theorists critique justice-based approaches on the
grounds that they rely on abstract, mechanical reasoning, are concerned with individuals rather than relations, and
prioritize impartiality over the personal meanings of relationships, whereas care-based strategies make space for
contextual interpretation, relationality, and emotion. However, in my work, I distinguish and critique rights-based
activism as a specific liberal tool that fails to produce dehumanist justice. My work also coincides with theorists
such as Virginia Held, who believe that care and justice are not polar opposites but can, in fact, be integrated—in
that, care can provide the broader background ethic within which justice can be pursued, even as the specific
contours of ‘justice’ would be transformed in this process.
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draw on] ‘the liberal justice tradition and its central concept of rights, in which ethical standing
and civil inclusivity are predicated on rationality, autonomy, and agency,’ [are] centered by a
normative concept of the human that grounds discrimination against animals in the first place”
(Rangan 165). This iteration of ‘dehumanist’ justice that Rangan describes is expansionist—it
holds the construct of the human as paradigmatic, and then extends rights to non-human entities
based on their resemblance to the human, thus not really being dehumanist at all. In being
grounded in care rather than rights, however, the Mayan dehumanist cosmo-epistemology that
Menchú offers up in her testimonio, works to be reconstructive rather than expansionist.
Articulated through Claire Jean Kim’s gloss on reconstructionism (as opposed to expansionism),
this Mayan cosmovision “reimagin[es] humans, animals, and nature outside of systems of
domination” (287) altogether.
Having elaborated on the ethos that saturates the Mayan Indian community’s dehumanist
cosmovision, as presented in Menchú’s testimonio, I now turn to deconstructing what this
cosmovision actually entails. The first aspect of this illiberal worldview that I seek to amplify
here is its predication on the recognition of a fundamental horizontality between humans,
animals, and matter. When Menchú describes Mayan cultural practices, such as the ceremony
held to integrate a newborn child into the universe, she notes: “Candles are lit to represent all the
things which belong to the universe—earth, water, sun, and man—and the child’s candle is put
with them” (11–12). Naming the human as one of many entities that belong to the universe
effectively locates them all in the same horizontal plane. None of these entities have ascendancy
or a right of ownership over the others, none of them are property, and the only claim to
ownership lies with the broad abstraction that Menchú calls ‘the universe’. Menchú further
reaffirms this Mayan belief when she recounts: “Indians think of flowers as part of nature and
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you never see flowers in an Indian house … My father explained that we don’t need flowers in
the house any other time because we live amongst plants and trees, which are all part of nature”
(74). By refusing to display flowers in their homes, the Mayan community again explicitly
rejects a claim to ownership over non-human life-forms, instead upholding a horizontality born
from being equal inhabitants of the same ecosystem.
This unequivocal rejection of relations of ownership between humans and their nonhuman counterparts, in favor of horizontality, allows non-humans—animals and objects—to
emerge as subjects. It conceptualizes them as beings that exist for their own sake, rather than
existing as resources for humans to utilize for their own ends. This conception of the non-human
as a subject is further manifested in the Mayan community’s behavior. Menchú describes how
the men in her community, “[b]efore they start work every day, whatever hour of the morning it
is … greet the sun. They remove their hats and talk to the sun before starting work” (16). In
talking to the sun, the Mayan Indian men treat it as a subject, as an equal partner capable of
understanding and response. This response, however, is not by default expected to be affable and
in the interest of human needs. The Mayan community, in treating non-humans as subjects, also
sees them as entities capable of refusal, as evinced in Menchú’s description of Indigenous
farming rituals: “[B]efore we sow our maize, we have to ask the earth’s permission. Pom, copal,
is a sacred ingredient for our people. We use it to express our feelings for the earth, so that she
will allow us to cultivate her” (56–57). Asking permission, requesting consent, is an act that
affirms that the earth exists for its own sake and as such, has a say in how it contributes to and
participates in human life. This notion of the non-human as a subject with a self-interest is once
again emphasized when Menchú meets the children of a Mayan man who used to live amongst
them before relocating to the city. The children ask Menchú: “How are the animals, the rivers;

164

how are the plants?” (Menchú 32). In inquiring after these non-human entities’ wellbeing, the
Mayan children recognize them as beings that can be thriving or ailing, and that deserve to be
asked after.
Another way in which Menchú’s Mayan Indian community affirms non-human beings’
subjecthood is by recognizing that they too display care for humans. Menchú, recounting her
experience of going into the forest to chop wood with her siblings, narrates: “We had a dog with
us as a guide. He used to look out for animals and knew the way. The dog used to guide us
everywhere in the mountains” (28). This acknowledgment of Menchú’s dog caring for and
protecting her family aligns with care theorist María Puig de la Bellacasa’s recommendation of
“broadening consideration of the lives involved in caring agencies” (2) as a way of becoming
conscious to the aliveness of the non-human world, instead of (inaccurately) perceiving it as an
inert, passive backdrop to the drama of human life.
While the Mayan cosmovision recognizes these non-human entities as subjects in their
own right, this does not mean that they are conceived of as distinct beings with no relational ties
to humans. Rather, Menchú represents the Mayan Indian worldview as being deeply cognizant of
the relational bonds tying humans to non-humans—a cognizance that both informs and is in turn
recemented through practice. One way the Mayan community conceives of this relationality
between humans and non-humans is as something that emerges from living together in the same
ecosystem. Menchú reflects this when she states, “Man is part of the natural world. There is not
one world for man and one for animals, they are part of the same one and lead parallel lives”
(19). This relationality, arising from cohabitation, is not something that is merely acknowledged;
rather, it is centered in the Mayan consciousness, through practices such as that of “hav[ing]
surnames which are the names of animals” (Menchú 19)—a custom that serves as an ever-
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present reminder of this entanglement. Moreover, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Mayan
Indians are also assigned nahuals—animal or arboreal counterparts—at birth, based on the day
they are born. Menchú explains that the nahual is a “representative of the earth, the animal
world, the sun, and water, and … [is a way for] the child [to] communicate with nature” (18).
She also notes that Mayans reflect the character traits of their assigned nahual: “Tuesday is a bad
day to be born because the child will grow up bad-tempered. That is because Tuesday’s nahual is
a bull and bulls are always angry. The child whose nahual is a cat will like fighting with his
brothers and sisters” (Menchú 18). Here, the idea of relationality between humans and nonhumans further gives way to enmeshment, where humans take on the characteristics of their
nahual in a way that destabilizes notions of humans and non-humans being distinct ontological
units. Arturo Escobar, in his work, identifies this radical relationality, this inter-existence, as a
thoroughly illiberal onto-epistemology—a defiant counter to the ‘ontologies of separation’ that
characterize hegemonic liberal commonsense.
The question that inevitably follows from this exploration is: why do the subject
possibilities of non-human life and the relationality they share with humans matter? And the
answer to this question lies in Puig de la Bellacasa’s words: “What [non-human entities are]
thought to be affects the ways in which [they are] cared for” (170). True to Puig de la Bellacasa’s
observation, Menchú’s testimonio goes on to illuminate how this epistemological training—of
perceiving non-human entities as subjects and acknowledging the relationality, to the point of
enmeshment, between humans and non-humans—cultivates attitudes of respect and
responsibility towards these non-human beings in the Mayan consciousness. The attitude of
respect stems directly from an understanding of non-human entities as subjects that exist for their
own sake, whereas the ethos of responsibility is evoked by a deep awareness of the entanglement
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between humans and their non-human counterparts, as evinced when Menchú relates, “There’s
another custom for our twelfth birthday. We’re given a little pig, or a lamb, or one or two
chickens. These little animals have to reproduce and that depends on each person, on the love we
give our parents’ present” (50). This Mayan custom ties the animal’s reproductive success
directly to the human’s treatment of it, fostering a realization of the acute interdependence
between the two, thereby instilling a sense of responsibility for the non-human animal in the
Indigenous community members. As suggested in this example, these attitudes of respect and
responsibility are systematically inculcated in community members since the time they are
children, through repetitively practiced rituals and traditions, be those prayers of gratitude
offered after a harvest “to the earth, the moon, the sun, the animals and the water, all of which
join with the seed to provide … food” (Menchú 53), or the binding of children’s hands and feet
“to show [them] that they are sacred and must only be used to work or do whatever nature meant
them to do. They must never steal or abuse the natural world, or show disrespect for any living
thing” (Menchú 11).
While these rituals and customs are intended to foster a sense of respect and
responsibility in the Mayans toward the non-human entities they are surrounded by—animals
and matter—they also inevitably shape how the Mayans learn to treat other human beings too.
This dual, mutually informing goal, is further reiterated in the prayers that the Mayans offer to
the sun:
[O]ur prayer … says that men, the children of the one God, must respect the life of the
trees, the birds, the animals around us … We must respect the life of every single one of
them. We must respect the life, the purity, the sacredness, which is water … We must not
do evil while the sun shines upon its children. … Then we promise to respect the life of
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the one creature, which is man. This is very important. We say: ‘We cannot harm the life
of one of your children, we are your children. We cannot kill any of your creatures,
neither trees nor animals.’ (Menchú 58)
As evident here, the illiberal, ecological, dehumanist epistemologies and attitudes that the
Mayans cultivate toward non-human entities enacts a fundamental transformation in their
worldviews, which fosters respect and responsibility toward humans as well.
As John Beverley noted in his treatise on the testimonio, narratives inhabiting this genre
have pedagogical import, especially in terms of “summon[ing] [readers] to … a new kind of
politics” (2). Menchú’s testimonio is no different. By first suggesting how sanctioned harm
toward non-humans brackets and feeds into practices of harm toward humans, and by then laying
out her Mayan Indian community’s dehumanist cosmovision, I, Rigoberta Menchú invites
readers to adopt this illiberal onto-epistemology as a way of bearing secondary witness to human
harm. What does such a dehumanist, illiberal secondary witnessing practice, adapted from the
Mayan cosmovision that Menchú lays out in her testimonio, look like then?
A vital first step for readers looking to hew the Mayan cosmovision that Menchú
discusses into an illiberal secondary witnessing practice is to recognize the existence of what
Arturo Escobar calls the ‘pluriverse’—the fact that the liberal conception of the world is simply
one rendition of it among others. As I note in the Introduction to this dissertation, imagining,
validating, and practicing different ways of thinking and being rely heavily on the precursory
action of “resist[ing] the hegemonic operation positing one world, one real, and one possible”
(Escobar x) in favor of a “realization of multiple reals/possibles” (Escobar xx). Affirming the
‘pluriverse’ involves intentionally rejecting the liberal commonsense of “One World made from
one world” (Escobar 9) to linger with the possibility of “‘a world in which many worlds fit,’ the
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pluriverse” (Escobar 9). It is only through the provincialization of the hegemonic liberal
real/possible that what Puig de la Bellacasa terms ‘alterontologies’—“alternative livable
relationalities” (170)—can be imagined and realized.
Next, it becomes crucial for readers of testimonial narratives to revise their
understandings of non-human animals and objects, both in terms of what they are—their
ontologies—as well as the relationships they share with humans. A powerful way to move away
from the commonsense that liberal discourses and technologies have fostered, and toward
illiberality instead, is to follow Menchú’s lead and intentionally detach oneself from notions of
human distinction and supremacy, in favor of affirming the subject possibilities of animals and
matter, while also recognizing the fundamental and ever-present enmeshment between humans
and our non-human counterparts.
Affirming non-human animals and objects as subjects relies on, as Menchú’s testimonio
suggests, shifting one’s understanding to view them as perceptually rich and animate beings
respectively. In the face of naturalized liberal understandings of animals as ‘lacking in world,’ in
Heideggerian terms, and of objects as static and inanimate, seeing animals as living perceptually
rich lives, albeit in their idiosyncratic ways, and making space for objects to emerge as animate,
functions as a decidedly illiberal, dehumanist practice.
When it comes to recognizing that animals inhabit perceptually rich worlds—no matter
how peculiar this world may be to each animal—this might, at first, seem like an imaginative
thought-experiment, a flight of fancy. Yet, as shown by applied ethics philosopher Ralph
Acampora, this perceptual richness can in fact be gauged by practicing what he calls
‘symphysis’—a convivial perceptual experience, almost like empathy, that is made possible by
corporeality, by enfleshment, or more specifically, by the human’s sharing of a “somaesthetic
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nexus” (Acampora 76) with other species. As an example of symphysis in action, Acampora
cites Craig Holdrege’s phenomenological study of the star-nosed mole: “We can picture
ourselves in a dark, quiet, enclosed space where the surface of our body touches myriad objects.
Since our sense of touch is most refined in fingertips and tongue, we can imagine concentrating
our perceptions of weight, texture, and temperature through these organs. In this way we can
begin to acquaint ourselves with a tactile world” (qtd. in Acampora 35). Commenting on the
symphysical experience Holdrege stages with the star-nosed mole, Acampora clarifies: “Yes, the
imagination figures here—but it is grounded … by rigorous acquaintance with the habits,
anatomy, and physiology of the species” (35). Moreover, Acampora warns that even when such
symphysical legibility is not possible, perhaps due to a lack of somatic sensibility shared across
species, one must not default to the assumption that these other species lack experiences and
worldhoods comparable in richness and elaboration to, if not richer and more elaborate than, that
of humans. In fact, the symphysical experiences humans are able to achieve must function as
windows that facilitate future acknowledgments of how other species do indeed possess complex
perceptual experiences that humans may or may not be able to share.
Apprehending matter as subject, on the other hand, proceeds from acknowledging it as
animate, as an agent that can produce effects in the world around it, a belief guiding many of the
Mayan Indian customs that Menchú describes in her testimonio. The fact that matter possesses
animacy is also a cornerstone tenet of new materialist theory. Prominent new materialist scholar
Jane Bennett gives tangible form to this effectivity possessed by matter through the terms “thingpower” (xvi) and “vitality” (viii): “the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms,
metals—not only to impede or block the wills and designs of humans but also to act as quasi
agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” (J. Bennett viii). J.
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Bennett affirms that matter, with its ‘thing-power’ or ‘vitality’ is able to produce effects with and
across nature, the human body, and human artifacts. To help readers truly visualize this ‘thingpower’ or ‘vitality’ possessed by matter, she furnishes the example of edible matter, observing
that it functions “as an actant operating inside and alongside humankind, exerting influence on
moods, dispositions, and decisions” (J. Bennett xvii). In fact, J. Bennett further leverages this
example to dismantle the very idea of the human as distinct from matter. Instead, she portrays the
human body itself as an “impure, human-nonhuman assemblage” (J. Bennett xvii), composed of
both organic and inorganic actants. She remarks that the only reason humans are unable to
perceive this vitality possessed by matter is because “almost as soon as they appear in public
(often at first by disrupting human projects or expectations), these activities and powers are
represented as human mood, action, meaning, agenda, or ideology. This quick substitution
sustains the fantasy that ‘we’ really are in charge of all those ‘its’” (J. Bennett x). Being able to
perceive matter as a subject in its own right, then, depends on actively divesting from the
tendency to arrogate its agential contributions to ourselves, as humans, and intentionally staying
with matters’ ability to produce effects in the world instead.
Once animals and objects are affirmed as being subjects—as possessing worldhood and
vitality, respectively—it becomes key for readers to recognize the fundamental relationality
between themselves and non-human entities. An effective means of affirming this entanglement
is again illuminated by the Mayan cosmovision that Menchú describes; it involves proactively
expanding one’s perspective to think, at a macro level, in terms of what Joseph Pugliese calls
“ecology” (16)—a phrase that emplaces humans, animals, and matter in the same space, as
dependent on one another for survival. Pugliese draws on Ernst Haeckel’s definition of
ecology—“the relations of the organism to the environment including, in the broad sense, all the
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‘conditions of existence’. These are partly organic, and partly inorganic in nature” (qtd. in
Pugliese 16)—to further emphasize how lingering with the idea of ‘ecology’ helps corrode the
hierarchical binary of nature/culture and promotes a recognition of interdependency. Political
theorist Achille Mbembe endorses the centering of ecology as a way of becoming alert to
interdependency as well. Mbembe cautions that fixating on alterity and difference stimulates an
unhelpful, artificial, and even violent, sanctuarization or separation, but actively becoming
cognizant to the ‘in-common’—to our “inclusion in some already constituted thing or entity …
the idea of a world that … must be shared by … all species taken together” (Mbembe 40)—
nourishes a deep awareness of the radical interdependency shared by humans and non-humans.
Recognizing the fundamental entanglement between humans, animals, and matter and
seeing these non-human entities as subjects are key epistemological antecedents that can
empower readers to cultivate dehumanist, illiberal sensibilities. Two key attitudes that can be
cultivated from these onto-epistemological shifts are those of respect and responsibility toward
these non-humans, as indicated by Menchú’s testimonio, especially when these transformations
enable humans to see non-human entities as what Ralph Acampora calls “related others” (80).
Acampora further unravels this term as one that derives its theoretical richness from holding
together both proximity and distance. In that, on one hand, by viewing animals and matter in
relational terms, as proximal to humans—be that as partners, neighbors, or kin—one is able to
“positively value aspects of their being” (Acampora 80) as well as “experience a moral demand
to look after their welfare” (Acampora 80). Donna Haraway, in her groundbreaking posthumanist
manifesto, Staying with the Trouble, further affirms that making ‘oddkin’—nurturing relations of
kinship across species, beyond our bio-genealogical kin—fosters responsibility toward these
non-human others; making oddkin functions as a “practice of learning to live and die well with
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each other” (1). On the other hand, however, treating non-human entities as related others, rather
than simply as extensions of oneself, enables one to step away from an impulse to colonize their
consciousness by claiming full knowledge. Allowing for opacity is thus a manifestation of
respect and responsibility too—it rejects the erasure of non-human entities that may occur
through a full overlap that effectively only centers the human.
Centering an understanding of animals and objects as always already entangled with
humans also enables readers to nurture a haptic, rather than visual, sense of the world, which
again fosters attitudes of respect and responsibility. Entanglement and relationality are proximal
states of being—and such proximity forces a consideration of how humans and non-humans are
constantly touching, and thus affecting, each other. Tina Campt, in her study of black diasporic
identification photographs, Listening to Images, flags visuality as reproducing the sovereign gaze
and thus functioning as a colonialist mode of engagement—visual engagement distances,
separates, surveils, classifies, and homogenizes. Instead, she advocates for modes of interaction
that contain haptic possibilities, such as listening, for example, due to the ability of soundwaves
to touch others. A haptic worldview is capable of further nurturing the illiberal sensibilities of
respect and responsibility toward non-human others, because as Donna Haraway puts it, “touch
ramifies and shapes accountability” (When Species Meet 36). In touching an other, one affects
the other—an encounter that thus demands utmost care, respect, and responsibility.
María Puig de la Bellacasa further calls attention to the haptic’s ‘reversibility’—“the fact
of being touched by what we touch” (20). In being reversible, as such, a haptic approach to the
non-human world forms a feedback loop that once again reinforces dehumanist, illiberal ontoepistemologies and commitments. In becoming aware of how one is touching—how one is
impacting—the non-human entities one is entangled with, one also becomes sensitive to how
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these non-human entities are simultaneously touching one back. On one hand, this awareness of
being touched back confirms the subject-hood of non-human entities. On the other, attending to
how one is constantly being touched back by non-human beings shatters the myth of
separation—and consequent invulnerability—that liberal discourses fabricate around the
construct of the human. Judith Butler43 observes that fantasies of invulnerability are often created
by projecting injurability onto the other, thus also denying it in oneself. They further remark that
it is only when one becomes aware of how no entity has a monopoly on injurability—that every
being, including oneself, exists in a shared state of vulnerability—that the ethical injunction to
control one’s own aggression becomes the most compelling. Exporting Butler’s insight to the
context at hand suggests that in becoming conscious of one’s own touchability—of how one’s
wellbeing is fundamentally dependent on the other—one is also motivated to become more
responsible in his/her interactions with the non-human world. Finally, this awareness of mutual
touchability also works to reframe how one may approach their illiberal commitments. Instead of
conceiving of these newly acquired sensibilities of respect and responsibility toward one’s nonhuman counterparts as a one-sided, patronizing generosity, we are compelled to become aware of
how this accountability is always multilateral and mutual.
Together, these dehumanist onto-epistemologies and sensibilities vitalize an illiberal
praxis that doubles as a secondary witnessing methodology, a way of responding to testimonies
that attest to state-inflicted injury and degradation, in place of attempting to re-humanize those
that have been dehumanized. This illiberal praxis is that of living in respectful and responsible
attunement with non-human others, caring for their wellbeing and not sanctioning harm
predicated on discursively constructed differences; it involves what Karl Steel calls “liv[ing] as
more uncertain, humble, and responsible beings, less confident in the moral irrelevance of
43

See Frames of War.
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others” (10). Since, as proposed in this chapter, non-human harm is sutured to human harm,
nurturing this illiberal dehumanist worldview promises to percolate through to produce more
rehabilitative relations between humans as well44. In fact, when the liberal disarticulation and
hierarchization of humans, animals, and objects itself has been destabilized, this illiberal
cosmovision will successfully intervene to restrain injury-infliction in general—irrespective of
the form a being takes.
Furthermore, as the epistemic underpinnings of both liberal and illiberal secondary
witnessing methods indicate, thinking practices are as important to cultivating a
humanist/dehumanist orientation as actions are; they cannot be dismissed as ancillary. This is
particularly important for literary critic readerships, whose primary channel of bearing secondary
witness to testimonial narratives is through the critical thought they put out. The reminder Puig
de la Bellacasa offers in her text becomes particularly meaningful in this context: “thinking and
knowing are … relational processes that require care” (19). As such, to bear illiberal secondary
witness to testimonial narratives, it is important for literary critics to actively step away from
reproducing liberal modes of thought, such as the ones highlighted earlier in this chapter, in
favor of more care-ful, explicitly dehumanist ways of thinking. Chandan Reddy offers
intersectional critique as a powerful way of pursuing more illiberal critical agendas. He notes
that intersectional critique—in rupturing the fixed identity categories bequeathed to us through
liberal infrastructures, and in prompting alertness to alternative forms of being—“generates
distinct practices of oppositionality that are conventionally illegible within the modes of
44

My repeated mention of how preventing harm to non-human others will transmit forward and mitigate human
suffering may at first suggest that the dehumanist attitudes and practices I urge in this chapter are ultimately oriented
by an anthropocentric telos. However, I return to human injury in this chapter as starting point rather than end goal.
In that, I revisit it to stress how the cultivation of dehumanist onto-epistemologies is not a shirking of the
responsibility—of responding to human injury—that secondary witnesses shoulder; rather, these dehumanist
practices do in fact work to assuage human harm, even as their impact radiates far beyond this particular scene of
wounding.
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perception and knowledge that organize the reproduction and extension of liberal political
modernity” (Reddy 32). While intersectionality has traditionally been understood in terms of
human identity, it should also be extended to the imbrications between human, animal, and
matter, as a way of enacting dehumanist, illiberal secondary witnessing through critical
scholarship.
As I showcase here, the dehumanist onto-epistemologies that Menchú elaborates in her
testimonio act as fecund ground from which a multitude of radical illiberal secondary witnessing
postures and practices can spring forth.
THE MÖBIUS STRIP OF THE (IL)LIBERAL
Even as her testimonio holds up how the Mayan Indian people live respectfully and
responsibly with the non-human world, Menchú notes that they also regularly instrumentalize
non-human animals and matter. Despite—or rather alongside—their dehumanist commitments,
the Indigenous people regularly make use of plants, animals, and the earth. They use plants for
medicinal purposes, till the earth to sow and harvest crops for their sustenance, utilize animals as
a mode of transportation down the mountain, and more.
Donna Haraway, in her influential monograph, When Species Meet, provides a helpful
frame for making sense of this seeming contradiction. She notes that “use … and instrumentality
are intrinsic to bodily webbed mortal earthly being and becoming” (Haraway, When Species
Meet 71)—human entanglement with non-human others is often itself marked by reciprocal
relations of use. Pretending to live outside use relations, Haraway notes, in fact risks “forgetting
the ecologies of all … beings, who live in and through the use of one another’s bodies” (When
Species Meet 79). In Haraway’s words, then, “instrumental relations of people and animals [and
objects] are not themselves the root of turning animals [or objects] … into dead things, into
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machines … who have no presence, no face, that demands recognition, caring, and shared pain”
(Haraway, When Species Meet 71; emphasis in original). Rather, it is when humans establish use
relations unidirectionally, based on self-interested calculation that fails to take the non-human
animal/object being used into consideration in any meaningful way, that these relations of
instrumentality begin to appear more colonialist in form, increasingly aligned with liberal
hierarchical, oppression-sanctioning conceptions of the human, non-human animal, and object.
Here, I piggyback on Haraway’s framing to highlight how closely the liberal tails the
illiberal. Haraway’s discussion of use relations illuminates how the liberal and illiberal manifest
like a Möbius strip—one always risks becoming the other—in this particular case, depending on
which attitudes and practices subtend these use relations. Even so, I contend that relations of use
do not alone surrender a dehumanist ethos to liberality. This all-or-nothing thinking would make
illiberality so virtual and hypothetical so as to render it only a thought-experiment, a fantasy,
something that can never really take root as tangible quotidian practice. Instead of occupying the
dual temporality of present practice and future horizon that I outline in the Introduction to this
dissertation, illiberal dehumanism would appear merely as a horizon—a horizon so unviable that
calling it a mirage instead would perhaps be more apropos.
What truly returns a practice to illiberality from this precipice between the liberal and
illiberal, then, are the ancillary practices of care one enacts alongside these moments of
unavoidable instrumentalization. Together, Menchú’s testimonio and Haraway’s posthumanist
manifesto again offer a template for better understanding what these practices of care might look
like. Menchú, in her testimonio, depicts her Mayan Indian community as engaging in several
practices of care and recognition in the moments where they may be making use of animals or
the earth. When they pick coffee, they try to minimize the injury caused to the plant by working
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with care: “We had to work very carefully … I remember that it’s one of the things that taught
me to treat things very gently. Picking coffee is like caring for a wounded person” (Menchú 35),
Menchú notes; before using animal and plant life for sustenance, the Mayans ask it for
permission to do so, rather than presuming access: “Our ancestors always asked the permission
of every living thing before using it to help us feed ourselves” (Menchú 68); and finally,
exercising a firm cognizance of how they are making use of the non-human world for their
nourishment, the Mayan people try to minimize their wastefulness: “During the fiesta, prayers
are given up to the earth, the moon, the sun, the animals and the water, all of which join with the
seed to provide our food. Each member of the family makes a vow and promises not to waste the
food” (Menchú 53). All these actions that Menchú portrays her Indigenous community as
engaging in are postures of respect and care—attitudes that, in accompanying the use of animals
and matter, blunt harm, and return actions that mimic the logics of liberalism to a dehumanist,
illiberal realm.
Haraway’s When Species Meet endorses a similar practice—of supplementing the
unavoidable instrumentalization of non-human entities with practices predicated on
(uncomfortably) remaining in solidarity with and taking responsibility for the harm caused to
these subjects in the process. She highlights several techniques that readers can implement to
ensure that their liberal-seeming actions are able to remain dehumanist and illiberal—methods
based on cultivating “a radical ability to remember and feel what is going on and performing the
epistemological, emotional, and technical work to respond practically” (Haraway, When Species
Meet 75). The first such technique is what Haraway dubs “nonmimetic sharing” (Haraway, When
Species Meet 75) of suffering. This ‘nonmimetic sharing’ is a practice of radical empathy; it
involves remaining co-present with the instrumentalized being in its moment of being
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instrumentalized, without substituting oneself in its place, to bear witness to its suffering.
Haraway holds that this ‘nonmimetic sharing’ is “the sort of engagement that keeps … inequality
from becoming commonsensical or taken as obviously okay” (Haraway, When Species Meet 75).
Next, Haraway notes that this act—of being affectively co-present with the instrumentalized
entity—should prompt one to reflect on whether the suffering being caused is truly minimal,
necessary, and consequential, and if it isn’t, to then undertake the material labor required to
ensure that it is. Further, Haraway recommends that when no further mitigation of
suffering/instrumentalization is possible, one should still remain in this discomfiting encounter
with non-human beings precisely because of the moral discomfort it produces. Staying with this
discomfort, in Haraway’s account, is a way of “serv[ing] as witness to the need for something
properly called forgiveness even in the most thoroughly justified instances of causing suffering”
(Haraway, When Species Meet 75). An illiberal dehumanist ethos, as Haraway’s work
underscores here, is “the result of remaining at risk and in solidarity in instrumental relationships
that one does not disavow” (Haraway, When Species Meet 70).
Holding on to the Möbius strip as a conceptual anchor for thinking the liberal and
illiberal together is therefore helpful for remaining alert to the ever-present risk that haunts the
illiberal: of it morphing into liberality at a moment’s notice. Menchú, in her testimonio, also
gestures to this instability between the two realms when she discusses the Guatemalan
government’s setting up of an agency—INAFOR (Instituto Nacional de Forestación de
Guatemala: Guatemalan Forestry Commission)—to protect the Guatemalan trees and forests.
While this act, undertaken by the government, may initially read as a dehumanist, illiberal
practice of care, akin to those implemented by the Mayan Indian community, Menchú notes that
this organization was merely set up as a legitimized channel for oppressing the Indians further
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and quelling their political activism. Since felling trees functioned as a key source of livelihood
and sustenance for the Indian community, by protecting the forests, the Guatemalan government
authorized itself to police and restrict Indigenous use of the trees. By setting up INAFOR, then,
in the name of protecting trees, the Guatemalan government arrogated to itself the power to
arrest Indians for deforestation; it also subjugated the Indians by setting up bureaucratic hurdles
that compelled them to “apply to a judge for permission to buy … trees” (Menchú 158) that they
sought to chop for timber or for their own domestic needs. Menchú here depicts how care for the
non-human world—something that her community valued as a dehumanist illiberal ontoepistemology (although not deemed as such in Menchú’s testimonio)—was thus weaponized and
made to operate in service of thoroughly oppressive ends.
In thus inviting reader-secondary witnesses to consider the constant instability between
the liberal and the illiberal—how an illiberal ethos can be co-opted and made to function in
service of liberal ends—Menchú’s testimonio effectively coaxes them into being vigilant. It
reminds reader-secondary witnesses that even as illiberal secondary witnessing attitudes and
practices can challenge and even unseat hegemonic liberal commonsenses, neither the ‘liberal’ or
‘illiberal’ are stable, immutable labels. Rather, successfully adopting an illiberal way of thinking
and being demands unrelenting wariness, flexibility, and creativity. A truly illiberal secondary
witnessing practice, then, is by definition evanescent—constantly shifting shape, alternately
thickening and dissipating in tandem with liberal discourses and technologies, but in ways that
evade their cold, deathly chokehold.
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CHAPTER 3
I Am Body(-)Mind: Bearing Illiberal Secondary Witness to the Shifting Experiences of
Selfhood Narrated in Testimonial Narratives through (Un)disciplined Scholarship
“To sit so far from everything … ensconced in the armchair, and to be convinced
you see things better than someone who has felt it all on his own skin, and on top
of that to pontificate, hold forth and preach, despite the fact that in reality
everything is different and, to say the least, you have no idea what is really going
on.”
—David Albahari, Snow Man
“And any education that is not chance, not, in other words, an adventure … is not
a real education, it is nothing more than a system … no surprises, so that at the
beginning of a class you know how the class will end. She had been here long
enough, at the university, she said, and she had seen how, under the guise of
championing certain freedoms and supposed equalities, all freedoms were being
suppressed.”
—David Albahari, Snow Man
“Literature you treat as a part of the system … but instead literature is freedom, a
freedom to choose, a freedom to abandon and a freedom of difference.”
—David Albahari, Snow Man
“I want to encourage interpretation to take risks.”
—Doris Sommer, The Work of Art in the World
The two testimonial narratives that I read in this chapter, Syrian writer Mustafa Khalifa’s
The Shell and Egyptian novelist and activist Nawal el Sa’adawi’s Memoirs from the Women’s
Prison, at their most elemental levels, testify to the openness of subjectivity—to one’s
constitutive condition of being exposed to others rather than being a hermetically sealed
fortress—and the exploitation of this fundamental vulnerability that incarcerated political
dissidents experience at the hands of their respective authoritarian regimes.
As I discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation, Mustafa Khalifa’s The Shell is a semi-
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autobiographical1 novel that, through the eyes of its protagonist, Musa, testifies to the detention,
brutal torture, and arbitrary execution faced by political prisoners who were held in military
prisons such as Tadmur2 and Sednaya3 at the behest of the Syrian dictator, Hafez al-Assad, in the
1980s and 1990s. While al-Assad’s regime detained those associated with several banned
secular, leftist, and Marxist political organizations4 more broadly, its main targets were those
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood—an Islamist religio-political movement that mounted
fierce opposition to the Ba’ath Party, which was led by al-Assad at the time. The protagonist of
Khalifa’s testimonial novel, Musa, is also detained and tortured in Tadmur on the pretext of
suspected involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood, despite his being unaffiliated with this
oppositional party.
From the time that he is arrested at the airport on his return from France—where he had
been studying filmmaking—and is brought to the interrogation center, through his detention at
Tadmur, Musa, in painstaking detail, recounts the savage torture visited upon both him and the
other detainees by the representatives of the al-Assad regime. The pathos elicited by Khalifa’s
representation of the gratuitous infliction of pain and injury on feeling, writhing, bleeding flesh is
only amplified by the detainees’ desperate attempts to escape it—to shield themselves from the
rabid attacks of the regime men—and their failure at doing so. At the interrogation center, when
Musa is stuffed into a car tire, and his feet are mercilessly whipped, he recounts: “Ayyoub
managed to stuff me into that car tire in such a way that my legs were sticking up in the air,

1

I refer to The Shell as a ‘semi-autobiographical’ text because, as Imad Karkas notes, it intertwines Khalifa’s own
detention experiences—first from 1979 to 1980 and then again from 1982 to 1994—with those of his Christian
friend as well as those of the other detainees he encountered in these state-run military prisons.
2
Also spelled as ‘Tadmor,’ this prison is invoked as the ‘desert prison’ in the text, on account of its location in the
desert city of Palmyra.
3
The Sednaya military prison was another security prison, located near the capital city of Damascus in Syria, that
was used by the al-Assad regime to detain political dissidents. Its location in the mountains bestowed upon it the
moniker of ‘Mountain Prison’—a reference also found in Khalifa’s The Shell.
4
See Taleghani, Readings in Syrian Prison Literature Chapter 5.
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unable to escape no matter how much I tried” (Khalifa, The Shell 7). Similarly, when the
detainees are let out of their cells to shower or shave, their short journey toward the common
areas of the prison is almost ritualistic in its repetition: “two rows of policemen on each side of
the door, with about two meters between one policeman and the next; each policeman carr[ying]
a whip. As soon as a prisoner reached the door he would start to run, only to be met by the whips
belonging to the right-hand row of policemen in front of him and pursued from behind by the
left-hand row” (Khalifa, The Shell 36). The prisoners run forward to escape the sting of the
whips but are unable to do so; the whips continue to rain down mercilessly on their mostly naked
bodies. Khalifa’s lifting up of the detainees’ repeated futile attempts at protecting themselves
from the infliction of pain emphasizes their inescapable exposure to the touch of others, as well
as the responsibility—whether attended to or flagrantly disregarded, as in the case of torture—
that attends such interpersonal entanglement and impressionability.
Memoirs from the Women’s Prison—an autobiographical account of Egyptian writer,
psychiatrist, and women’s rights activist5, Nawal el Sa’adawi’s almost three month-long
imprisonment in the Qanatir women’s prison6 in 1981 for her public criticism of President
Anwar Sadat’s one-party system—articulates a similar proposition. Like Khalifa’s text, el
Sa’adawi’s testimonial memoir also underscores how women detained in the Qanatir prison are
impacted by the regime, albeit not in as direct a manner as torture; rather, el Sa’adawi’s memoir
draws attention to how the Sadat regime abuses the fundamental vulnerability that marks human

5

As a feminist writer and activist, el Sa’adawi focused largely on the oppression faced by women in an Islamic
patriarchal society. She wrote particularly extensively against the practice of female genital mutilation. Her feminist
writing and activism have led her to be described as the “Simone de Beauvoir of the Arab world” (Batha) and
“Egypt’s most radical woman” (N. Bennett).
6
Also referred to as Qanater or Al Qanater, this prison, located in the northwest of Cairo, is the largest women’s
prison in Egypt. It occupies slightly more than two acres of a 30-acre carceral complex that also includes a men’s
prison. As a Middle East Watch report published in 1993 noted, the carceral conditions in Qanatir were quite abject:
the women prisoners remained confined for long periods, without even being let out to wash and relieve themselves,
in overcrowded and poorly ventilated cells.
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subjectivity by abandoning the female detainees to systematic neglect7 as a form of abuse—
they’re cooped up in dark and cramped communal cells, served food infested with worms, and
deprived of the ability to use operational toilets or shower regularly, to name a few
infrastructural oppressions they’re subjected to. el Sa’adawi’s memoir bears witness to the
regime’s impact on the women by evocatively ‘showing’ readers how these untenable living
conditions register corporeally—the female detainees’ faces appear “exhausted and pale, [their]
eyes anxious and showing the effects of sleeplessness, [their] feet grimy, heels blackened from
walking through the dusty enclosure then plunging them into the sewer water in the toilet” (el
Sa’adawi 52), and at another point, “the whites of their eyes [are] stained with the yellowishness
of carbon dioxide poisoning and the smoke of burnt gas, while the corners [are] inflamed by
sleeplessness, worry, and flies” (el Sa’adawi 122). By showcasing how the women incarcerated
in the Qanatir prison are adversely affected by the Sadat regime, despite rarely being physically
assaulted by the police or the prison wardens, el Sa’adawi’s Memoirs from the Women’s Prison
highlights that impact can also occur across distance. Despite a lack of co-presence or direct
physical interaction, one remains capable of impacting others and therefore remains beholden to
them for their wellbeing. Notwithstanding a lack of physical proximity or contact, one is still
able to contribute to the conditions that either proliferate flourishing for others or severely curtail
its potential8.
Philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler too, across their prominent works,
7

This neglect isn’t a careless, passive negligence; instead, it’s intentionally produced by the regime as a form of
debasement and oppression. This ‘neglect’ manifests as a biopolitical exercise of power that insists on the survival
of these female prisoners, but only in the most abject of conditions.
8
Of course, the extent of the impact—in the absence of direct physical interaction—achievable by those imbued
with unrestrained biopower, such as state agents, and those that don’t inhabit these roles is vastly disproportional,
and I don’t intend to simplistically conflate the two here. I merely seek to lift up how direct physical contact or copresence aren’t necessary preconditions for enacting harm; harm can also be inflicted across distance, by
contributing to the conditions that induce flourishing into being or actively forestall it. State agents, no doubt, retain
the ability to inflict greater and more immediate harm—through the active creation of degrading conditions—than
non-state-affiliated individuals are capable of.
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Precarious Life and Frames of War, meditates at length on how an irreducible feature of human
subjectivity is a vulnerability to being impacted by others—a state of being they dub
‘precariousness’. They invite a consideration of how we’re socially constituted beings,
determined by and exposed to one another, an aspect most pronounced in infancy, when we are
dependent on others for our very survival. Precariousness—this condition of universally shared
vulnerability—they further underscore, “implies exposure both to those we know and to those we
do not know” (Frames of War 14). While Khalifa and el Sa’adawi’s testimonial narratives most
directly explore precariousness as it simmers to the fore in the particular relations between the
detainees and those working on behalf of the Syrian and Egyptian autocratic regimes
respectively, Butler’s theorization, in implicating relationalities that exist in more amorphous and
dispersed forms, in ways that cannot be specifically named or identified, ensnares readers of
testimonial texts—their secondary witnesses—within this web of impressibility as well. As I
discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation, the intradiegetic events narrated in these
testimonial narratives seek to impact readers by provoking experiences of corporeal mirroring in
them. Drawing from theorizations of the torture porn film genre, I explained corporeal mirroring
as a set of bodily responses—flinching, squirming, and wincing, among others—that the grisly
representations of torture, reported in testimonial narratives, elicit from secondary witnesses;
these elicited responses are ones that simulate—albeit in highly watered-down form—the affects
and reactions of those that are experiencing torture firsthand. In this chapter, then, I’m interested
in the reciprocal possibilities of this relationship between reader-secondary witnesses and
testifiers: how might readers affirm and attend to the impact that they, in turn, can have on
testifiers who speak in and are represented by these narratives? Considering that the future of
both testimonial narratives and the testifiers themselves is often sutured to readerly reception and
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response9, this impact is quite material, and not just an idle thought experiment10. Given that
impressionability subtends every relation, both proximal and mediated, including that which
exists between reader and testifier—these testimonial narratives prompt reader-secondary
witnesses to respond to them in ways that nurture possibilities for thriving, rather than those that
reproduce injury.
In this chapter, I focus on a specific kind of readerly subjectivity that may bear secondary
witness to testimonial narratives by immersing itself in and writing about these texts—that of the
humanities scholar practicing literary criticism and scholarship within the (neo)liberal American
university. I identify literary scholarship as overlapping with secondary witnessing11 because the
activities of critique and theorization that the former is involved in—activities that involve
engaging with, responding to, and carrying forward these narratives through commentary—
intersect with the work of secondary witnessing itself. Moreover, critique—implicitly invoked in
the term ‘literary criticism’—as defined by Michel Foucault12 and Judith Butler13, is itself an
oppositional endeavor; it seeks to question and limit the unjust exercise of power, which is the
very injunction that testifiers writing against the exercise of brute sovereign power on their
bodies levy on secondary witnesses. In Foucault’s words, the work of critique involves inquiring

9

As I discuss at length in the Introduction to this dissertation, the circulation of testimonial narratives, and
consequently, the readerly attention they garner and the secondary witnessing action they catalyze, is also
ineluctably influenced by the publishing industry.
10
This impact is all the more pronounced when it comes to the readerly subjectivity that I focalize in this chapter—
that of literary scholars producing literary criticism in the (neo)liberal American university. As Barbara Christian
notes, literary criticism is an act of “promotion … [it is] a response to the writer to whom there is often no response”
(78); through this act of response and promotion, then, literary criticism often plays a role in how widely testimonial
narratives circulate, how they are taught, and thus, how they are read and received.
11
While literary criticism and secondary witnessing do coincide in the ways that I outline here, they also exceed
each other. Literary criticism can be practiced in ways that spill beyond secondary witnessing objectives; similarly,
the avenues for secondary witnessing action are multiple, and stretch beyond the particular instance of literary
criticism. In this chapter, though, I intend to call attention to how literary scholarship nevertheless does intersect
with secondary witnessing, even as this intersection may not encapsulate the totality of activity happening within
each sphere.
12
See “What is Critique?”.
13
See “Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity.”
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into modes of governing with the particular goal of determining “[h]ow not to be governed like
that, by that, in the name of these principles, in view of such objectives and by the means of such
methods, not like that, not for that, not by them” (“What is Critique” 384), a concept reiterated
by Butler when they observe: “what is critical in academic work relates more broadly to the
problem of political dissent, where the latter is understood as a way of objecting to illegitimate
claims of public and governmental authority” (“Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity” 11).
Braiding together these two propositions—of humanities scholarship, specifically the
work of literary criticism, functioning as a form of secondary witnessing, and about secondary
witnesses’ potential ability to impact the testifiers they encounter in the pages of these
testimonial narratives—I ask: what stances and modes, within which literary criticism might be
undertaken, affirm scholars’ ability to impact testifiers through their work? How might literary
scholars’ hermeneutic and theoretical endeavors, occurring under the aegis of the (neo)liberal
American university as they are, become further alert and responsive to this responsibility of
inducing flourishing into being for these testifiers rather than further inflicting harm on them?
In this chapter, I conduct this inquiry by drawing on select theorizations of subjectivity
advanced in extant humanities scholarship14 alongside a consideration of the metaphoric
representations15 of selfhood reported in Khalifa and el Sa’adawi’s narratives. My interest is in
contributing to the development of a literary criticism that is able to represent, and thus bear

14

While these theories of subjectivity have not been developed uniquely by literary scholars, they have nevertheless
been informed by insights cultivated through literary criticism, and they’re also often further upheld through literary
scholarship. As such, my use of the term ‘humanities scholarship’ encompasses literary scholarship, even as it
acknowledges the role that other disciplines have played in the creation, propagation, and ascension to
commonsense of these theories of subjectivity.
15
The metaphorical quality of these representations of selfhood—their ‘as if’-ness—is expressed only indirectly in
these testimonial texts. By that, I mean that these narratives refrain from overtly mobilizing metaphoric
formulations; rather, the manner in which they depict the detainees’ experiences of selfhood takes on an implicit
metaphorical form. Without expressly using ‘as if’ constructions, these texts ask reader-secondary witnesses to
suspend their preexisting conceptions of subjectivity in order to allow detainees’ understandings of their selfhood to
float into view.
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secondary witness to, the metaphorical experiences of selfhood narrated in these testimonial
texts. More specifically, I am invested in exploring: how does the fact of literary criticism being
practiced within and disciplined by the (neo)liberal American university influence this ability?
Does working within these institutional confines—bearing secondary witness to testimonial texts
through the (neo)liberal American university’s imparted commonsense—enable the methods via
which scholars undertake the work of literary criticism to acquire more elasticity, or does it
stiffen them? What undisciplined, illiberal approaches and stances may scholars turn to, in order
to make the work of literary criticism more hospitable to these testimonial accounts, to enable
them to host testifiers’ autopoietic endeavors more responsibly, more care-fully?
Further, I refract my study of subjectivity, across the realms of humanities scholarship
and testimonial texts, through the analytic prism of body(-)mind-ness. Sami Schalk uses the term
‘bodymind’ to reference embodiment—“the enmeshment of the mind and body” (Schalk 5)—as
characteristic of subjectivity, in direct contradistinction to Cartesian dualism, which posits that
“there are two mutually exclusive types of ‘thing’, physical and mental, body and mind, that
compose … subjectivity … [with the body as] somehow subordinate to and dependent for all that
is interesting about it on animating intentions” (Grosz vii) (a notion I index through the
shorthand of body-mind). I posit my inquiry with a parenthetical hyphen separating the body and
mind to keep the connection between the two unsettled over the course of this chapter, to allow
these two components of subjectivity to exist in fluid relation to each other. In other words, via
this parenthetical hyphen, I intend to keep open the question of how both theoretical scholarship
and testimonial texts understand these entities—body and mind—as structuring subjectivity,
rather than preemptively leaning toward or away from either embodiment or a dualist framework
as a way of explaining subjectivity.
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In this chapter, I first juxtapose the predominant theorizations of body(-)mind subjectivity
available in humanities scholarship with the shifting metaphoric representations of body(-)mind
selfhood articulated in Mustafa Khalifa’s The Shell to spotlight the misalignment between the
two. I then delve into an exploration of how the (neo)liberal American university, as the
institution that subtends and disciplines the practice of humanities (and literary) scholarship,
calcifies literary criticism in ways that prevent it from being fully responsive to the testimonial
narratives it reads and comments on. I parse the creation and circulation of this stultifying
institutional commonsense as it operates at two different scales: that of the university more
broadly, and specifically, at the relatively micro-scale of the literary discipline itself. Next, I read
the metaphoric representation of selfhood, in body(-)mind terms, reported in Khalifa’s text
against that narrated in Nawal el Sa’adawi’s Memoirs from the Women’s Prison. By highlighting
the disjuncture between the two, and therefore the limits of undertaking scholarship in the mode
of strong, one-size-fits-all theorizations, I make a case for turning to illiberal scholarly
methods—to pliant modes of literary criticism.
Finally, and most importantly, I close out this chapter by exploring what these illiberal
modes of scholarly secondary witnessing may look like in a more tangible vein. The reading and
writing methods I propose here—as components of an illiberal iteration of literary criticism—are
oriented by the overarching goal of ceding primacy to the first-person experiences reported by
testifiers, instead of burying them under the weight of hegemonic scholarly theorizations; the
kind of literary criticism that I advocate for here is therefore one that can remain alert to and
affirm the singularity16 of each testimonial utterance, while also embodying a deep awareness of

16

This proposition—of literary scholarship engaging testimonial narratives in their irreducible singularity—might
raise questions about the possibility and value of cohering testimonial narratives as a genre, as a category of
analysis. However, I maintain that the two are not mutually exclusionary propositions: attending to the singularity of
a testimonial text, to the unique first-person experiences reported in each one, does not render nonviable an inquiry
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its own ephemerality17. The illiberal praxes that I urge, then, range from the cultivation of a
stance of radical openness in one’s textual engagements—an active shift from professionalized,
disciplined reading techniques to ones that are more vulnerable, more untrained, more amateur
almost—to weak theory and thin description as critical writing practices. Additionally, I also
offer up the cultivation of a deinstrumentalized curiosity and an openness to experimentation as
postures that may be capable of further augmenting an illiberal literary scholarly practice. Last
but not the least, I exhort scholars engaging with testimonial narratives to adopt an ethos of
answerability in their critical endeavors, as a way of remaining accountable to the testifiers they
encounter in testimonial narratives and respond to, as secondary witnesses. These illiberal praxes
and postures, I thus posit, are ones that hold the potential to nurture a literary critical practice that
is simultaneously responsive and responsible to the testimonial narratives it engages with.
SCHOLARLY THEORIZATIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY, IN BODY(-)MIND TERMS
In this section, I seek to offer a snapshot of the understandings of body(-)mind
subjectivity that have ascended to commonsense in humanities scholarship18. More specifically, I
sketch, in broad strokes, how the debate between embodiment and dualism has sedimented in
humanities scholarship more generally, and also how it has taken shape vis-à-vis pained and unpained subjects particularly.
As I explained earlier, the theory of embodiment refers to the conceptualization of mind
into the formal features that these texts may share as a group, nor does it nullify the fact that they all testify to
sovereign enactments of wounding and massacre, for instance.
17
The ‘ephemerality’ I invoke here refers to the applicability of the particular piece of literary scholarship to
testimonial utterances beyond the one it is immediately concerned with; the term ‘ephemerality’ does not seek to
foretell the impact that that piece of literary criticism might have, which in fact may be quite far-reaching and/or
long-lasting, as I noted earlier.
18
A crucial caveat bears mentioning here: the summary I provide in this section is an illustrative, rather than
exhaustive, undertaking. In that, it is not a survey that captures and represents every instance of scholarly
theorization of body(-)mind subjectivity ever published; such a comprehensive study lies beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Instead, in this section, I provide a broad-strokes rendering of how certain scholarly theorizations of
subjectivity, in body(-)mind terms, have become commonsense, such that alternative understandings—palpable in
the testimonial narratives that I read in this chapter—are afforded sparing critical recognition.
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and body as thoroughly enmeshed—it is for this reason that I invoke it through the term
‘bodymind’; embodiment is captured most colorfully in Elizabeth Grosz’s metaphor of the
Mobiüs strip—“The Mobiüs strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of mind into body
and body into mind, the ways in which, through a kind of twisting or inversion, one side
becomes the other” (xii). Dualism—initially theorized by philosopher René Descartes—on the
other hand, figures the mind and body as distinct entities, an idea captured in the term ‘bodymind,’ with the mind discursively positioned as superior to the body; Suzanne Hatty summarizes
dualism most succinctly when she writes, “the body [is] simply res extensa, matter animated by
mechanical forces … divorced from higher cognition” (118-119). While Cartesian dualism
reigned supreme as the commonsense understanding of subjectivity for centuries, post- and
decolonial scholarship as well as women of color and queer of color feminist writing subverted
the hegemony of a dualist understanding of subjectivity. These critiques displaced dualist
ideology in favor of embodiment due to the discursive and even material violence discharged by
the former toward marginalized subjects. In that, dualism has historically been wielded as an
oppressive discourse that has created racialized, gendered, and ableist hierarchies wherein
women, nonwhite, disabled, and other marginalized subjects have been represented as tethered to
the body and therefore as inferior—more given to the passions19 and as resources from which
devalued physical20 and sexual labor can be extracted—while white, cis-het, able-bodied men
have leveraged a dualist understanding of subjectivity to align themselves definitively with the
mind, an intellectual sphere considered separate from and superior to corporeality. As Naomi
Scheman helpfully summarizes:

19

See Atherton 19–21, Haslanger, Scheman, Grosz for sustained engagements with how women have been aligned
with the body and men with the mind.
20
See Yusoff for an exploration of how black bodies were visualized as passive resources from which labor could be
extracted, as part of the ravages of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism.
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All the oppressed—the obviously exploited and the others—share in the minds of the
privileged a defining connection to the body—whether it is seen primarily as the laboring
body, the sexual body, the body insufficiently under the control of the rational will, or
some combination of these. The privileged are precisely those who are not defined by the
meanings and uses of their bodies for others but by their ability … to exist virtually
bodilessly. They are those who have conquered the sexual, dependent, mortal, and messy
parts of themselves—in part by projecting all those qualities onto others, whom they
thereby earn the right to dominate and, if the occasion arises, to exploit. (187)
Feminist, black, and postcolonial studies scholars, among others, countered these oppressive
depictions of marginalized subjects through the theory of embodiment, to not only equalize men
and women, white and nonwhite, able-bodied and disabled persons in their condition of being
embodied (thus simultaneously constrained and empowered by the bodymind) but to also revalue
bodily ways of knowing and moving through the world. A once-commonsense dualist
understanding of subjectivity has thus now been largely displaced in favor of an embodied one in
humanities scholarship.
Given that embodiment has largely replaced dualist conceptions of body(-)mind
subjectivity in humanities scholarship more broadly, I now explore how these theories—of
dualism and embodiment—have been leveraged to explain the experiences of individuals in pain.
I undertake this inquiry here with the aim of juxtaposing these scholarly theorizations of body()mind subjectivity with the representations of selfhood reported in Mustafa Khalifa and Nawal el
Sa’adawi’s testimonial narratives, towards the end of asking after the overlap, or lack thereof,
between the two; in other words, I intend to explore whether extant theorizations of body(-)mind
subjectivity, in humanities scholarship, function as a vessel capacious enough to accommodate
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the experiences of selfhood that the detainees in Mustafa Khalifa and Nawal el Sa’adawi’s
narratives testify to. To do this work, I draw on Drew Leder’s The Absent Body and Elaine
Scarry’s The Body in Pain as illustrative texts that theorize subjects in pain at length, even as this
theorization is routed through an initial exploration of the selfhood experiences of un-pained
individuals.
Leder, in The Absent Body, first argues that subjects have access to the world by virtue of
being embodied—since the world is made available to them through the senses; he thus rehearses
the dominance accorded to embodiment in contemporary humanities scholarship. Yet, Leder
goes on to note that, despite this fact of embodiment, the most common experience of self, in
‘normal and healthy functioning’ individuals, is dualist. This is because subjects live through the
body rather than experiencing the body itself; in un-pained individuals, the body recedes into the
background and becomes imperceptible so that the world can emerge into consciousness (an
experience Leder christens ‘disappearance’): “the lived body is necessarily self-effacing …
These disappearances particularly characterize normal and healthy functioning” (Leder 69). An
interesting aside Leder makes, that I want to flag here, is that the body can indeed remain
marginally available to the un-pained subject, as a background hum creeping in at the edges of
one’s consciousness—“The body, even when unthematized, remains indirectly … available to
experience. Though it may be nowhere manifest within the perceptual field, my body is indicated
as the orientational center in relation to which everything else takes place” (Leder 22). Even
though Leder acknowledges this availability of the body—this experience of oneself as
embodied—to un-pained individuals, he quickly glosses over it, rather than engaging it robustly
in a way that might unsettle or even expand his central theorization of how ‘normal and healthy
functioning’ individuals experience their selfhood.
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When it comes to individuals in pain, Leder and Scarry’s theorizations again reaffirm the
primacy of the fact of embodiment. The shift in their theorization occurs at the level of the
pained subject’s perceptual experience of self: Leder and Scarry both claim that the body—
heretofore portrayed as having receded from consciousness for the un-pained—is instead
experientially foregrounded and hyper-available to those in pain, a phenomenon Leder refers to
as “sensory intensification” (71). Leder writes, “Prior to the onset of pain, the lived body … is an
openness upon the world. It is a center from which the rays of intentionality radiate outward …
[One] lives from his body to the world … No longer simply a ‘from’ structure, the painful body
becomes that ‘to’ which [one] attends” (73–74), an insight Elaine Scarry confirms when she
writes, “As the body breaks down, it becomes increasingly the object of attention, usurping the
place of all other objects” (The Body in Pain 32). Pained subjects’ experience of their selfhood
therefore takes shape as being more embodied than dualist in Leder and Scarry’s theorizations.
An interesting proposition briefly flickers to life here too, that both Leder and Scarry
acknowledge, but only in a perfunctory fashion: that the body, instead of always inevitably being
centered in a pained subject’s experience of self, may be perceived as alienated instead. Leder
observes, albeit in a way that fails to trouble his aforementioned theorization of the pained
subject’s experience of self: “My own body may feel away from me, something problematic and
foreign, even at moments of its most intimate disclosure … the body manifests as a problematic
and disharmonious thing, and is therefore experienced as a ‘being-away’” (70), an idea also
suggested by Scarry when she writes: “[W]hat the process of torture does is to split the human
being into two, to make emphatic the ever present but … only latent distinction between a self
and a body, between a ‘me’ and ‘my body’” (The Body in Pain 48–49)21. However, both Leder

21

This alienation of the body from one’s experience of self is not only downplayed in scholarly theorizations; it is
also pathologized, as evinced when Elizabeth Grosz explains the experience of “the body feel[ing] as if it has been
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and Scarry quickly move on from this fleeting mention of pained individuals’ alternate appraisal
of their bodies—one that lends itself to a more dualist than embodied understanding—thus
reconfirming their overarching theory that pained subjects largely experience their selfhood in
embodied terms.
This illustrative summary of the scholarly theorizations of body(-)mind subjectivity that I
offer here lends itself to two broad inferences. First, throughout these theorizations, a tacit
hierarchy emerges between embodiment and dualism: embodiment is emphasized as
incontrovertible fact, and thus prioritized, whereas dualism, in being denounced for the historical
and continuing oppression it has sanctioned of marginalized populations and in being only ever
engaged as a perceptual fiction—as illusory—tends to be de-emphasized22. A peril that rears its
head here, then, is that dualist experiences of selfhood will be overwritten, in scholarship, by
assertions of embodiment as defining of subjectivity; dualist experiences of self run the risk of
being obfuscated, of eliciting little critical attention from scholars. The second inference I stress
here, specifically vis-à-vis Leder and Scarry’s theorizations, is that the experience of selfhood
held to be paradigmatic for the un-pained subject is that of dualism, whereas only pained subjects
are theorized as experiencing their selfhood in intensely embodied terms. As I mention above,
Leder and Scarry’s work does acknowledge experiences that diverge from this overarching
theorization, but only cursorily, as edge cases that instead of calling for a provincialization or
even wholesale reevaluation of the theories of body(-)mind subjectivity that they advance, are

taken over by others or is controlled by outside forces” (43) as “psychotic depersonalization” (43).
Certain fields of scholarly theoretical thought—including postcolonial and feminist critique—that have
participated in making understandings of embodiment commonsense, have also attended to how oppressive relations
and conditions may compel subjects to experience psychic fragmentation and an alienation of one such split-off part
from their experience of self. For instance, Frantz Fanon observes that colonialism causes the black man to
experience psychic alienation, whereas Sandra Lee Bartky, in Femininity and Domination, writes about
fragmentation through the lens of gendered experience, specifically women’s experiences navigating a patriarchal
world. However, this experience of fragmentation is rarely explored in terms of a dualist body-mind experience of
self.
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relegated to asides that are skimmed over and forgotten. Such an ossified understanding of
un/pained subjects’ experience of their selfhood shackles scholarly theorizations of
subjectivity—it fixes particular body(-)mind experiences as typical, rendering others illegible
and disallowing experiences of self from emerging as plural and/or unstable.
As I will now explain, the experiences of selfhood, in body(-)mind terms, that detainees
narrate in Khalifa’s The Shell, spill outside this purportedly thorough chassis constructed by
scholarly theorizations of subjectivity such as Leder’s and Scarry’s.
THE METAPHORIC REPRESENTATIONS OF DETAINEES’ BODY(-)MINDS IN
MUSTAFA KHALIFA’S THE SHELL
Before delving into Khalifa’s metaphoric representation of the detainees’ experiences of
their body(-)minds, I pause to explain the insights I take from Crewe et al.’s work in reading
these experiences. Crewe et al., in their article, argue that although the prison is often theorized
as being a total institution, as Erving Goffman has influentially argued in Asylums, it
nevertheless has “complex and spatially differentiated … domains” (59). While Crewe et al.’s
argument centers on how different spaces of the prison facilitate distinct forms of emotional
expression, the aspect of their work that lends itself most fruitfully to my discussion here is their
claim that “[s]pace and place are … determinants of … personal experience, rather than …
empty theatres or neutral backcloths within and against which [it] occur[s]” (Crewe 60). While
the geography of the prisons (used as a catchall for the different spaces of detention) in The Shell
is complex, Khalifa’s narrative constructs a general binaristic layout of carceral geography—one
predicated on the presence or absence of torture, each of which compels detainees to experience
their body(-)minds in specific ways.

196

As if Body-Mind: Detainees’ Experiences of Selfhood in Spaces Where Torture is Practiced
In The Shell, when the narrator, Musa, or the other detainees are being tortured—in
several spaces, of which the prison yard is most paradigmatic—the detainees are represented as
experiencing excruciating pain. While corporeal pain, an experience of embodiment, acts as an
initial stimulant, dualist splitting eventually marks the detainees’ experience of self; in that, the
detainees experience their selfhood as aligned with a non-corporeal interiority (‘mind’) and
detached from their bodies. This is evinced in the very first scene of torture in the text. When
Musa is brought into the detention center from the Syrian airport, and is forced to stand on his
left leg, with his hands and right leg raised, his body eventually starts to fade from
consciousness—“My left leg, which was supporting the whole of my body, was growing tired …
My left leg was growing numb” (Khalifa, The Shell 6)—along with a corresponding shift into the
mental realm, here through memory: “The armchair in Orly Airport, Suzanne, refreshments,
beer, the comfortable seat in the plane, the air hostess who exuded beauty and kindness, the
juice, the tea!” (Khalifa, The Shell 6; italics in original).
This alignment of the self with the mind can be read as a means via which the detainees
escape the body, experienced during torture as coextensive with the regime—a weapon wielded
by the regime—rather than as a part of the self23. The following comment Scarry makes in her
work, albeit perfunctory, is particularly illuminating in this regard. She writes:
[T]he person in great pain experiences his own body as the agent of his agony. The
ceaseless, self-announcing signal of the body in pain, at once so empty and
23

Hortense Spillers, in her influential essay tackling the impact of slavery on subjectivity, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s
Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” notes that captivity is enacted by “a theft of the body—a willful and violent
… severing of the captive body from its motive will” (Spillers 67). Even so, in her work, this ‘theft of the body’
doesn’t lend itself to a dualist understanding of subjectivity—rather, Spillers writes that torture and dispossession
transforms individuals into flesh, a form of being antecedent to the ‘body’—a “zero degree of social
conceptualization” (Spillers 67); this flesh is inscribed by the “calculated work of irons, whips, chains, knives … the
bullet” (Spillers 67) and it, in turn, inscribes individuals (who are massified through this transformation into flesh)
with the mark of dispossession.
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undifferentiated and so full of blaring adversity, contains not only the feeling ‘my body
hurts’ but the feeling ‘my body hurts me.’ This part of the pain, like almost all others, is
usually invisible to anyone outside the boundaries of the sufferer’s body, though it
sometimes becomes visible when a young child or an animal in the first moments of
acute distress takes maddening flight, fleeing from its own body as though it were a part
of the environment that could be left behind. (Scarry, The Body in Pain 47)
Gayle Salamon’s work, although focused on transgenderism, helps explicate how the detainees
may come to experience their body as a weapon possessed by their oppressor, as therefore
alienated from their self-concept. Salamon, drawing on psychoanalytic theory, warns that we
lack direct access to our bodies. Rather, one way in which we understand and make sense of our
bodies is through the psychic representations—the ‘body schemas’—that we form of them.
These body schemas are built relationally, based on one’s engagement with one’s social
environment. A situation where one is deprived of agency over one’s body, where one’s body is
repeatedly exploited to cause one suffering, may thus result in a fragmented self-understanding
where one’s body appears more anti-self than self.
The experience of the body as an entity detached from one’s selfhood, alongside a
corresponding alignment of the self with the mind, is made concrete in Khalifa’s text when Musa
is tortured again by being stuffed into a tire and whipped on his feet. “A rod of fire stung the
soles of my feet … I started to count the blows” (Khalifa, The Shell 7), Musa narrates, revealing
body-as-self as a brief initial experience only, soon tailed by the words, “[The detainees] told me
in these situations it was best if you could concentrate hard mentally, focus on something dear to
you and try to forget your feet. At number forty, I lost count and began to lose any physical
feeling. My screams grew quieter … Clouds, nausea, Orly Airport, juice, beer, the plane and the
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charming hostess” (Khalifa, The Shell 8; italics in original). The detainees thus come to
experience the body as alien and derive self-definition from the mind. Musa’s experience of his
body as alien to himself becomes further pronounced in the third-person perspective he takes on
his bodily activities, narrating his actions as though he is watching himself from an exterior, disembodied vantage point: “[E]ven the film director drank and swallowed the drain water … yes, I
drank and swallowed the drain water” (Khalifa, The Shell 31).
While this dualist experience of self, under the duress of torture, risks reading as a
voluntaristic renunciation of the body, Khalifa’s text suggests that it is compelled, being the only
means of survival in a situation where embodiment is made perilous24. Musa’s narration, in the
following symbolic utterance, suggests that the regime assails the body to dissolve it, in order to
access an embodied interiority: “The skin on the back had almost completely disintegrated …
The skin on my left foot had peeled off completely on the top and the bones were visible”
(Khalifa, The Shell 35). The regime here seems to act on the detainees’ bodies to crumble them
and reach into a beyond, a notion amplified in the detainees’ torture often being accompanied by
a demand for confession, an imperative to lay out the interiorized knowledge that they may
possess, for the interrogators: “It’s best to satisfy us and give yourself some peace right from the
start. You need to talk, I mean, you need to talk!” (Khalifa, The Shell 8). Khalifa’s narrative thus
indicates that the regime acts on the detainees’ bodies to access and control their interiority; this
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This rejection of embodiment, in favor of a dualist experience of self, isn’t an agentic choice made by the
detainees. The regime’s weaponization of the detainees’ bodies, and the consequent severance it enacts between the
body and their will, speaks to the limits of choice or agency as explanatory frameworks for how the detainees
experience their body in relation to their selfhood. This un-willed experience of the body as detached from self is
further literalized in the detainees’ repeated mentions of numbness—the disappearance of the body from their
consciousness—attending their experience of torture. Yet, the detainees often narrate the alienation of the body from
self as a conscious choice they make, evinced when Musa, being whipped on his feet, reports that he had been
advised to concentrate hard mentally and forget his feet. In my analysis here, then, I uphold the detainees’ narrations
of intentionality to unpack why the detainees perceive embodiment as threat and seek to actively cultivate a dualist
experience of self—even as I acknowledge that this dualist experience of self is not necessarily one that can be
chosen or rejected in an agentic manner.
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method of access presumes and can be successful only when the mind is embodied.
This proposition that Khalifa’s text makes, of totalitarian regimes leveraging embodiment
as rationale—acting on the body to access an enmeshed interiority—also finds resonance in
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. Writing about the demise of sovereign power, with its
spectacular executions, Foucault asserts: “Punitive practices had become more reticent. One no
longer touched the body, or at least as little as possible, and then only to reach something other
than the body itself” (Discipline and Punish 10–11)25. Bodies, here, are handled by regimes only
as conduits to embodied minds. Feeling embodied, feeling like a bodymind, in this context,
becomes risky for detainees. This risk is communicated metaphorically by Musa’s recounting of
the plotline of a film he had watched, where pirates rape a young nun when they attack the island
on which she lives; when the nun recovers consciousness after the assault, “filled with a sense
that she was unclean inside … [she] eventually [goes] mad” (Khalifa, The Shell 69). When
violators access a subject’s interiority, through torture or rape, survival and sanity are therefore at
stake. Khalifa’s text suggests that in this context, renouncing the body is the most effective way
of refusing the regime access to one’s interiority and securing one’s survival.
Furthermore, in a situation where the regime has already weaponized their bodies and
claimed a part of the detainees’ subjectivities for itself, conceiving of one’s interiority as alloyed
with the body connotes a complete surrender of self to the regime, for the detainees. Khalifa’s
text makes this clear when Musa utters statements such as, “he breathed his last and surrendered
his spirit” (The Shell 86), making the surrendering of interiority equivalent to complete
annihilation of selfhood, or “I was just like stone, a piece of wood bereft of sentiment and
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Sandra Lee Bartky, paraphrasing Foucault’s tracing of the evolution of sovereign power into disciplinary power,
also claims: “Power now seeks to transform the minds of those individuals who might be tempted to resist it, not
merely to punish or imprison their bodies” (“Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power”
147; emphasis added).
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feelings … no thoughts, no reactions … total submission” (Khalifa, The Shell 47; emphasis
added)—a lack of interior experience signaling complete capitulation of oneself to the regime.
Experiencing the body as not-self and mind as self, then, is the only possible way for the
detainees to carve out a viable living space for themselves under a totalitarian regime determined
to extinguish their existence.
The detainees’ dualist experience of body-mind also risks reading as a fantasy they
actively mobilize—a state that is desired—rather than something that is actually perceived. Drew
Leder’s theory gestures to this possibility through the term he uses to theorize the experiences of
those in pain—“dys-appearance” (86). As a homonym to ‘disappearance’, ‘dys-appearance’
points to how those in pain may desire the disappearance of the bodies; however, by citing the
“affective call” (Leder 73) that pained bodies levy and the “spatiotemporal constriction” (Leder
73) they enact, Leder concludes that those in pain are ultimately compelled to experience
embodiment rather than dualism. Khalifa’s text, however, counters this possibility of dualism as
fantasy, rather than perceived reality, by rendering the experience of the body disappearing from
consciousness tangible through a hyper-emphasized numbness perpetually attending the
experience of pain: “The whips rose and fell. A red veil descended. The sky was pink, the pain
became less, the screams became quieter. A gentle wave of … numbness spread down from my
feet to the other parts of my body. The numbness increased, and a wave of welcome relaxation
swept over me” (Khalifa, The Shell 34)26.
While Khalifa’s narrative depicts detainees as experiencing their selfhood as dualistically
split into body-mind (with body as not-self and mind as self) in spaces of torture, they are shown
to experience their selfhood differently in spaces where torture is absent, paradigmatic of which
26

As I note earlier, this experience of numbness attests to how the detainees’ experience of their selfhood in dualist,
rather than embodied, terms is not necessarily agentially chosen by them—it is produced by the regime—even
though it is sometimes narrated as intentionally chosen in Khalifa’s text.
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is the dormitory.
As if Body-Mind with Body Drawn Closer to Self: Detainees’ Experiences of Selfhood in
Spaces of Imprisonment with Brief Respites from Torture
In the dormitory—and in other spaces where they receive brief respites from the
otherwise-incessant torture—the detainees experience their bodies and minds (as aspects of their
selfhood) quite differently from the spaces in which they are tortured. In spaces where torture is
absent, the detainees are able to use their bodies for various purposes. One such purpose that the
detainees are routinely seen to be fulfilling through their bodies is that of providing each other
with care: the Fedayeen, a “group of strong and physically fit young men” (Khalifa, The Shell
41) use their bodies to “undertake important tasks requiring speed and the strength to carry
things, like bringing food into the dormitory; or, if a sick or elderly man had been ‘noted’ [to be
whipped] by the guards, then one of [them] … would take the place of the sick man and receive
the five hundred lashes” (Khalifa, The Shell 41); when Musa is wounded too badly to stand up
due to the torture he underwent, “several hands [stretch] out, [grab him] under [his] arms and
[help him] up” (Khalifa, The Shell 11); when the guards take them to be shaved, the detainees
“[p]ick up anyone who is sick and carry on blankets anyone who can’t walk properly” (Khalifa,
The Shell 36).
Musa too, employs his body, including all his sensory capacities, in the moments when
he is not being tortured, in service of recording the prison and the goings-on within it. He uses
his sight to first sketch a map of the prison for the reader—“There was a small iron door, smaller
than the first door, between two rooms … From this door we emerged into a large yard: it was
Yard 1, and was covered with asphalt … The yard was surrounded by single-story buildings
numbered consecutively:” (Khalifa, The Shell 24)—and later to document the executions
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conducted in the yard through the hole created in the dormitory wall when a piece of concrete
falls out: “I had been continuously … spying on the prison yard … After the condemned men
had left the dormitory, the policemen would shut the door and seal the mouths of the condemned
men with broad tape. It was as if a shout of Allah akbar! from the condemned men before their
execution would pose a challenge … so they stopped the shout with tape” (Khalifa, The Shell
93). This visual documentation of Tadmur, provided by Musa, takes on particular significance
when considered in light of the fact that the interior of the military prison had never been viewed
by the public until the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/Da’ish) took over the city of Palmyra
in May 2015 and circulated both photographs and a video of the exterior and interior of the
prison, while claiming responsibility for releasing the detainees held there by the al-Assad
regime for their own agendas. Prior to this photographic and video release by ISIS/Da’ish, only
aerial shots, on Google, of the exterior of the prison, and diagrams and sketches of the interior,
made by former detainees, had been available27. Shareah Taleghani, reflecting on the
representations of Tadmur available publicly before this ISIS release, writes: “Prior to May
2015, oral testimonies, writings, and drawings by prisoners as well as human rights reports ha[d]
constituted the primary sources of everything envisioned about Tadmur by larger publics both in
and outside Syria” (Readings in Syrian Prison Literature 130). Further, beyond just the visual,
Musa, in Khalifa’s testimonial narrative, also uses his olfactory and auditory capacities to
sensorially document the prison—“My nose caught a whiff of a distinctive smell, the sort that is
only found in security men’s offices—a mixture of different perfumes, high quality cigarettes,
human sweat, the smell of feet. All mixed with the scent of torture … The smell of cruelty”
(Khalifa, The Shell 4–5) and “the sounds of torture … could be heard loud and clear in all the
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See Taleghani, Readings in Syrian Prison Literature 129 for a systematic overview of the scattered
representations of the Tadmur prison available prior to the 2015 ISIS/Da’ish takeover.
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solitary cells” (Khalifa, The Shell 195).
The detainees’ tendency to ‘use’ their bodies, in spaces where they have a brief reprieve
from torture, suggests that they experience their bodies as tools—as objects that can be possessed
and utilized for specific ends28. This metaphor of the tool is generative for understanding how, in
spaces where torture is (temporarily) absent, the detainees experience their bodies as closer to
their selfhood—as possessed by the self—compared to the total alienation that they experienced
from their bodies when they were being tortured; yet, the body is still not experienced as
completely integrated with the self. The detainees’ experience of selfhood in these spaces, then,
is not as starkly dualist as it was when they were being tortured, but it isn’t fully embodied
either.
This tentative drawing closer of the body to the self, while also maintaining it as separate,
is suggested in how the detainees still experience their selfhood in dualist terms where the
‘mind’—understood as separate from any form of corporeality—is marked as a space of comfort
and aligned with. Even in the space of the dormitory, Musa repeatedly narrates how he turned to
his mind, an aspect of selfhood that remains distinct from his (often pained and wounded)
corporeal condition, for solace: “I would spend long hours … lost to the real world, living a
beautiful reality in which everything was sweet, simple, and easy” (Khalifa, The Shell 76) and “I
reviewed the past and dreamed of the future. It became a habit, creating these daydreams … I
became addicted to daydreams” (Khalifa, The Shell 75).
In the dormitory, the detainees sometimes experience glimmers of embodiment such as
when Musa claims, “[i]n every daydream, there would always be a woman … and the cells of

28

This experience of the body-as-tool is distinct from the one that takes place during torture, when the detainees
experience their bodies as weaponized by the regime; in the latter instance, they’re unable to impose their will on
their bodies, leading to an experience of body-as-other, whereas in this case, they’re able to utilize their bodies for
self-directed purposes, leading the detainees to experience their bodies as adjacent to their selfhood.
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my body would be on fire” (Khalifa, The Shell 76). However, these moments where the detainees
experience their selfhood as bodymind, rather than body-mind, are sparing, and a dualist
experience of self is quickly reinstated through a seeking of comfort in a mind divorced of any
corporeal linkages.
This representation of the detainees experiencing their selfhood dualistically—with a
body held adjacent to self, in its capacity to be utilized, without being accepted as self, alongside
a valorized mind fully accepted as self—in the dormitory, is significant considering that while
torture is not being enacted on the detainees in this space, it still hovers over them as an
omnipresent threat. This constant dangling sword of torture is made manifest in the form of the
“armed military policeman watching over [each dormitory]” (Khalifa, The Shell 38), through
indirect torture mechanisms such as that of depriving the detainees of food or flooding the
dormitory with food to the point where “[t]here wasn’t a spare niche in the dormitory … that …
didn’t fill up with dry bread, so that moving about within the dormitory became difficult, then
impossible” (Khalifa, The Shell 104), and in reminders of torture invading the dormitory through
the “sounds of people screaming night and day” (Khalifa, The Shell 204). The possibility of the
regime weaponizing the detainees’ bodies against them via torture remains an ever-present
possibility, preventing the detainees from completely integrating the body with their selfconcept.
Tracking the difference in the detainees’ experiences of their body(-)minds in spaces of
torture versus spaces where it is largely absent, except as a threat, suggests that greater proximity
to the exercise of naked biopower compels one to experience oneself in dualist terms—the more
directly biopower is able to act on one, the more likely it is for the self to be experienced
dualistically as body-mind, and conversely, the further one is able to draw away from the brute
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exercise of biopower, the more one is able to experience oneself as an embodied bodymind. A
question that proceeds from this unpacking of The Shell’s portrayal of the effect of biopower on
the detainees’ experiences of selfhood is: When the detainees leave the prison—when they are
further away from the epicenter of biopower’s senseless violence than even the spaces where the
infliction of torture is temporarily paused—are they able to experience their selfhood in the most
embodied terms? Khalifa’s narration of Musa’s life after he's released from Tadmur responds in
the affirmative.
As if Bodymind: Detainees’ Experiences of Selfhood Outside of Prison
The first instance where Musa is able to experience his body as self is when he is
transferred to the Mountain Prison. Despite being pervaded by the influence of the regime on
account of it being a carceral space, the Mountain Prison is mostly lenient—rarely, if ever,
torturing its inmates—and hence, it functions as a space where Musa is, up till that point in the
text, furthest from the stark manifestation of biopower’s total and absolute control. It is here that
Musa develops acquaintance with his body as self, by observing his reflection in the mirror:
Among the first things I did on the first day I arrived at the mountain prison was to look
at myself in the mirror … The front of my head was bald. The hair … was turning white.
My mustache was drooping and more than half of it had turned white; my eyes were
sunken and surrounded by black rings. Pain, violence, fear, and humiliation had dug deep
furrows on my brow and around my eyes. (Khalifa, The Shell 217)
This scene from Khalifa’s narrative fruitfully lends itself to a Lacanian reading. Lacan posits in
his psychoanalytic explanation of the ‘mirror stage’—a stage he holds as playing a crucial role in
the development of subjectivity—that it is through the infant’s act of gazing upon itself in the
mirror that it is able to compose a Gestalt image of itself, that it is able to understand its body—
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previously only experienced in fragmented terms—as a whole, unified entity integrated with its
self-concept. Similarly, it is upon looking at himself in the mirror that Musa is able to reintegrate his body into his concept of self, rather than perceiving it as alienated.
This initial experience of the body as part of his selfhood becomes even more pronounced
when Musa is released from the prison and he goes to live with his niece, Lena, and her husband.
His full acceptance of body-as-self is evinced in his complete preoccupation with corporeal
activities outside of the prison: “I had slept naked … For an hour or two, sometimes longer, I sat
on the sofa drinking coffee with no sugar and smoking. I went to the lavatory. I took great care to
relieve myself … I walked and walked … I might buy a piece of good quality chocolate. I liked
chocolate … I ate it, I smoked as I walked” (Khalifa, The Shell 237). Musa’s cataloging of all the
physical activities he engages in after being released from prison reads almost as a reveling in the
newfound experience of embodiment available at a distance from the exercise of brute biopower.
Embodiment is also suggested in the synthesis that Musa is able to achieve between what his
body experiences and what his mind perceives—“I was so captivated by the scenery that I could
think of nothing else except for what I was seeing” (Khalifa, The Shell 232).
While Musa is finally able to experience his body as part of his selfhood outside of the
prison, a slight discomfort still inheres on his experience of bodymind-ness, due to his past
experiences of torture. Musa gives expression to this vague unease co-present with his
experience of embodiment by likening himself to a drunk man, who simultaneously experiences
his body as self and not completely self, controlled by an intermediary ‘non-mind’:
A man drinks wine … He carries on drinking until he is intoxicated, which is the state in
which a man’s mind splits into two. The drunkard has two minds: a drunken mind—let us
call it the ‘non-mind,’ though it is not a denial of the mind, not nonexistence, rather it is
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the opposite of the mind. The ‘non-mind’ is something material that exists, like the mind
itself. The ‘non-mind’ controls the actions and movement of the drunken man … The
other mind of the drunken man is a wakeful, conscious mind that has no control over this
person at this moment … For a year, I have been living in a state like this. (Khalifa, The
Shell 250)
Finally, Khalifa’s The Shell insinuates that the only persons capable of fully and comfortably
experiencing their selfhood in bodymind terms are the state agents—the guards and military
police who stand in for the regime and function as its personified manifestations29. While readers
never receive first-person accounts of their experiences of selfhood from these state agents,
Musa’s narration strongly encourages this reading. Musa repeatedly metonymizes the state
agents using the parts of their bodies through which they act on the detainees, their hands—“As
we walked and turned, a pudgy hand stretched out, gripped me by the arm and pulled me out of
the line” (Khalifa, The Shell 68); “There had been occasional periods when we felt the guards
had relaxed their grip a little, but all of a sudden things would return to their previous state, and
the iron grip would resume” (Khalifa, The Shell 85); “O Lord, deliver me … deliver me from
their hands!” (Khalifa, The Shell 33)—while also peppering the text with statements such as,
“every policeman was a specialist in devising new forms of torment” (Khalifa, The Shell 40).
The fact that these state actors are able to utilize their creativity—a mental activity—to devise
forms of torture and then give material form to these ideas through their bodies, particularly their
hands, suggests an integration between body and mind unavailable to the detainees. While the
detainees are compelled to inhabit mind at the expense of body, and therefore experience
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Hortense Spillers identifies the ability to possess one’s ‘body’ as being the very hallmark of a liberated subject: “I
would make a distinction … between ‘body’ and ‘flesh’ and impose that distinction as the central one between
captive and liberated subject-positions” (67), she writes.
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themselves as dualist body-minds, the state actors are able to experience a reciprocal, mutually
interacting and reinforcing bodymind.
As I have explained here, Khalifa’s text indicates that one’s experience of their body()mind varies based on their positionality vis-à-vis power—the more proximal one is to biopower,
in terms of its ability to directly act on the individual, the less one is able to experience their
selfhood in bodymind terms and the more one is forced into a dualist experience of self;
conversely, the individuals who are able to feel maximally embodied are those who materialize
this power, who act as its tangible stand-ins.
THE OSSIFICATION OF SCHOLARSHIP IN THE (NEO)LIBERAL AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY
As evinced in the above juxtaposition between Khalifa’s depiction of how the detainees
experience their selfhood and dominant scholarly theorizations about body(-)mind subjectivity,
the latter largely fails to hold space for the former—scholarly theorizations fall short of
meaningfully accounting for the shifting experiences of body(-)mind in relation to one’s
exposure to biopower that the detainees in Khalifa’s The Shell attest to. What are the conditions
and structures that congeal scholarly theorizations30 in a way that limits their ability to expand to
accommodate experiences such as the ones recounted in Khalifa’s narrative of witness? What
about the work of literary scholarship specifically, practiced under the aegis of the (neo)liberal
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This ossification occurs alongside a seemingly constant institutional hunger for scholarly innovation, because the
demand for novelty that the (neo)liberal American university levies on scholars is specifically a demand for
commodifiable new research—research that attracts increased funding or that produces outputs that can be
capitalized on. Literary criticism that is truly responsive to testimonial texts—that offers unconventional
propositions that are by their very nature evanescent, are not commodifiable in this way; as such, the U.S. academy
is less interested in these forms of scholarly innovation. Moreover, when I refer to the ossification of scholarly
knowledge, I don’t mean to suggest that no new knowledge is ever produced and the wheel is constantly reinvented
in scholarship; rather, I intend to point to two things: first, that certain theoretical commonsenses sediment in ways
that render their questioning sacrilege, and second, that while new knowledge is produced, it often tends to take the
form of disciplined innovation that upholds existing ways of knowing and leaves certain revered forms of
knowledge untouched.
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American university as it is, makes it increasingly inhospitable to the detainees’ experiences of
their selfhood?
Before I proceed, I seek to draw special attention to the language I mobilize here—in
asking after the conditions and structures that deplete scholarly theorization’s ability to host
testifiers’ autopoietic endeavors, I intentionally veer away from assigning blame to individual
scholars and their work, even as I draw on them as instances where the theoretical rigidity I refer
to in this chapter is visibly crystallized. The problematic I inquire into, in this chapter, is not one
of individual intent or desire; many scholars do, in fact, strive to develop politically efficacious,
oppositional, imaginative scholarship. Rather, I am curious about the university, the site that
births this scholarly work, as well as the literary discipline within which part of it takes place,
and how these structures operate together to constrain its possibilities—how they impart a
commonsense that arrests scholarship’s ability to develop the plasticity needed to be able to host
testifiers’ self-understandings. Scholarly work isn’t undertaken in a vacuum, and I am therefore
invested in probing the conditions that feed into and structure its production. Even as I name
these conditions—that straitjacket and petrify scholarly criticism—I remain an optimist: in that, I
still maintain that the intentional deployment of illiberal modes of scholarship, which I identify
later in this chapter, can disrupt the circuits of (neo)liberal power within which scholars operate
and undertake the work of literary criticism. Relatedly, and crucially, I maintain that the
university and its disciplines are not total institutions: even as they exert pressures that constrain
scholars’ ability to pursue maverick forms and methods of scholarship, this stranglehold has not
yet succeeded in being fully annihilating. As such, even as I outline how scholarship is often
petrified in the (neo)liberal American university, this claim is not comprehensive—every now
and again, scholarship is produced within the university that survives its disciplining, that slips
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out, gasping and gulping, from under its crushing weight. Through the illiberal modes that I
advocate for in this chapter, I aspire to champion a form of literary criticism that can also model
this resilience.
The first structure that I inquire into—that imposes confining shackles on scholarly
theorizations of body(-)mind subjectivity—is that of the university itself. The (neo)liberal
American university has acquired notoriety for institutionalizing subversive social and
intellectual movements and through this co-optation, dissipating their insurgent potential.
Roderick Ferguson writes extensively about how the American university incorporated and gave
institutional shape to the radical student demands of the sixties and seventies in the form of
women’s studies, ethnic studies, and black studies programs—an institutionalization that did
more harm than good by absorbing and disciplining difference and thus short-circuiting its
disruptive potential. Ellen Messer-Davidow too, writing about the institutionalization of secondwave feminism in the academy, poses a rhetorical question to her readers, leading them to the
same conclusion that Ferguson’s monograph arrives at: “How did it happen that a bold venture
launched … to transform academic … institutions was itself transformed by them?” (1). She
further observes, based on her own experience in the university as a feminist activist:
The social change I knew from activism I couldn’t reformulate as academic knowledge,
and the social change I knew from academic theories I couldn’t deploy in activism …
Through activist discourse I acquired know-how as I did change—like a cat leaping,
twisting, and landing on its feet—and through disciplinary discourses I acquired
knowledge as I read about change—like a scholar analyzing, criticizing, and arguing.
These discourses did not provide two perspectives on ‘change’ as the same thing; rather,
their very divergent sets of practice had constituted ‘change’ as two divergent things. The
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tactical skills of activism rendered ‘change’ as conflicts to be shaped, whereas the
intellectual skills of disciplines had rendered it as schematics to be debated. (MesserDavidow 11)
The university thus attempts to cleave theorization from activism—to attenuate the agility of the
former and effectively defang it, to exhaust its ability to be disorderly and throw existing systems
of power into chaos. By absorbing radical movements, the university seeks to reduce the visceral
stakes attached to them to a more passive form of debate. I aver here that scholarly theories of
subjectivity have undergone a similar process of appropriation and deactivation. While the
notion of embodiment—offered to counter and subvert the dualism that facilitated the oppression
of marginalized populations—emerged as a radical liberating proposition, its institutionalization
in academic discourse ossified it, somewhat eroding its mutinous potential. Instead of
dismantling relations of subjugation, such theorizations, that emphasize embodiment to the point
where they might render illegible the shifting experiences of selfhood—especially dualist ones—
that germinate in response to and as a way of surviving specific arrangements of power,
effectively cover over the workings of these power dynamics.
How has the university effected this calcification of scholarship—a calcification evoked
in the stiff theorizations of subjectivity that I invoked earlier in this chapter? A crucial factor I
hold responsible here is the operation of the university according to a neoliberal logic, which in
turn enacts an “insidious evisceration of experimental … research” (Loveless 2), as Natalie
Loveless identifies in her manifesto that simultaneously laments an “all-administrative”
(Loveless 9) university and that also attempts to survive this institutionally-fostered fatalism to
create space for a research-based art practice. Several factors, all idiosyncratic to a corporatized
university culture, make arduous scholars’ ability and desire to follow experimental intellectual
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itches. These include the assessment of scholars via “mechanisms of accounting whereby both
material resources and capital accrue to productivity measured in quantity often delinked from
questions of quality or social significance” (Chuh 7) as well as increasing administrative
demands being levied on scholars, which as Loveless bemoans, eats into time dedicated to
research activities. Fettered by these neoliberal institutional conditions, scholars are compelled to
default to hegemonic modes of theorization—to their academic muscle memory, so to speak—
rather than spending the time and resources required to walk down untrammeled avenues of
research and thinking.
These neoliberal conditions, that undergird and structure the American university’s
operations, have also compelled literary scholarship to adopt a nomothetic posture—an impulse
to formulate wide-reaching, generalizable theories. Barbara Christian bemoans this tendency in
her essay, “The Race for Theory,” when she writes about how literature has been taken over by
philosophers: “Activities such as … writing one’s response to specific works of literature have
… become subordinated to one primary thrust—that moment when one creates a theory, thus
fixing a constellation of ideas for a time at least” (68). In an environment of severe austerity
coupled with “resources flowing to potentially patentable research and away from work less
easily commodified” (Chuh 7), the humanities, and the literary scholarship that takes place
within its ambit, is faced with the same pressure of being socially serviceable, of demonstrating
its use-value—a pressure that has become increasingly palpable in the language of ‘crisis’ being
used in conjunction with the humanities. Bruce Kuklick reiterates that the humanities, “have
[acquired] a yen to be more worldly” (211) and the way in which they’re fulfilling it is by
emphasizing the formulation of theory: “The emphasis on … theory reflects an interest in
establishing a ‘scientific’ basis for literary studies, a basis that would eventually make them more
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like the social sciences, more practical in character” (Kuklick 211). While the activity of
theorization may indeed make a case for the value of the humanities according to the marketbased barometer that the university and its funding streams treasure, it prioritizes scholarship that
can demonstrate permanence and broad applicability, rather than that which derives meaning
from its very transience and singularity.
Disciplines function as yet another institutional handcuff that arrests unconventional
modes of scholarly research and writing—a subduing process that Messer-Davidow dubs
“disciplinary socialization” (30). The ways in which disciplines straitjacket scholarship are
multiple and thorough—in that, they offer charted and approved paths of knowledge-seeking that
influence the objects scholars select as worthy of study, the questions they ask of these
materials31, and the techniques they deploy to answer these questions. It is this rigorous
disciplining effect that Timothy Lenoir gestures toward when he observes that “[d]isciplines are
institutionalized formations for organizing schemes of perception, appreciation, and action” (qtd.
in Messer-Davidow 19).
One such methodology that literary studies has made particularly kneejerk for scholars—
to the point where it has become almost synonymous with the work of criticism itself32—is that
of suspicious reading33. Rita Felski and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick explain this critical method as
being one that relies on paranoia; suspicious reading distrusts manifest appearances and seeks to
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Natalie Loveless warns scholars that “research methods and disciplines precede us. We enter into them and they
work to craft the possible forms of our questions. Thus, when examining our research practices, it is crucial to ask:
which stories are animating our choices? Why might this research choice matter?” (24)
32
Christopher Castiglia names the dispositional orientation that attends this mode of scholarship ‘critiquiness’.
Critiquiness, in Castiglia’s words, arises from a blend of “mistrust, indignation, ungenerosity, and selfcongratulation” (214).
33
A symptomatic method of reading was originally invoked by Louis Althusser in relation to Marx’s work—
Althusser identified it as being one of the reading methods that Marx deploys in Capital, going on to then deploy
this method himself to read Marx. Different scholars have since referred to this mode of reading through different
monikers: Paul Ricoeur dubs it the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion,’ Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus call it
‘symptomatic reading,’ and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick identifies it as ‘paranoid reading’, to name a few.
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peer beyond the obvious to ‘unveil’ concealed meaning, usually taking shape as a disclosure of
the workings of power. Moreover, suspicious reading, as a critical method, retains the defining
qualities of the particularly Freudian diagnostic tradition it grows out of34: in that, the text figures
as the analysand, the critic as psychoanalyst, and “the third-person perspective of the
critic/analyst … always trump[s] the self-understanding of the text/patient” (Anker and Felski 5).
In this way, suspicious reading reanimates the formalist frame of apprehending the author as
dead35—his/her contexts and intentions as moot—in favor of ceding primacy to the critic, who
alone is equipped to draw out the meanings embedded deep within a text36. It is only through this
suspicious posture that scholars—confronted with the detainees’ shifting experiences of selfhood
in Khalifa’s narrative—may bring themselves to ignore the detainees’ self-perceptions to insist
on the hegemony of embodiment as defining subjectivity, or that they may remain attached to
theorizations of un/pained individuals’ experiences of selfhood in the way that Drew Leder and
Elaine Scarry offer them, where these alternative experiences of selfhood that the detainees
recount can only ever figure as deprioritized asides.
The ossification of scholarly criticism in the (neo)liberal American university also occurs
through the granting or withholding of institutional legibility. In Jack Halberstam’s words:
“Disciplines qualify and disqualify, legitimate and delegitimate, reward and punish; most
important, they statically reproduce themselves and inhibit dissent” (10). While these cultures of
34

Elizabeth Anker and Rita Felski note that “Psychoanalysis … played the role of mediator between a clinical
context and a literary one. From the 1970s onward, critics trained themselves to read as Freudian analysts” (4).
35
Roland Barthes’ influential essay, ‘The Death of the Author’ argues for locating meaning in a reader’s
interpretation of the text, rather than in the author’s intentions. The following pithy phrase from the essay effectively
summarizes the crux of Barthes’ argument: “the true place of the writing … is reading” (147).
36
Two things warrant mention here. First, I don’t advocate a wholesale rejection of a reading method that
occasionally peeks ‘behind’ the text to surface suppressed meaning—in fact, in this dissertation, I sometimes
execute this very maneuver to discern the metaphors and illiberal secondary witnessing possibilities nestled within
testimonial texts, as I explain in the Introduction to this dissertation; rather, I indict a tendency to enshrine this kind
of suspicious textual inquiry as paradigmatic. Second, the particular kind of ‘suspicious reading’ that I censure here
is one that willfully, and rather condescendingly, disregards testifiers’ experiences to either read the text through a
more commonsense theoretical frame or that accords a shrewder understanding of the testifiers’ circumstances to the
literary critic than to the testifiers themselves.
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academic containment—where conformity is rewarded and dissent penalized—have become
hyper-visible in the post-9/11 era37, they have always been institutionally present and operative
through mechanisms ranging from journal peer review and publication processes to tenure
review. The hypercompetitive job market—that threatens to consign its outcasts to contingent
and precarious labor conditions—exerts pressure on junior scholars to conform to disciplinary
and theoretical orthodoxies in order to be accepted into the academy as professionalized scholars,
and then “once the discipline has credentialed and employed them, it ensures that they continue
to observe its ‘good subject’’ practices by subjecting them to ongoing evaluations … [and]
apprais[ing] their publications [among other criteria]… [it] tenures or terminates them” (MesserDavidow 20). Further deploring how these criteria of disciplinary legibility inculcate and enforce
specific disciplinary commonsenses, Messer-Davidow writes: “woe to the practitioner who
violates the disciplinary truth—its ‘ordered procedures for the production, regulation,
distribution, circulation, and operation of [true] statements’—because the discipline will regard
her as a bad subject to be subdued or expelled” (21). Operating within these coercive conditions,
scholars can mostly only achieve recognition by ensuring that their scholarship adheres to a
particular disciplinary/theoretical commonsense, instead of producing work that breaches it; they
are shoehorned, consciously or otherwise, into being what Halberstam calls ‘disciplinarily
correct’—"confirm[ing] what is already known according to approved methods of knowing …
[instead of pursuing] visionary insights or flights of fancy” (Halberstam 6).
Why does the American academy, and the disciplines that operate within it, seek to fix
theoretical discourses in these ways, rather than allowing them to remain mutable, ephemeral
even? I contend that a key goal served through this institutionally-compelled petrification is that
37

See Chatterjee and Maira for a discussion of post-9/11 scholarly censorship and how it decisively identified the
U.S. academy as being an ‘imperial institution,’ where intellectual projects affirming American exceptionalism and
rationalizing U.S. imperial ventures are rewarded, whereas dissident scholarship is excised.
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of rendering difference/subalternity stable, knowable, and hence manageable or commodifiable.
As Roderick Ferguson has persuasively argued, the American university functions as a crucial
partner of both capital and state—it functions as “the ‘training ground’ for state and capital’s
engagement with minority difference as a site of representation and meaning” (Ferguson 11).
Folded into this notion of ‘state’ is also its imperial character—one that the university
participates in and fortifies as well. As Piya Chatterjee and Sunaina Maira emphasize: “the U.S.
academy is an ‘imperial university’. As in all imperial and colonial nations, intellectuals and
scholarship play an important role … in legitimizing American exceptionalism and rationalizing
U.S. expansionism and repression, domestically and globally” (6–7). The way that the university
buttresses the state’s imperial function is largely through the construction of knowledge about
the ‘other’: “expert knowledge on ‘other’ cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the
development of academic disciplines and used in the management of ‘difference’ within the
nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here
and overseas” (Chatterjee and Maira 14). To effectively discharge this function—of facilitating
the state and capital’s management and utilization of minority difference—the knowledge
produced about difference must have longevity to it; to be usable it must be at least somewhat
enduring and dependable. This desire for fixity is embedded in the very concept of theory, a
highly revered form of scholarly production in the academy, as I mention earlier; D.N.
Rodowick, piggybacking on Raymond Williams’ gloss on the term ‘theory’ parses it as an
“explanatory scheme” (18), a way of “mastering [experience] through concepts that … settle this
moving world” (3).
Further, as academic research’s imperialist past evinces, scholarship has historically been
marked by the tendency to serve scholars, rather than being overtly accountable to the people it
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studies38. Indigenous scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith characterizes research, and the scholars that
undertake it, as “inquisitive and acquisitive” (3); she comments that such scholarship is
characterized by its “absolute worthlessness to [those that are studied] … and its absolute
usefulness to those who [wield] it as an instrument. It tells [its subjects] things already known,
suggest[s] things that [do] not work, and ma[kes] careers for people who already h[ave] jobs”
(3). Mired in this ethos of non-accountability and professional advancement—the latter being
increasingly top-of-mind in an austere, devalued, and hypercompetitive neoliberal academic
environment—academic scholarship is further inoculated from the need to be responsive and
adaptable.
Higher education also functions as an interface mediating between the U.S. and the
globalized world, as Kandice Chuh notes. While Chuh writes about how the knowledge economy
functions as an apparatus of national competitiveness in terms of commodifiable research, I
invite a consideration of how scholarship occurring within the American university also does
important cultural work for the U.S. on the world stage. By uplifting theories that purport to
equalize privileged and historically marginalized groups—such as that of embodiment—the U.S.
nation-state, through the instrument of the scholarship undertaken within its educational
institutions, is able to narrativize itself as having accounted for and remedied its past injustices.
Further, by ossifying these theories, rather than holding them to be contingent and shifting, the
U.S. is able to depict these issues as resolved, with justice meted out, reparations successfully
made, rather than as an ongoing project of accountability and response.
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While anti-oppressive approaches to scholarship—that ask scholars to adopt a reflexive stance vis-à-vis their
research and explicitly attend to who it benefits—have been broached, they’re far from normative in the university
at this time. See Potts and Brown for an immersive exploration of anti-oppressive research methodologies.
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NAWAL EL SA’ADAWI’S EXPERIENCE OF HER BODY(-)MIND IN MEMOIRS
FROM THE WOMEN’S PRISON
While Khalifa’s The Shell suggests that detainees’ experiences of their body(-)minds
fluctuates based on their proximity to biopower—thus unsettling hegemonic scholarly
theorizations of the body(-)mind experiences of both pained and un-pained subjects—the
particular experiences that Khalifa’s text offers up cannot be facilely extrapolated to explain the
selfhood experiences of all those that are imprisoned and/or subjected to torture. In other words,
simply replacing extant scholarly theorizations with the experiences that Khalifa’s narrative
recounts, or retroactively attaching them as addendums to current theorizations as a way of
accounting for how imprisoned/tortured subjects understand their selfhood, are both paltry
responses. On one hand, while detainees’ experiences of their selfhood were indeed compelled
by the operation of biopower, holding their experiences to be paradigmatic of all those that are
imprisoned/tortured would involve reifying this biopower and the impact it has on individuals,
rather than focalizing the subjects undertaking the creative autopoietic work necessary to survive
their exposure to it39. On the other hand, and more importantly, simply exporting the autopoietic
endeavors of one group of detainees to all those that are imprisoned/tortured fails to represent the
diverse, and particular, ways in which the incarcerated fashion their subjectivities to oppose and
withstand the exercise of brute power on themselves.
Nawal el Sa’adawi’s Memoirs from the Women’s Prison serves as a tangible example of
this latter point. The metaphorical account of her selfhood, in body(-)mind terms, that she offers
39

It is for this very reason that Dylan Rodriguez shies away from cohering the writings produced by the incarcerated
within the genre of ‘prison writing’—this move “legitimizes and reproduces the discursive-material regime of
imprisonment” (409), he warns, preferring to focus instead on how these writings articulate a “radical prison praxis”
(411). Rodriguez’s new lexicon understands these writings as “a modality of critique and political dissent that
critically reinscribes and amplifies the condition of captivity while violating the social logic of incarceration”
(411)—it therefore focalizes the oppositional practices of the prisoners rather than privileging the captivity that
marks their condition.
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up in her testimonial memoir diverges radically from that made available by Khalifa’s narrative,
because it responds to the specific constellation of power within which she is embedded. el
Sa’adawi, an Egyptian feminist writer, activist, physician, and psychiatrist, was arrested in
September 1981 and imprisoned in the Qanatir women’s prison, for her public criticism of the
one-party system that President Anwar Sadat instituted in the country on the pretext of
democracy. She was only released from Qanatir in November 1981 after Sadat’s assassination. It
is this experience of incarceration that she attests to in her testimonial memoir that I read in this
chapter.
el Sa’adawi’s experience of her selfhood, when she is furthest away from the Sadat
regime’s direct operation of power, marks the first moment of divergence from the body(-)mind
experiences recounted in Khalifa’s The Shell. At the beginning of her memoir, when she is in her
apartment, working on her novel, el Sa’adawi narrates her selfhood in dualist terms, as bodymind; el Sa’adawi, in these moments, reports herself as deriving her self-identity from her mind
rather than her body. This dualism is evinced in the fact that she associates the activity of
writing, with which she is preoccupied in these early textual moments, with an interiorized part
of self—“I have only written what my mind dictates to me” (el Sa’adawi 2) and “[the novel]
wants no competition for my … mind” (el Sa’adawi 1). Experiences that her body make
available figure here only as irksome disruptions, experiences that she chooses to disregard: “I
heard a knock at the door … I ignored the knock … When I sit down to write, it is the … the
sound of the doorbell or telephone, which torture me” (el Sa’adawi 1). el Sa’adawi depicts
embodiment—bodymind-ness—as torment in these moments, something she would rather
excise, whereas being able to fully inhabit and tarry with an interiorized aspect of self is an
experience she covets.
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It is only when the police arrive at her doorstep to arrest her for her dissident statements
that el Sa’adawi depicts herself as closely inhabiting her body, as evinced in the possessive
pronouns used in conjunction with the corporeal sensations she describes: “A shiver ran over my
body” (4; emphasis added); “With shaking fingers, I opened the little opaque glass pane set in
the door. My eyes widened in alarm” (4; emphasis added); “My whole body was shaking, and my
heart was knocking violently beneath my ribs” (5; emphasis added). Moreover, as she acutely
inhabits her body, she also invokes an interiorized aspect of self to help her decide whether to
open the door to the police: “A voice in my head tells me ‘Open the door for them’ while another
voice, emerging from a remote place inside me … insists ‘Don’t open it! Don’t give in!’” (el
Sa’adawi 6). In these moments, el Sa’adawi represents herself as being attuned to her
corporeality while simultaneously conversing with an interiorized aspect of self—her experience
of her selfhood thus increasingly takes shape as bodymind. Yet, scattered amidst el Sa’adawi’s
experiences of bodymind-ness here are also a few moments of dualism, such as the following,
where she briefly adopts a third-person perspective on her body, almost experiencing it as being
controlled by someone else, a ‘devil’: “I could not see myself, but it seems that my appearance
had changed, and so had my face and eyes. A devil must have been taking over my body” (el
Sa’adawi 7).
Soon after the above moment—when the police finally break down the door and enter el
Sa’adawi’s home—her dualist experiences of self fully give way to a more embodied selfunderstanding. She recounts, “I was no longer afraid. In the small sitting room, I stood before
them, head held high, prepared to face them to death” (el Sa’adawi 7; emphasis added), giving
her thoughts physical expression through her body. The fact that el Saadawi’s experience of
embodiment is spurred by the male police forcefully entering the private sanctuary of her home
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with their phallic rifles—a scene that thus alludes to rape—is significant because it points to how
her experience of self as bodymind is catalyzed by gendered violence. el Sa’adawi further coaxes
an interpretation of this scene—that compels her to experience herself as bodymind—as one of
gendered violence by first playing up its prurient quality, particularly in her description of the
armed men encircling her: “They surrounded me, their breathing still heavy. Long, haggard faces
damp with sweat. Open mouths panting. Noses curved like the beaks of predatory birds” (7), and
later by comparing it to a witch-hunt: “Their long and sharply pointed rifles and bayonets
reminded me of the needles which used to be plunged into the bodies of witches in search of the
mark of the devil” (23).
In el Sa’adawi’s memoir, both the prison in which she is ultimately detained and the
regime that seeks to incarcerate and intimidate her signify beyond their literal selves; in that, they
symbolize how captivity, as a function of the patriarchal setup of Egyptian society, produces a
‘female’ subjectivity. This is evinced in the fact that the prison guards (except one female
warden called the shawisha40) are all men, whereas the prisoners are all women, alongside the
fact that most of these women prisoners are confined in Qanatir on account of specifically
gendered forms of oppression. As el Sa’adawi describes: “Behind every one of these women
prisoners is a man: a father branding his daughter for a life of thievery, a husband beating his
wife into practicing prostitution, a brother threatening his sister so she will smuggle hashish and
hard drugs for him, the head of a gang stealing a young female child and training her to beg in
the streets” (44). This melding of the prison and the patriarchy are also evinced in the clamor of
misogynistic curses that el Sa’adawi wakes up to after her first night in prison: “‘Bitch, whore,
daughter of a whore.’ Oaths cast on women’s sexual organs, oaths directed to all women’s body

40

In el Sa’adawi’s words, the shawisha is “the prison official serving as [the detainees’] doorwoman and guard”
(45).
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parts” (el Sa’adawi 34). To explicitly call out this very intertwining of the prison and the
patriarchy, that el Sa’adawi so piercingly indicts in her memoir, I refer to the two as
prison/patriarchy—as a braided singularity—in the rest of this chapter.
While el Sa’adawi’s experience of embodiment is stimulated by her encounter with the
prison/patriarchy—initially suggesting that this experience of bodymind-ness might be traumatic
for, and hence shunned by, her—el Sa’adawi’s memoir suggests that she instead reclaims this
understanding of herself as embodied as a way of protesting the prison/patriarchy and insulating
herself from its ferocity41. The first textual moment where el Sa’adawi is shown to be leveraging
her understanding of herself as bodymind in these ways is when she sits in the police car—a part
of carceral geography itself—to be driven to the Qanatir prison. She writes:
[The officer] tried to persuade me to sit between him and the driver, but I refused to sit
between two men in this heavy heat. Two strange bodies oozing the sweat of hatred. It
was absolutely necessary to impose my will from the start … The officer looked at me in
the eye, and I fixed my gaze on his. I didn’t blink, but he did, and looked at the ground.
… A look of despair came over his face. He got in ahead of me and seated himself next to
the driver. I stepped up after him and sat next to the door. … My will had won out. (el
Sa’adawi 9)
Once at Qanatir, el Sa’adawi’s experience of herself as bodymind settles into
permanency, as indicated by the reciprocity between mind and body that she gives voice to. At
one point el Sa’adawi states, “I understood from the motion of my body as I was rising and
stretching the muscles of my neck and back, that I had made a firm decision: I would live in this

41

el Sa’adawi’s turn to embodiment as a way of countering gendered oppression here aligns with Cherríe Moraga’s
exploration of how an attunement to one’s body can in fact function as a crucial resource for an oppositional
politics. Moraga urges attention to one’s own body, to how oppression registers corporeally—how it settles under
the skin, how it feels—as a way of mobilizing against this oppression, both for oneself and for others.
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place as I had lived in any other” (35)—the fact that the movement of her body catalyzes an
interiorized decision proposing an embodied mind; at another, she narrates: “I put on my sports
shoes in preparation for my morning exercises … bodily strength means strength of mind and
soul” (83)—the mutual fortification of body and mind once again pointing to their entwinement.
Thus, reading el Sa’adawi’s shifting understandings of her selfhood alongside the
contexts they manifest in, I suggest that her memoir posits her experience of selfhood, at the
epicenter of the prison/patriarchy complex—at Qanatir—as being bodymind, because this
embodiment functions as an oppositional weapon that both enables her to resist the machinations
of the prison/patriarchy and also facilitates her survival in an otherwise deathly world.
el Sa’adawi’s memoir indicates that her experiencing her selfhood in a dualist manner,
where she severs ties with one part of her subjectivity, would in fact benefit the
prison/patriarchy; she therefore emphatically rejects this dualism. This benefit to the regime
yields from the fact that bodies function as texts that can be inscribed upon and that then
broadcast these significations to all and sundry. el Sa’adawi encourages this notion by constantly
reading bodies for meaning. She closely observes security officers, deducing their internal states
from their corporeal presentations: “His eyes were shifting back and forth rapidly—an obvious
anxiety which he was trying to hide. Beneath the cast of worry was something like a profound
relaxation or a concealed joy. … The chief prison administrator was also hiding his happiness,
but his eyes betrayed him, as they sparkled in a smile” (el Sa’adawi 177). Apart from emotional
states, el Sa’adawi is also able to gauge socioeconomic conditions by ‘reading’ bodies: she notes,
“[t]he driver’s … lean, dark face was mottled with white: a sign of skin disease known in
medical terminology as pellagra which results from malnutrition, and especially from a
deficiency of vitamin B. … This disease is widespread among the families of poor peasants in
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Egypt” (el Sa’adawi 22). The risk attending the body’s ability to signify is that her own body
might be made to function as a text—one that bears the inscription of, and therefore makes
legible, the regime’s power. This peril acquires tangible form in the bodies of the female
prisoners in her cell, whose “faces [are] exhausted and pale … eyes anxious and showing the
effects of sleeplessness … feet grimy” (el Sa’adawi 52)—the regime, through neglect and
mistreatment, has reduced them to feeble bodies, and these feeble bodies attest to the regime’s
absolute power. As such, if el Sa’adawi were to uncouple her body from her self-understanding,
it too could be appropriated by the regime and contorted into a text that testifies to the
prison/patriarchy’s supremacy. It is to skirt this possibility that el Sa’adawi reclaims her body
and revels in her ownership of it. el Sa’adawi’s apprehension of this danger and her response to it
are crystallized in the following moment, soon after she enters the prison, when she reflects:
Feelings of impotence seeped into my body like a paralysis. I imagined that I could no
longer move my limbs. I was so frightened by this thought that I found myself jumping to
my feet … My sense of powerlessness was transformed into a feeling of power, and it
was no longer important that before me was a wall and steel bars. The crucial thing was
that my body could still move, that I could propel my feet along the ground, one after the
other. In the movement of my feet there was something akin to joy, like that of a paralytic
who is healed suddenly and has started to walk … everything had become bearable, as
long as my body could move. (el Sa’adawi 34)
In the moment where she realizes that she may lose control over her body—that it may become a
tool wielded by the regime to do as they may with it, to showcase their sovereign power—she
reclaims possession of it and savors its incorporation into her self-identity. It is for this very
reason that el Sa’adawi also rallies her cellmates to demand facilities such as a functioning
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shower from the regime, facilities that would enable them to care for their bodies in the prison.
Additionally, the prison/patriarchy also attempts to stimulate experiences of dualism in
the female detainees as a way of subjugating them via gendered stereotypes—it compels them to
align closely with their bodies, at the expense of their minds. el Saadawi recounts how, when she
enters the prison and is waiting to be assigned to a cell, one of the first pieces of counsel she
receives from an old prison guard is: “There is no point in thinking. Leave your mind behind you
and don’t think about anything. As long as you’ve come here you should know that there are
people who are doing your thinking for you” (el Sa’adawi 15). This misogynistic dualism is
again echoed by a policeman when he explains why there are no women in the police force, the
army, or the judiciary: “We are an Islamic nation. According to Islam, women are lacking in
mental power and faith” (el Sa’adawi 21), he says. The prison/patriarchy’s attempt to divorce
women from their critical thinking skills—to produce them as only ever corporeal—is not just
discursive; it’s also materialized in the deplorable conditions that compel the female detainees to
focus on their unkempt, infirm, fatigued bodies and that push them to the brink of insanity, a
threat el Sa’adawi speaks to with the words: “I felt I was going to lose my mind” (44). The
prison/patriarchy also compels female detainees to feel estranged from their minds by creating
and feeding a constant sense of doubt, by never allowing them to trust what their minds tell them
about their situation; in el Sa’adawi’s words, “Prison is doubt. And doubt is the most certain of
tortures. It is doubt that kills the intellect … not doubt in others, but doubt in oneself” (136).
Even as the prison/patriarchy compels women to focalize their bodies, rather than their
minds, as the locus of their selfhood, it also attempts to induce a very particular feminine body
into being. This is a body that patriarchal society reifies, on account of its connotation of
frailty—a physique that el Sa’adawi’s colleagues in the university possessed, characterized by
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“the smallness of their feet … their small bodies and the laxness of their weak muscles” (41).
The prison/patriarchy too attempts to usher such a diminutive female body into being by
subjecting the female detainees to starvation, by disallowing them from walking in the yard, and
by exposing them to constant, intentionally-produced neglect.
To counter these threats that she faces as a female detainee in the prison/patriarchal setup,
of being reduced to her body—which in turn is produced as a frail body—so that she can be
dismissed as lacking cognitive acuity and weak, el Sa’adawi asserts an embodied selfhood, one
where mind and body share a reciprocal relationship. Through an imbricated bodymind selfhood,
el Sa’adawi advances specific narratives about both her body and mind that counter those
ascribed to women by the prison/patriarchy—as she writes, “I sensed within myself a rejection of
the notion of weakness as ‘feminine’ or femininity as weakness” (el Sa’adawi 41). First, el
Sa’adawi cultivates a strong, lean body in prison through diligent exercise, in order to counter
the prison/patriarchy’s myths of female fragility and incapacity in an embodied manner, as
evinced when she comments, “I realized early that I needed two strong arms with which I could
defend myself when necessary … whenever any man would try to turn my being into a female
body” (41). Through this fit and sinewy corporeal presentation, el Sa’adawi also advances
specific narratives about her interiority, as evinced when she writes, “bodily strength means
strength of mind and soul” (83). While on one hand her embodied bodymind helps her assert a
sharp mind through a strong, muscular body, her mind reciprocally props up the resilience of her
body: “Does one become sick by one’s will? Yes, and sometimes no, except that a person may
be able to will herself or himself to get sick and even to die. The opposite is also true—one might
will oneself not to become ill or to die” (el Sa’adawi 102). Together, then, her mutually
invigorating bodymind helps her simultaneously contest the misogynistic narratives of the
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prison/patriarchy, while also helping her survive the prison/patriarchy’s material fulfilment of its
own prophecies.
The prison/patriarchy’s attempt to render el Sa’adawi mind-less is also an effort to
extinguish her identity as an intellectual who uses her writing—her critical thinking skills—to
condemn both the regime and the patriarchal shackles that fence Egyptian women in. This desire
is made manifest in the fact that the prison/patriarchy prevents her from writing—no writing
implements are allowed to enter the female political prisoners’ cell; as the shawisha warns:
“[N]ot even one piece of paper should be around, since not one written word can possibly leave
or enter the political cell … One written word in the political cell is a more serious matter than
having a pistol. Writing is more dangerous than killing, doctor” (el Sa’adawi 73). This threat of
losing her identity—as activist, as critical thinker, as writer—is a risk that el Sa’adawi grapples
with throughout the text, as evinced when she thinks to herself—"Was he addressing me? Was I
still the ‘doctor’?” (10), and later, “Had I written books or novels? It was as if I had forgotten
who I was” (20).
In this context, feeling embodied—feeling like a bodymind—empowers el Sa’adawi to
remain in touch with her identity before she was detained at Qanatir, instead of succumbing to
what the prison/patriarchy wants to make of her. Through her body, she becomes reacquainted
with herself, rather than simply lapsing into being Prisoner 1536, the number the prison assigns
to her to further deindividuate her: “I lowered my head and gazed at my fingers, touched my
right hand with my left. I am alert, awake, and still alive” (el Sa’adawi 19), she writes, showing
how her body helps her rekindle familiarity with herself and her state of mind. As her memoir
goes on, both her body and her mind take the form of writing implements, helping el Sa’adawi
keep her identity as writer and dissident intellectual intact, notwithstanding the assaults of
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incarceration—“I write in my memory, since I have no paper and pen” (el Sa’adawi 69), she
recounts, and later, “Sitting on the ground of the dirt enclosure, my fingers encircling a pointed
sliver of mudbrick, I inscribe the letters of my name on the ground” (108). In fact, el Sa’adawi’s
experience of bodymind-ness helps further shore up her dissident voice: she uses her senses to
document the conditions of the prison, just as Musa did in Khalifa’s narrative—a documentation
she then internalizes, to later testify against this detention experience and the regime’s
maltreatment of the prisoners. She surveys the conditions of the prison through sight—“scabby
black ceiling, cracked walls, steel bars, with a small window high in the wall, next to the ceiling,
blocked with a steel grille” (el Sa’adawi 30), through sound—“steel clanging against steel … as
if hundreds of steel doors are being closed and locked. A whistle as sharp as utter silence, and
voices resounding like a whistle” (el Sa’adawi 27), and even through smell—“The air, becoming
sluggish, takes on a piercing odor which burns through the mucous of my nose like a suffocating
gas” (el Sa’adawi 27); el Sa’adawi then records these conditions in her mind so that she can later
denounce the regime for detaining political dissidents, without just cause, in these deplorable
circumstances: “My narrative imagination and the artistic fiend within me record this moment,
etching the image and the tragedy” (178).
Finally, el Sa’adawi’s experience of her selfhood as bodymind also enables her to resist
the prison/patriarchy by functioning as a conduit for the experience of joy. The old guard
supervising el Sa’adawi in the prison warns her: “[The prison officials] don’t like people who …
show joy, so … accept everything calmly without smiling” (el Sa’adawi 17). This suppression of
delight is also characteristic of the patriarchal society that el Sa’adawi inhabits: as she recounts,
“I was born into a world which despises joyousness and those who are high-spirited. Even my
mother used to fix her eyes on me in irritation or repugnance when she would see me dancing
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with joy … When I had grown older, I understood that she, like me, was born into a world which
has an aversion to merriment and considers all human pleasures to be perversions” (el Sa’adawi
38). Despite being at the epicenter of the prison/patriarchy, el Sa’adawi’s body enables her to
experience joy through physical movement—she recounts how she experiences a sense of
jubilation when she exercises, when she uses the hoe in the prison, and even when she washes
her clothes. This joy, in turn, nourishes and fortifies both her body and her mind, enhancing her
ability to resist the oppressive tactics of the prison/patriarchy: “Laughter … is similar to athletic
games or dancing: it strengthens the heart and chest muscles and vitalizes the brain cells …
Laughing is a sign of thinking” (125), el Sa’adawi writes.
As I illuminate in my reading of Nawal el Sa’adawi’s Memoirs from the Women’s Prison
here, her experience of her selfhood diverges radically from that of the detainees in Khalifa’s
testimonial narrative. Updating our existing scholarly theorizations about subjectivity, in body()mind terms, to simply tack on an experience of selfhood that seems aberrant, such as the one
presented in Khalifa’s novel, appears as an inadequate response then, because, as el Sa’adawi’s
text suggests, retrofitting our theorizations of subjectivity in this way would still render them
unable to accommodate every unique experience of selfhood, fashioned in response to the
particular power configurations testifiers are embedded in. How, then, can literary scholars,
through their critical work, bear secondary witness to testimonial texts in more careful and
rehabilitative ways, in ways that truly make space for the distinctive autopoietic attempts that
they are confronted with in these narratives of witness, rather than pulverizing these acts of
autopoiesis under hegemonic, static theories?
BEARING ILLIBERAL SECONDARY WITNESS THROUGH LITERARY CRITICISM
I now turn my attention to the tangible praxes and postures that may empower literary
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scholars to bear secondary witness to testimonial texts, through their critical scholarship, in an
illiberal vein. A crucial disclaimer I would like to preface this discussion with is that when I use
the term ‘illiberal’ here, I do not intend to advocate a simplistic opposition to and dismantling of
the (neo)liberal structures that hem in and ossify scholars’ work—as if mounting such an
opposition has always simply been a straightforward matter of resolve; rather, I suggest practices
that may help literary scholars survive—in Julietta Singh’s words—the chokehold of the
(neo)liberal American university and its discipline(s). Singh reminds us that liberalism42 is an
inheritance bequeathed to each one of us, that each of us has internalized, and as such, it cannot
be overcome by mere choice; it can, however, be survived. One cannot simply pretend that one’s
consciousness, as a scholar, is not irrevocably shaped by the university’s (neo)liberality;
nonetheless, this formative harm isn’t a death sentence—one can still survive it by reaching
toward something else, by allowing “other … forms of engagement [to] resound” (Singh 27).
The overarching secondary witnessing objective that I urge literary scholars to aspire to
here—the central object toward which the following illiberal practices of reading and writing are
oriented—is that of ceding primacy, in one’s literary criticism, to the first-person experiences
hosted by testimonial narratives. The testimonial texts that I read in this chapter, through their
testifiers’ implied metaphoric representations of their selfhood, solicit close attention to the
personal experiences that they attest to. Bearing illiberal secondary witness to these narratives
through one’s scholarship, then, involves, first and foremost, a commitment to seeing,
responding to, and lifting up these subjective experiences, rather than treating them as ancillary
details that can be disregarded and written over by static scholarly theories.
Making space for testifiers’ first-person experiences in one’s literary criticism demands a
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While Singh refers specifically to liberal colonial onto-epistemologies, I use this term to refer to the workings of
the neoliberal university.
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stance of radical openness from scholars—a cultivation of techniques that affirm one’s
vulnerability to being impressed upon by the testimonial text at hand, a key feature of the
testimonial encounter that I highlighted early on in this chapter. A reading method that is
particularly facilitative of this scholarly radical openness is that of vulnerable reading43. Julietta
Singh explains vulnerable reading as an anti-masterful reading method—one that intentionally
veers away from the violent desire to domesticate one’s object of study and warp it such that it
fits within a preestablished hermeneutic template. Instead, vulnerable reading, in a rather
Spivakian manner, pursues “othering … as an end in itself” (qtd. in Singh 22); it is “an open,
continuous practice that … remain[s] unremittingly susceptible to new world configurations that
reading texts … can begin to produce … [it] resist[s] disciplinary enclosure, refusing to restrict
in advance how and where one might wander through textual engagement” (Singh 22).
Vulnerable reading therefore involves reading along the grain rather than only ever against it44; it
calls for attending to and making sense of what is on the page, rather than forcefully reading
one’s own theoretical frameworks and disciplinary commonsenses into texts. Such a practice of
vulnerable reading therefore almost demands that literary critics, in their encounters with
testimonial narratives, step outside of their professionalized, theoretically-fortified, disciplined
identities to become common readers again.
This stance of anti-masterful radical openness must also be mirrored in how scholars
undertake the creation of literary criticism itself. Rather than conceiving of testimonial texts as
crude raw materials that one, as a literary scholar, alchemically transfigures into the polished
43

Rita Felski dubs this reading method “postcritical reading”—a form of reading that instead of “looking behind the
text … [involves] plac[ing] [oneself] in front of the text, reflecting on what it unfurls, calls forth, makes possible”
(12).
44
Once again, I don’t intend to suggest that reading along the grain of texts should always be pursued by scholars, to
the exclusion of other reading methods. Rather, in this section, I intend to specifically name the reading and writing
practices that literary critics can leverage to responsibly host testifiers’ autopoietic endeavors in their literary
criticism as a form of illiberal secondary witnessing.
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final product of theory45, one must recognize how these texts are already undertaking the work of
theory—how, through their testimonial accounts, by laying out their particular modes of selffashioning in response to the specific configurations of power that they are made to confront,
testifiers are already making important theoretical inroads—just in narrative form rather than the
abstract, impersonal style that has come to be revered in academic scholarship. When
approached in this manner, doing literary scholarship takes shape, in Barbara Christian’s words,
as the task of “illuminat[ing] and explain[ing] these hieroglyphs … an activity quite different
from the creating of the hieroglyphs themselves” (68); literary criticism becomes an act of
“promotion as well as understanding, a response to the writer to whom there is often no
response” (Christian 78). This mode of critical scholarship centers testifiers, rather than the
literary scholar—it yields the mic to the singular experiences that these testifiers attest to; in
doing so, literary criticism becomes more responsive, it acquires more plasticity.
When scholars approach literary criticism, as a form of secondary witnessing, through
this stance of radical openness, their scholarship takes shape as what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,
leaning on Silvan Tomkins’ formulation, calls “weak theory” (134). Sedgwick explains this
theoretical mode as one that stands in direct contrast to ‘strong theory’; where strong theory
strives to be generalizable (and hence ends up being reductive), weak theory “account[s] only for
‘near’ phenomena, it is … little better than a description of the phenomena it purports to explain”
(qtd. in Sedgwick 134). Michel Foucault too endorses this turn to weak theory (although he
doesn’t make use of this term itself); he champions the reinstallation of “local, discontinuous,
disqualified, or nonlegitimized knowledges … [in place of] the unitary theoretical instance that
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Joanna Kadi indicts this mode of scholarship through a Marxist lens—she critiques how these kinds of scholarly
undertakings mimic factory activity. They devalue the labor of author-testifiers (metaphorically cast as factory
workers here) and alienate them from their work, to position scholars, the theory-makers, as the valued experts
instead.
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claims to be able to filter them … organize them in the name of a true body of knowledge”
(Society Must Be Defended 9).
As briefly alluded to above, a writing technique that is particularly conducive to the task
of creating weak, rather than strong, theories is that of description—specifically what Heather
Love refers to as “thin description” (403). Love explains thin description as a form of surface
reading—it is a method devoted to parsing what is overtly visible in a text46. Practicing thin
description in literary scholarship can be catalyzed by posing the question that Erving Goffman
often asked as a way of kickstarting his observations of the social realities he studied47: “What is
it that is really going on here?” (qtd. in Love 422). I also suggest the appending of another
question to the one Goffman relied on, and that is: ‘Why does this—whatever it is that is going
on here—matter, in the context of this particular testimonial account?’ Together, I believe that
these two questions can encourage the formulation of weak, malleable, ephemeral theories that
are truly attentive and responsive to the testimonial texts they read, rather than strong, hegemonic
theories that do more suppressive than generative work.
Apart from specific reading and writing methods, the creation of literary scholarship that
can truly host the testimonial experiences it responds to rests on the cultivation of a specific
ethos suited to this kind of illiberal inquiry. The critical attitude I find to be particularly
capacious in this endeavor is that of curiosity—becoming curious to the narrative at hand.
Curiosity is characterized by several features that make it particularly suited for the kind of
illiberal critical scholarship I advocate for here: it takes multiple forms and can be deployed
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Using the analogy of a device that records and reproduces scenes that play out before it, Heather Love explicates
‘thin reading’ as an empiricist method. I, however, shirk this turn to empiricism, due to its positivist connotations.
While the thin reading I espouse here indeed chronicles what is overtly palpable in a text, what is apparent is neither
objective nor depersonalized. As such, I seek to cleave thin description, as I present it in this chapter, from these
empiricist undertones.
47
See the introduction to Frame Analysis.
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toward multiple ends; it is unruly48 and transgresses established boundaries; and, finally, as Perry
Zurn and Arjun Shankar note, it’s “ready to sit with uncertainty and unknowing” (xxiii) even as
it probes for answers.
Curiosity is not just a state of mind, or a private affect; rather, it is praxiological, as Zurn
and Shankar note—"far from something that is simply felt, curiosity is something that is done,
expressed in behaviors” (xiii). One way in which literary scholars can deploy curiosity as
practice is through the posing of yet another question of the testimonial narratives that they read
and write about, a question Toril Moi identifies as capturing the very epitome of puzzlement:
“Why this?” (21). Moi explains that asking ‘Why this?’ enables scholars to launch their inquiry
from the standpoint of inquisitiveness—“a spirit of really wanting to know” (Moi 37)—rather
than that of a disciplined methodology. This question is particularly well-suited to the moments
when literary scholars sense friction in their textual engagements, no matter how subdued:
friction between their theoretical frameworks—the commonsense that they hold to be deeply
true—and what they encounter on the page of testimonial texts. These moments of friction
function as points of dense uncanniness, where one “feel[s] displaced (ignorant) at the moment
… one should be at home (knowledgeable)” (Loveless 47). Natalie Loveless explains that this
experience of uncanniness “is the condition of knowledge making at its best” (47) because it is a
moment of rupture, of unpredictability, and of true responsiveness. In the moment where
scholars experience this uncanniness, they become “boundary object[s], within and without [a
trained commonsense] simultaneously” (Loveless 46), and when they sink into this experience of
uncanniness by becoming inquisitive to it, they become better equipped to undertake the work of
scholarship in a way that is oblique to the (neo)liberal university’s disciplining.
48

This unruliness takes several forms. Natalie Loveless observes that curiosity is often spurred by prohibition and is
hence disobedient, whereas Perry Zurn and Arjun Shankar identify curiosity as being transgressive—relentlessly
questioning established ways of thinking and stretching the bounds of the possible.
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Alongside these points of friction, I urge literary scholars to also exercise their curiosity
in those moments of textual engagement when they don’t perceive any friction, where their
existing theoretical schemas are able to perfectly make sense of the testimonies they are working
through. Natalie Loveless and Toril Moi both maintain that in order to implement curiosity in
relevant, interesting, and generative ways, one needs some amount of training—an archive of
knowledge that alerts one to what lies outside of it, what remains unexplained by it. However, I
break from this perspective on the grounds that such training can also act as an intellectual
barricade: it can lead scholars to read testimonial utterances in disciplined, staid ways, rather
than attending to textual contexts that may birth new insights about experiences that appear, at
first glance, to be familiar. Jack Halberstam warns: “disciplines actually get in the way of
answers and theorems precisely because they offer maps of thought where intuition and blind
fumbling might yield better results” (6), and it is to restore a semblance of this very blind
fumbling that I encourage scholars to become curious to those aspects of texts that don’t
naturally stoke their inquisitiveness.
Curiosity, however, is not necessarily a liberatory, illiberal ethos or practice in and of
itself; as I mention earlier, a defining feature of curiosity is its multiplicity49—in fact, curiosity
has historically been enlisted for the pursuit of several liberal ends and has discharged a great
deal of harm in this capacity50. The (neo)liberal university too encourages scholars to nurture
curiosity; however, this curiosity is almost always invoked in relation to what it may produce—
innovation. Pam Grossman and John L. Jackson Jr. identify innovation as being a corollary to
curiosity, noting that it is cited by institutions more frequently than curiosity because it “seems
49

See Zurn, “Curiosity and Political Resistance” for an exploration of how thinkers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, and
Derrida have understood the multiple, (de)politicized iterations of curiosity.
50
Zurn and Shankar attend to both how cultural exploration, and eventually processes of colonization/imperialism,
were set into motion by curiosity, as well as how “an objectifying medico-scientific curiosity has … caused
irreparable harm to the intersex community” (xxi).

236

more substantive and precise” (vii) in comparison to the seemingly frivolous curiosity. They also
note that while used interchangeably, curiosity and innovation are not true substitutes for each
other—where innovation is teleological and oriented toward the accomplishment of a particular
objective, curiosity meanders aimlessly; where innovation is yoked to the market, curiosity is
private, “even antisocial in its privileging of an interiorized purpose and ambition that may not
have any obvious social applicability” (Grossman and Jackson Jr. viii). It is therefore important
for scholars to delink the two and pursue, in their scholarship, a form of curiosity that is
untethered from neoliberal notions of innovation. Literary scholars, as they practice curiosity in
their engagements with testimonial texts, must strive for “a deinstrumentalized and open
curiosity” (Zurn and Shankar xxii), rather than “an overdetermined, ruthlessly pragmatic,
neoliberal curiosity” (Zurn and Shankar xxii). They must strive to cultivate a curiosity that tarries
with testimonial texts not to mine them for innovative theories, but to open themselves up to the
insights that these texts make legible.
Bringing a curious disposition to bear on one’s literary scholarship, in the way that I
suggest, demands an experimentational ethos—a willingness to step off the well-worn trail that
leads to a predetermined destination in favor of undirected wandering. It is this very embrace of
experimentation that loosens the manacles of the (neo)liberal university because it enables one,
as a literary scholar, to surrender the desire for mastery51. It empowers one to entertain ‘what if’
propositions in one’s scholarship, to linger with alternative modes of thinking that testimonial
narratives may make available, rather than insisting on that which the university, its disciplines,
and theories have made commonsense. A curiosity that is experimental is also capacious enough
to birth forms of literary criticism that are flexible, that adapt to the narratives of witness that
they read and respond to, rather than holding tightly on to strong theories that, through
51

See Singh.
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institutionalized repetition, have ascended to sacrosanct status.
Alongside experimentation, being curious in the way that I urge here also requires an
openness to being stupid—what Stefano Harney and Fred Moten describe as “mak[ing] common
cause with those … (non)positions that seem crazy, nonsensical, unimaginable” (11–12).
Stupidity, as Jack Halberstam explains in his work, is “not … a lack of knowledge but … the
limits of certain forms of knowing and certain ways of inhabiting structures of knowing” (12).
Both Michel Foucault52 and Judith Butler—in their gloss on Foucault’s essay on critique—
reinforce this idea when they note that in order to question authority, one must inhabit a
perspective that lies beyond that of the thinkable, as defined by the epistemic regime within
which one is embedded and which one seeks to counter. This position, on account of lying
beyond the frontiers of the hegemonic thinkable, is necessarily one that appears nonsensical—in
Butler’s words, “one becomes, at the moment of being critical, irrational or nonrational”
(“Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity” 23). To become truly curious to testimonial texts and
undertake the work of literary criticism in an illiberal, undisciplined mode, then, it becomes
imperative for scholars to embrace stupidity, to linger with perspectives that appear nonsensical
from the vantage point of the sense-making formations of the (neo)liberal university.
Last but not the least, literary scholars can also fashion their scholarship into an illiberal
secondary witnessing practice by developing an ethos of accountability in their work. Linda
Tuhiwai Smith writes that it is indefensible for scholars to conduct research with individuals and
communities “as if their views d[o] not count” (9). Instead, she advises that researchers should
engage in knowledge-sharing practices with their research subjects—“research [should reach] the
people who have helped make it” (L. Smith 15). Exporting Smith’s counsel to literary scholars
working with testimonial texts, I invite scholars to cultivate such a knowledge-sharing ethos in
52

See “What is Critique?”.
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their own scholarship too, even where such dissemination back to the testifiers may not be
practically feasible or achievable. The knowledge-sharing ethos I make a case for here involves
scholars periodically reflecting on whether their scholarship represents testifiers and what they
seek to communicate through their testimonies, as well as asking after the futures that their
scholarship may induce into being. Refracting research and writing through an ethos of
answerability coaxes scholars into reminding themselves that they’re first and foremost
accountable to these testifiers, whose testimonies feed into and sustain their work, rather than the
(neo)liberal universities from which they operate. As Doris Sommer notes, “interpretation is art’s
agent” (The Work of Art in the World 10)—literary criticism influences how testimonies travel
and are received in the world—and as such, I repeat, this accountability is material, and not
merely a thought experiment.

Undertaking literary scholarship in the illiberal modes I suggest above is a fraught
endeavor—it involves risk for the scholar implanted in and working from within the confines of
the (neo)liberal university. Since the (neo)liberal university circulates and sediments institutional
commonsenses through reward and punishment mechanisms, as I noted earlier in this chapter, a
crucial aspect of cultivating an undisciplined relationship to the university involves exposing
oneself to the consequences that may result from one’s illiberal stance. Transforming one’s
scholarship into an illiberal secondary witnessing practice requires, as Roderick Ferguson
advocates, a renunciation of the “will to institutionality” (209)—a foregoing of the desire for
recognition from and legibility within the university. Stefano Harney and Fred Moten emphasize
this in The Undercommons when they identify the truly subversive intellectual in the modern
university as being one who is “in but not of” (26)—such a scholar sneaks in and steals the
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resources of the university without becoming incorporated into it, without becoming a conduit
for its agendas, methods, and logics. These ‘fugitive’ scholars, as Harney and Moten dub them,
will inevitably be called “impractical, naïve, unprofessional” (Harney and Moten 28), but it is
only when they enthusiastically accept this “negligence of professionalization” (Harney and
Moten 28) that they will “exceed the profession … and by exceeding escape” (Moten and
Harney 30). Bearing secondary witness to testimonial narratives, through one’s literary
scholarship, in an illiberal vein—against the ways and means made commonsense by the
(neo)liberal university—then, is not a safe act; such a scholarly undertaking demands risk, it
demands skin in the game, but then again, it is only by incurring risk that liberation can be
achieved.
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CONCLUSION
“[T]he survivor-witness bears a terrible burden—a duty to both the living and the
dead to testify, to tell the world of the horrors he has seen. At the same time …
testimony is never adequate … it can never bridge the gap between language and
experience.”
—Kali Tal, Worlds of Hurt
“[T]he impact of the survivor’s strongest message—that his traumatic suffering
was seemingly without purpose, arbitrary, outside the framework of meaning—
simply cannot be grasped by the reader, whose framework of meaning remains
essentially intact.”
—Kali Tal, Worlds of Hurt
I opened this dissertation by delving into Mohamedou Ould Slahi—testifier-narrator of
Guantánamo Diary’s—invocation of his readers as a jury, who might read and evaluate his
testimonial account, and subsequently pass a judgment on it. However, this act of judging can
only really occur once the reader-secondary witness has fully comprehended the ghastliness of
the abuse perpetrated at Guantánamo—the arbitrary suffering and injury inflicted on the
detainees, as well as the discursive calisthenics that the U.S. government engaged in to remove
them from the purview of the law, through the law1. Guantánamo Diary—Slahi’s testimonial
memoir—therefore takes shape as a project thoroughly devoted to catalyzing this readerly
understanding; by offering up visceral descriptions of the brutal torture that the detainees were
subjected to, all on the grounds of flimsy evidence, racially-motivated suspicions, and the
egregious exercise of imperial power, Slahi’s text attempts to facilitate readers’ understanding of
the magnitude of the injustice that the detainees were subjected to. Even though his narrative
strives to compel outrage in his readers—an outrage prompted by a deep cognizance of the
1

See Ahmad 1703–1707 for a discussion of how the U.S. government, through the construction of legal fictions
such as the category of ‘enemy combatant,’ legally removed the Guantánamo detainees from the jurisdiction of U.S.
and international law.
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extreme oppression that the detainees were made vulnerable to—Slahi remains ambivalent about
whether his readers will in fact experience this fury, and thus whether their judgment will lean in
the detainees’ favor. Anticipating the misgivings that his readers might have after reading his
memoir, Slahi writes: “Did the Leader of the Free World, the United States, really torture
detainees? Or are stories of torture part of a conspiracy to present the U.S. in a horrible way, so
the rest of the world will hate it? I don’t even know how to treat this subject” (369). Slahi further
reveals his anxieties about a readerly skepticism regarding the veracity of the events he narrates
when he clarifies:
I have only written what I have experienced, what I saw, and what I learned firsthand. I
have tried not to exaggerate, nor to understate. I have tried to be as fair as possible, to the
U.S. government, to my brothers, and to myself. I don’t expect people who don’t know
me to believe me, but I expect them, at least, to give me the benefit of the doubt … I am
more than confident that I can prove every single thing I have written in this book. (Slahi
369)
Slahi’s expectation of this readerly cynicism stems from the fact that, despite his testimonial
memoir’s desperate attempt to help readers understand the sheer savagery that the detainees
experienced, he is aware that his readers are fundamentally unable to grasp it, since they have not
themselves experienced the multi-scalar injustice and suffering he attests to in his memoir. Even
as he tries to explain the atrocities visited upon the detainees, Slahi admits: “You, Dear Reader,
could never understand the extent of the physical, and much more the psychological, pain people
in my situation suffered, no matter how hard you try to put yourself in another’s shoes” (232).
Kali Tal unpacks why readers are unable to comprehend the suffering that testifiers
describe when she observes that testimonial accounts are merely metaphorical vehicles that
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attempt to communicate the real traumatizing experiences that testifiers have survived; yet, the
“symbols generated by [these experiences] are readable only to those familiar with the ‘alphabet’
of trauma; what they represent is not common knowledge” (Tal 118). Tal further explains this
disjuncture between testifier-survivor and reader-secondary witness by writing:
Traumatic experience catalyzes a transformation of meaning in the signs individuals use
to represent their experiences. Words such as blood, terror, agony, and madness gain new
meaning, within the context of the trauma, and survivors emerge from the traumatic
environment with a new set of definitions. On the surface, language appears unchanged—
survivors still use the word terror, non-traumatized audiences read and understand the
word terror … [but there is a] dislocation of meaning. (16; italics in original)
As such, owing to the fact that reader-secondary witnesses and testifier-survivors lack a set of
shared referents, non-comprehension on the reader-secondary witness’s part is an inevitable
component of bearing secondary witness to testimonial utterances.
Testimonial narratives, in being refracted through the liberal infrastructures of
humanitarianism2 and the juridical arena3 as they are, tend to recount highly visceral scenes of
injury- and death-production in a bid to help their readers understand the scope of testifiers’
oppression—an understanding that these liberal infrastructures posit as being a crucial precursor
to any kind of ameliorative response4. To close this dissertation, I push against this liberal
commonsense that undergirds the very production and reception of testimonial articulations,

2

In staging spectacles of distress and harm as a means of securing aid for suffering communities, humanitarianism
suggests that audiences must view and fully understand a people’s suffering before they’re activated to respond to it.
3
Legal testimony, in the Euro-American courtroom, is also furnished with the intent of offering a fuller
understanding of an incident of harm to the jury, as a prerequisite for the jury’s decision.
4
Testimonial narratives, though informed by these liberal discourses/institutions, are not exhaustively determined by
them. See Gilmore for an exploration of how limit-case testimonial narratives push against the liberal juridical
frames imposed on them, and Sommer, “Rigoberta’s Secrets” for an exploration of how testifiers may actively
disallow readers from gaining full knowledge of their circumstances through their testimonies.
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inviting a consideration of how a readerly affirmation of one’s non-comprehension5 of the
suffering unleashed by events of torture and/or genocide may in fact operate as an illiberal,
responsible secondary witnessing practice.
I route this proposition through a reading of Boubacar Boris Diop’s Murambi, a novel
published in 2000, that testifies to the Rwandan genocide—of the Tutsi ethnic group at the hands
of the Hutus—that occurred over a 100-day period in 1994. Even as it provides snapshots of the
brutality of the genocide and delves into the conditions that prompted it, Murambi is preoccupied
with representing the process of secondary witnessing—specifically, the harm enacted by
secondary witnesses presuming that they comprehend this event. By dramatizing the deleterious
consequences of assuming that one, as a secondary witness, can make sense of the suffering and
trauma spawned by this kind of brutal massacre, Diop’s novel urges secondary witnesses to
instead engage with testimonial narratives by actively foregrounding their non-comprehension,
by affirming their inability to fathom the far-reaching impact that such atrocities can have.
Finally, I close this epilogue by reflecting on the affordances of such an illiberal
secondary witnessing practice—where reader-secondary witnesses intentionally affirm their noncomprehension of the suffering unleashed by the atrocities that testimonial narratives bear
witness to. I highlight how centering one’s lack of comprehension, of the multi-scalar harm
inflicted by acts of torture and genocide, can function as a way for reader-secondary witnesses to
surrender their desire to be willful knowing subjects, and instead sink into the more capacious
epistemological orientations of attentiveness and curiosity. A curious form of engagement—that
continues to respect opacity—enables reader-secondary witnesses to remain in prolonged
attunement with those that are harmed, to ask after the conditions that enabled these acts of

5

I specifically use this term to emphasize and then urge a rejection of the thorough, and almost cocky, form of
understanding that the word ‘comprehension’ implies.
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wounding, and to learn more while acknowledging the impossibility of ever learning everything.
THE HARMS OF (MIS)UNDERSTANDING IN DIOP’S MURAMBI
The secondary witness that Diop’s testimonial novel tracks most closely is Cornelius
Uvimana, a Rwandan native who was in self-imposed exile in Djibouti for the duration of the
genocide and only returned to Rwanda four years after its culmination, in 1998. When Cornelius
returns, he engages with the country as well as his Rwandan friends and family in ways that
reveal a presumption of comprehension—he assumes that he is able to fully understand what it is
like to live through a genocide; he takes for granted his understanding of the pain, trauma, and
grief catalyzed by a tragedy of such proportions. Diop’s Murambi goes on to carefully tease out
how Cornelius’s presumption of comprehension leads him to engage with the event of the
genocide as well as its survivors in ways that are pernicious and distasteful, rather than
restorative.
When Cornelius first arrives in Rwanda, the easy intimacy he presumes with the country
as well as the genocide—on account of hearing about it on the radio and the television, and
learning about it through historical texts—leads him to adopt a voyeuristic gaze. He approaches
the genocide as a tourist, treating key sites and landmarks as visual spectacles to be consumed
with pleasure, with no regard for the traumatic significance that they may hold for survivors of
the genocide. As his friend, Stan—a survivor of the genocide—drives him home from the Kigali
airport, naming different neighborhoods to provide Cornelius with some spatial anchors,
Cornelius finds himself wanting “to be shown the place where Habyarimana’s plane had fallen in
April 1994”6 (Diop 37). Later, when he visits the Café des Grands Lacs in the Nyamirambo
neighborhood, he thinks to himself, “Where on this avenue had they set up the famous
6

The Rwandan President, Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane being shot down was the event that brought brewing ethnic
tensions to a head, ended peace accords signed between the two ethnic groups, and triggered the indiscriminate
killing of the Tutsis by the Hutus.
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Nyamirambo barricade?” (Diop 49). Cornelius’s use of the adjective ‘famous’ to describe a site
where Hutu men mercilessly slaughtered and raped the Tutsis showcases the raw, and rather
perverse, tourist gaze he trains on the post-genocide Rwandan landscape. In believing that he is
in fact able to comprehend the genocide and the scale of its impact, Cornelius consigns its
ghastliness to a distant past; he approaches Rwanda as a country that has recovered from its
trauma, whose sites of atrocity now bear no more significance than being mere tourist spectacles.
In believing that he himself has grappled with the genocide and moved past its horrors,
Cornelius naïvely universalizes his experience to the survivors of the Rwandan genocide. He
thus holds his experience of coming to terms with the terrors of the genocide to be
paradigmatic—a tendency that leads him to approach his Rwandan friends with a lack of
sensitivity. When he meets his friend, Jessica—someone who both lived through the terrors of
the genocide and worked to stanch them as an RPF guerrilla7—he notices her sickly
comportment, but instead of attributing it to the emotional and psychological toll that the
genocide might have taken on her, he rather flippantly notes that she “seemed to be in bad health
… [and had] slightly sad eyes” (Diop 36).
In approaching the genocide as though he already fully comprehends it, Cornelius does
not allow space for the possibility that there is more for him to learn and work through when he
visits Rwanda. Rather than becoming humble to all that he does not yet know and may never
fully understand, Cornelius’s perspective remains self-centered, self-assured even. Gerárd,
another survivor of the genocide that Cornelius meets in Rwanda, indicts Cornelius’s arrogance
by describing his body language to him: “You were there, in the Café des Grands Lacs,
comfortable, sure of yourself … You were making big gestures, your entire body was getting

7

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a guerrilla group largely composed of Tutsis, re-captured Rwandan territory
from the Hutus and cut off their supply routes, eventually forcing the Hutus into retreat and ending the genocide.
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away from you, while we, because of circumstances, we’ve learned to draw in our bodies … And
there, at the GL, the only thing we heard was you … you felt great. … you quickly got to
thinking that you could still have a good time, genocide or not!” (Diop 150–151). Cornelius’s
misplaced confidence radiates through his conduct: secure in his belief that he fully understands
the genocide and its legacy, Cornelius engages with Rwanda through a self-assured posture; he
makes himself the center, instead of adopting the deferential, yielding, diffident attitude that
might issue from an acknowledgement of his ignorance, of his being a stranger to the scars and
the trauma that the Rwandans bear.
Moreover, when Cornelius explicitly invokes the genocide, he fetishizes it—exaggerating
its gruesomeness in a way that in fact detracts from the real toll it took on the Rwandan people8.
It is this very fetishization that Jessica calls out in a conversation she has with Cornelius about
her former lover. When Jessica invokes this lover through the lexicon of past-ness, Cornelius
automatically assumes that he was murdered in the genocide, a fetishistic assumption Jessica
mocks when she asks, “What’s got into you, Cornelius, that you think no one in this country is
still alive?” (Diop 70). Cornelius’s fetishization of the genocide also takes shape as his reading of
its violence through a poetic lens—he perceives the grisly scenes described to him as symbols
that hold deeper meaning, instead of simply being unmoored by their unvarnished grimness.
When his uncle, Siméon Habineza, describes how dogs came to the mass graves of the Tutsis to
drink from the puddles of blood bubbling up to the surface of the ground, Cornelius glibly
responds, “Monsters drinking the blood of Rwanda. I understand the symbol” (Diop 153)—an
interpretation Siméon immediately rejects by saying: “It’s not a symbol … Our eyes saw it …

8

Scholars writing about the spectacle have long maintained that the spectacularization of suffering evacuates it of its
real, raw potency. Chouliaraki summarizes the deleterious consequences of confronting suffering in its
spectacularized form when she writes: “the spectacle cancels the authenticity of suffering … its urgent matter-offactness … rendering suffering an object of inactive contemplation rather than a cause for action” (39).
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Don’t listen to those who claim to have seen spots of blood on the moon before the massacres.
Nothing of the sort happened. The wind didn’t howl with sorrow during the night, nor did the
trees start to talk to each other about the folly of men. It was all very simple.” (Diop 153).
When Cornelius doesn’t spectacularize the violence of the genocide, he minimizes it,
leaching it of its horror. Cornelius’s impoverished conception of the genocide becomes apparent
in the play that he intends to write about it. When Cornelius, after a night of heavy drinking,
summarizes this play to Roger, a Rwandan he meets in the capital city of Kigali, the latter is
taken aback by its depoliticized, irreverent quality—the central conflict driving Cornelius’s play
is merely a French General’s desire to save his cat from the ‘genocides,’ the plural form, in
Cornelius’s words, referring to the “general[‘s] … damned theory about reciprocal genocides”
(Diop 56) between the Hutus and Tutsis; Roger is so appalled by Cornelius’s flippant treatment
of this atrocity that he is only able to remark, “You’re clueless, Cornelius” (Diop 58) at the end
of Cornelius’s narration. A particular image from the play that Cornelius describes, which
effectively captures his paltry understanding of the genocide, is that of two soldiers who “keep
their two machetes raised toward the sky and crossed … [t]heir only way of talking … [being] to
scrape their machetes against each other” (Diop 58). Machetes were one of the most common
weapons used by the Hutus to decapitate and butcher the Tutsi people; yet, in the way that
Cornelius evokes them, the machetes fail to convey the pain and terror that they evoked in the
Tutsis—instead, the machetes appear as mere props in Cornelius’s play, completely drained of
their terrifying affective significance.
Diop’s Murambi explores the damaging effects of secondary witnesses claiming to
understand atrocity through figures other than Cornelius as well. The other secondary witnessing
audiences that the novel examines are those that Stan appealed to for funds, on behalf of the RPF
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guerrillas, by traveling to cities as diverse as Bobo-Dioulasso, Stockholm, and Denver.
Recounting his experience speaking to these audiences about the ongoing genocide in Rwanda,
as part of the fundraising campaign, Stan laments, “I talked about our country to lots of people
… Nice people too, they wanted to help, but first they wanted to understand” (Diop 46). When
secondary witnesses attempt to fully make sense of acts of brutality as a necessary precursor to
responding to them, their activism comes to be predicated on this comprehension, and when this
comprehension fails—as it is bound to, as Kali Tal’s theorization makes evident—restorative
secondary witnessing action is withheld.
Alternatively,

secondary

witnesses

often

uphold

their

misunderstandings

as

understanding—a tendency that Cornelius’s attitude initially points to, and that is further
explored through how other characters, outside Rwanda, make sense of the genocide. Zakya,
Cornelius’s girlfriend from Djibouti, expresses concern about Cornelius traveling back to
Rwanda, because she “imagine[s] Rwanda as a country completely devastated by murderous
combat that could flare up again at any moment” (Diop 65). Moreover, as Cornelius later tells
Jessica, Zakya holds onto “the same old stereotypes … two ethnic groups who’ve hated each
other since time immemorial” (Diop 65). Zakya’s understanding of the genocide—a metonym
for how many other secondary witnesses, especially those to whom Africa has been discursively
presented as a continent mired in unceasing, bloody, irrational conflict, understand the
genocide—fixes Rwanda as a site of ahistorical, and thus perpetual, violence. Perceived from
this standpoint, the genocide appears less as an aberration, and more as an expected event—in
the words of an old man that Cornelius had once spoken to, “[i]n those countries a genocide
doesn’t mean much” (Diop 177). This misunderstanding, that secondary witnesses often hold
onto as being an accurate appraisal of Rwanda (and often even the whole of Africa), can in fact
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dangerously impede any kind of meaningful or rehabilitative secondary witnessing, instead of
facilitating it.
THE

AFFORDANCES

OF

NON-COMPREHENSION

AS

A

SECONDARY

WITNESSING PRACTICE IN DIOP’S MURAMBI
It is only when Cornelius recognizes and affirms his non-comprehension of the suffering
unleashed by the genocide that a shift occurs in his secondary witnessing practice. The first time
he is brought up close to his inability to fathom the materiality and extent of the harm inflicted
by the genocide is when he visits the massacre site at the Ntarama parish church. Observing the
corpses laid out there—“in the same state that the killers had left them in, four years earlier”
(Diop 73), with pieces of clothing still clinging to their decaying flesh and screams frozen on
their disfigured faces—Cornelius’s internal all-knowing commentary, for the first time, is
silenced. He watches the horrific display of pain and death and listens to the church caretaker’s
narration of the slaughter, unable to provide any kind of self-preoccupied metacommentary on
what he sees and hears; at one point, he admits to being too overwhelmed to coherently unpack
the specific details of the catastrophe he is bearing secondary witness to: “A stake—of wood or
of iron, Cornelius didn’t know, he was too shocked to notice—had remained lodged in her
vagina” (Diop 73). Rather than commenting on the scenes he is confronted with or attempting to
accommodate them in some preconstructed framework of meaning, Cornelius simply submits
himself to the visceral assault of this experience. It is this very submission that leads him to
eventually admit: “[i]t was as if he’d never been aware of the atrocities committed in the
country” (Diop 73).
Once Cornelius affirms his inability to make sense of the Rwandan genocide and its
afterlives, the qualitative contours of his engagement with it radically shift. When visiting other
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massacre sites, such as the Murambi Polytechnic school, he is able to attend to the
distinctiveness of each individual cadaver laid out for the secondary witnesses, rather than
collapsing them into an undifferentiated sea of death—he notices how one person’s left foot had
been chopped off before their slaughter, how another one of the skeletons still had braids
attached to it, and how a third one was curled up like a fetus—thus becoming cognizant of how
“[e]ach one of the corpses had had a life that was different from that of all the others” (Diop
147). This episode insinuates that Cornelius’s affirmation of his non-comprehension enables him
to move outside of his own interiority and cede attentive primacy to the scenes of annihilation
presented to him. It is this very self-decentering humility that is spotlighted when Cornelius
reflects on how “[h]e was surprised not to be thinking of anything in particular. He was satisfied
to look, silent, horrified” (Diop 146).
This attentive ethos also enables Cornelius to become alert to the different scales that the
festering wounds inflicted by the genocide inhabit. Where before he had naïvely assumed that
“the events of 1994 had left no visible traces anywhere” (Diop 49) and that, since he “couldn’t
even remember seeing any injured or mentally ill people during his walks. … the country was
intact” (Diop 49), in paying more attention to the legacy of the genocide, Cornelius gradually
becomes sensitive to the varying pitches in which the cries of pain echo through Rwanda. He
learns how Rwandan infrastructure also bore the brunt of the violence, such that the Murambi
Polytechnic school, for instance, was left half-built and thus, for a long time, would be unable to
fulfill its mission of educating Rwandan children; he notices how the memories of unspeakable
atrocities swell into his friends’ silences; he becomes sensitive to how survivors’ lives are still
deathlike, evinced when he eventually admits, “after such an ordeal, there was a little bit of death
in everyone” (Diop 181).
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Beyond becoming more externally attuned and attentive, acknowledging his ignorance
also motivates Cornelius to embark on a mission to learn more about the genocide by listening to
all that Siméon, Gerárd, and Jessica have to share with him—including his own implication in
the genocide through his father’s sanctioning of the massacre of the Tutsi refugees sheltered in
the Murambi Polytechnic school. Moreover, even as Cornelius becomes receptive to the
survivors’ accounts of the genocide, in centering his non-surmountable lack of comprehension—
in listening to understand more without ever presuming he can understand fully—Cornelius steps
away from demanding full transparency from the survivors, as indicated when he tells Gerárd:
“In this whole affair, everyone has his secrets. Keep yours for yourself” (Diop 162).
ADOPTING AN ILLIBERAL SECONDARY WITNESSING PRACTICE GROUNDED
IN NON-COMPREHENSION
Following the edifying lead of Boubacar Boris Diop’s Murambi, I advocate an intentional
foregrounding of one’s non-comprehension of suffering as a responsible illiberal secondary
witnessing practice that reader-secondary witnesses must adopt when engaging with testimonial
narratives. The affordances of such a secondary witnessing posture are many, as brought forward
by Diop’s novel.
When readers presume that they fully comprehend the harm proliferated by an act of
brutality by engaging with a testimonial account of it, they render such an event transparent and
accessible. Such a reading and secondary witnessing practice is one that seeks to ‘grasp’9—a
gesture that Édouard Glissant, in Poetics of Relation, describes quite literally in order to lay bare
its full implication: “the movement of hands that grab their surroundings and bring them back to

9

The word ‘comprehension’ derives from the Latin comprehensionem, which translates to ‘grasping, seizing, laying
hold of, arresting’. See “Comprehension” for a detailed tracing of this word’s etymology. This appropriative,
arresting connotation of ‘comprehension’ is also mirrored in ‘apprehend’—a homonym that at once functions as a
substitute for both the acts of comprehension and those of arrest/capture.
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themselves. A gesture of enclosure if not appropriation” (191–192). As Glissant’s description of
‘grasping’ emphasizes, presuming full comprehension of the suffering that testimonial narratives
attest to functions as a practice of appropriation, of domestication, of the reduction of the
complexity of these events and the ways in which testifiers and other survivors register them.
Engaging with testimonial texts in this way also takes shape as a secondary witnessing practice
that tends toward closure, toward finality, toward a readerly form of knowing that disallows the
possibility of further engagement, learning, and even response that might extend long beyond the
moments of direct textual contact.
On the contrary, affirming partial understanding of the suffering that testimonial texts
attempt to communicate about functions as an illiberal secondary witnessing practice that can
yield more accountable and capacious forms of readerly engagement. One of the most immediate
benefits of such a praxis—that grants obscurity by refusing the lure of a blustering, and rather
naïve, claim of comprehension—is that it prompts persistent curiosity. Curiosity takes many
forms10, as I briefly explored in Chapter Three of this dissertation, and it is not the curiosity that
once again seeks to render transparent and fully knowable that I gesture to here, but rather a
curiosity that attempts to learn more while always also acknowledging opacity. Christina León
describes this as a practice of “reading curiously for opacity” (184)—a form of humble
engagement that relies on “asking more and more questions, rather than statically finding
answers” (León 184); it is therefore a secondary witnessing practice that can be adopted by both
common readerly subjects and literary scholars.
The generative potential of this reading method—of remaining curious while also
granting opacity—emanates both from the force that these practices exert individually as well as

10

See Zurn, “Curiosity and Political Resistance” for a thorough inquiry into the various damaging and insubordinate
forms of curiosity that thinkers such as Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida have theorized.
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how each one keeps the other in check. On one hand, the praxis of curiosity motivates sustained
attunement and engagement with the atrocities that testimonial texts make palpable—it coaxes
reader-secondary witnesses to learn more about the event of harm and ask after the conditions
that facilitated its emergence; it encourages them to stay with the pain that they encounter in and
across testimonial texts, to continue to bear witness to the afterlives and legacies of atrocities, to
grapple with secondary witnessing as a longitudinal process rather than subscribing to the facile
fiction that injury ends when readers turn the last page of the testimonial narrative. On the other
hand, opacity acts as a guardrail for curious engagement—it “keeps curiosity open instead of
curating a curio of difference—a boutique of carefully placed and easily dismissed curiosities”
(León 185). As Glissant confirms, affirming opacity functions as an effective way of staying in
relation—it de-emphasizes the drive to dominate and instead offers up a de-hierarchized way of
remaining with people and acts of injury without reducing or co-opting them. In this way,
remaining curious while also granting opacity empowers reader-secondary witnesses to remain
with testifiers in partial, imperfect ways—it enables them to walk alongside testifiers and keep
them company as they testify to their wounds, without ever presuming that as reader-secondary
witnesses, they can, even for a second, step into the testifiers’ shoes themselves. Specialized
forms of reception and response—such as that of literary criticism—can also benefit from such
an illiberal reading-secondary witnessing practice. Doing the work of literary criticism in a way
that affirms non-comprehension—that is thus saturated in curiosity, even as it cedes opacity to
testifiers—holds the potential to take shape as the humble, experimental, radically open form of
inquiry and engagement that I urged in Chapter Three of this dissertation.
This affirmation of non-comprehension when reading and responding to testimonial
narratives may, at first, seem uncomfortably reminiscent of a shirking of responsibility, a
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neglectful turning away from tragedy, a return to the tendency to engage acts of wounding and
death-production through the spatial metaphor of distance that I indicted liberal discourses and
technologies for making commonsense in Chapter One of this dissertation. However, there is a
crucial distinction that I would like to make here. When I urge a readerly acknowledgment of
non-comprehension, it is specifically vis-à-vis the suffering and pain spawned by acts of torture
and/or genocide. I maintain that it remains absolutely imperative to reckon with the conditions
that make the acts of torture/genocide being testified to in these narratives possible in the first
place—a form of learning and understanding that the praxis of curiosity helps materialize. It is
for this very reason that Diop’s Murambi, even as it persuades reader-secondary witnesses to
move toward an acceptance of their non-comprehension of the suffering proliferated by the
genocide, meticulously explores past and ongoing French colonial-imperialist actions that
planted the seeds for the genocide and further delayed Tutsi healing by enabling the genocidaires
to evade retribution by escaping to neighboring countries.

Bearing illiberal secondary witness to testimonial narratives, as I explore it in this
dissertation, therefore emerges as a practice that requires reader-secondary witnesses to
constantly oscillate between understanding—arrived at by undertaking the painstaking labor of
sinking into and learning from the quiet metaphorical subtext of these testimonial utterances—
and an intentional affirmation of the limits of one’s understanding, specifically vis-à-vis the
multi-scalar suffering proliferated by acts of torture and/or genocide.
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